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BENCE PALFI, PHD IN PSYCHOLOGY 
BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF METACOGNITION IN COGNITIVE 
CONTROL 
SUMMARY 
 
Metacognitive theories of hypnotic responding, such as the cold-control theory, assert that 
people engage in strategies to create the experience requested by a suggestion (e.g., percept 
of something that is not present). This act is accompanied with the feeling of involuntariness 
due to a disrupted metacognition that makes suggestible people (highs) unaware of their 
intention to be engaged in the strategy. The presented research investigated predictions drawn 
from the cold-control theory focusing on the claim that hypnotic suggestions should not 
provide highs with any special abilities, since hypnotic responses are implemented by 
traditional cognitive control processes. In several experiments, the word-blindness suggestion 
(suggestion to see meaningless words in the Stroop task) was applied. The suggestion halves 
the extent of the Stroop interference when it is given to highs, posing a challenge to the 
metacognitive account of hypnosis and so providing a unique opportunity to test its 
assumptions. In addition, as the experimental usage of hypnosis requires offline screening to 
identify potential participants, I investigated whether it is possible to conduct the screening 
online to ease the costs of recruitment. Throughout this thesis, the Bayes factor was applied 
for hypothesis-testing. In the last chapter, a case  with a 2x2 design (a design that was 
frequently used in this thesis) is presented to demonstrate how Bayes factors with cut-offs of 
good enough evidence relate to the old inferential mistake of the neglect of the test of 
interaction. 
This thesis presents empirical evidence that responses to the word-blindness 
suggestion are not produced by the disruption of reading. First, the extent of the effect is 
influenced by the proportion of incongruent Stroop trials of the experimental blocks implying 
that the suggestion alleviates response competition whereas it does not de-automatise reading. 
Second, when highs are asked to use simple visual strategies, such as blurring and looking-
away, to reduce the Stroop interference, the pattern of results produced by the strategies are 
not in harmony with those of the word-blindness suggestion deeming it unlikely that highs 
use these strategies when they respond to the suggestion. This thesis also examines whether 
a voluntary act to imagine meaningless words is sufficient to reduce the Stroop interference. 
Consistent with the core idea of cold control theory, we found a positive correlation between 
the extent to which highs reduced interference in the volitional request and in the suggestion 
conditions. Nonetheless, the current strength of evidence is not good enough to conclude 
whether or not voluntary and hypnotic responses can reduce the interference to the same 
extent. The experiment comparing offline and online hypnotic screening demonstrated 
evidence supporting the notion that hypnotic suggestibility (measured via the SWASH) can 
be assessed online. Finally, different scenarios of a case study were presented to help 
researchers develop the right intuition on the issue of why Bayesian evidence for H1 in one 
group and Bayesian evidence for H0 in another group does not mean Bayesian evidence for 
the difference between the two by itself.  
  
4 
 
 
Declarations 
The thesis conforms to an ‘article format’ in which the middle chapters consist of discrete 
articles written in a style that is appropriate for publication in peer-reviewed journals in 
the field. The first and final chapters present overviews and discussions of the field and 
the research undertaken. 
 
Chapter 2 is written in the style of an article appropriate for Cortex. 
B. Palfi, B. A. Parris, A. Seth and Z. Dienes contributed to the study concept and design. 
B. Palfi performed data collection; B. Palfi performed the data analysis and interpretation 
under the supervision of Z. Dienes. B. Palfi drafted the manuscript, and all authors 
provided critical revisions. The preregistration and the materials of the study can be 
accessed at https://osf.io/7ma4t/. 
 
Chapter 3 is written in the style of an article (Report format) appropriate for Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 
B. Palfi, B. A. Parris, and Z. Dienes contributed to the study concept and design. B. Palfi 
performed data collection with the help of A. Collins (who used the data as part of his 
Msc thesis). B. Palfi performed the data analysis and interpretation under the supervision 
of Z. Dienes. B. Palfi drafted the manuscript, and all authors provided critical revisions. 
The preregistration and the materials of the study can be accessed at https://osf.io/bkweg/ 
and the preprint of the Manuscript submitted to JEP:HPP at https://psyarxiv.com/ej7w8/. 
 
Parts of Chapter 4 were accepted as a Stage 1 Registered Report at Cortex: 
Palfi, B., Parris, B. A., McLatchie, N., Kekecs, Z., &  Dienes, Z. (2018). Can 
unconscious intentions be more effective than conscious intentions? Test of the role of 
metacognition in hypnotic response. Cortex, (Stage 1 Registered Report). 
All the authors contributed to the study concept and design. The data of the Pilot study 
were collected by the students of Z. Dienes as part of student projects in 2013 and 2014. 
B. Palfi performed data collection of the Pre-registered Experiment with the help of N. 
  
5 
 
 
Mclatchie. B. Palfi performed the data analysis (both of the Pilot and Pre-registered 
Experiments) and interpretation under the supervision of Z. Dienes. B. Palfi drafted the 
manuscript, and all authors provided critical revisions. The accepted Stage 1 version of 
the manuscript and the materials can be accessed at https://osf.io/h6znt and at 
https://osf.io/d67u8/, respectively.  
 
Chapter 5 is published in Psychological Research as: 
Palfi, B., Moga, G., Lush, P., Scott, R. B., & Dienes, Z. (2019). Can hypnotic 
suggestibility be measured online?. Psychological Research, 1-12. 
All the authors contributed to the study concept and design. B. Palfi, and G. Moga 
performed the testing and data collection and B. Palfi performed the data analysis and 
interpretation under the supervision of Z. Dienes. B. Palfi drafted the manuscript, and Z. 
Dienes provided critical revisions. All authors approved the final version before 
submission. 
 
Chapter 6 was submitted as a revised version of an earlier manuscript to Advances in 
Methods and Practices in Psychological Science. 
B. Palfi performed the data analysis and wrote the script of the Shiny app with the 
supervision of Z. Dienes. B. Palfi drafted the manuscript and Z. Dienes provided critical 
revisions. The materials and the preprint of the manuscript submitted to AMPPS can be 
accessed at https://osf.io/xrctq/ and at https://psyarxiv.com/qjrg4/, respectively. 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part 
to another University for the award of any other degree. 
 Signature: ..................................................................................... 
 
  
  
6 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
First, I would like to thank my family for their support. Even if living all around Europe 
makes it difficult to see each other, I felt very much supported and loved by you. 
Thanks to Pete for helping me get my head around the who is who of hypnosis research 
and for sharing practical advice on how to minimise the nuisance involved with 
administrative duties and the recruitment of participants. Thanks to Lina for all the fun 
and useful conversations, for listening to my rants on the credibility crisis in 
psychology, and for correcting me when I misunderstood a theory. I`m very greatful to 
Balazs Aczel for encouraging me to pursue an academic carreer and for supporting me 
all the way during my PhD. I would like to express my thanks to Anil Seth for his 
advice and for the opportunity to join the Sackler Centre, a scientifc community, which 
is full of critical yet friendly people. Finally but most importantly, I would like to thank 
Zoltan Dienes for being an amazing supervisor, for guiding me in all ascpects of 
academia from how to ask the right questions to how to handle Reviewer 2. I will truly 
miss the Wednesday morning meetings.   
  
7 
 
 
Chapter I: Introduction 
General Introduction 
“In the summer of 1974, a 26-year-old Mayan villager lay drunk in a town square in the 
Guatemalan highlands. Suddenly he heard a voice that was to change the course of his 
life and that of his home town, Almolonga. “I was lying there and I saw Jesus saying, ‘I 
love you and I want you to serve me’,” says the man, Mariano Riscajche. He dusted 
himself down, sobered up and soon started preaching, establishing a small Protestant 
congregation in a room not far from the town’s ancient Catholic church.” (The Stand, 
2017).  
This story comes across as an unusual example of an auditory hallucination as it 
appears that the experience furthered the goals of the person who heard voices. In fact, 
this is not an isolated case. Hallucination like experiences that are socially appropriate 
and beneficial for the people sensing them have always been part of our lives. Throughout 
the history of humanity, these experiences appeared in various rituals. Some of these 
rituals are religiously motivated, such as the ones inducing spirit possession (Lewis, 
2003), whereas others focus more on individual thriving such as mesmerism or as it is 
called today, hypnosis (Khilstrom, 2008). The fact that these experiences are goal-
directed and appropriate to the social context in which they were sensed suggests that 
they are created by controlled rather than genuinely automatic cognitive processes. 
However, if these experiences are created by intentional cognitive control processes then 
why are they felt as if they just happen by themselves? How come the actors have no 
sense of voluntariness over their own responses? 
This thesis focuses on the cold control theory of hypnosis (Dienes & Perner, 
2007), which provides a simple mechanistic model explaining how an intentionally 
formed action can feel involuntary. The theory draws from the seminal consciousness 
theory of higher-order thoughts (Rosenthal, 1986; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011a) and applies 
it to intentional actions. In a nutshell, the cold control theory postulates that people have 
the ability to relinquish the higher-order thought of their intentions, which would create 
the conscious experience of volition, without affecting their first-order intentions, the 
intentions that are needed to perform a response. Therefore, according to the theory, 
hypnosis is about self-deception, and it is purely a metacognitive phenomenon. Although 
the theory was inspired by hypnosis, its reach goes far beyond that and its explanation 
can be applied to the phenomena mentioned earlier.  
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The primary aim of the thesis is to investigate a prediction of cold control theory 
that follows from the assumption about hypnosis being a metacognitive phenomenon. 
Cold control asserts that hypnotic responses cannot be more efficient in terms of 
implementing goal-directed behaviour than non-hypnotic responses, as the mere 
difference between the two is whether they are accompanied by the feeling of 
involuntariness or voluntariness. This assumption coincides with the idea that our 
conscious experiences (at least the conscious experience of voluntariness) and 
metacognitive processes creating them have limited functions. The thesis tests this 
hypothesis by investigating a specific hypnotic suggestion to which highly suggestible 
people can create responses that seemingly disconfirm the prediction of cold control (i.e., 
hypnosis seems to provide them with skills they do not possess outside of hypnosis). 
Understanding this suggestion is crucial to explore the boundaries of cold control theory 
and theories of cognitive control. The secondary aim of the thesis is to contribute to 
methodological and statistical advancements that can potentially facilitate hypnosis 
research and increase its credibility. An essential part of any hypnosis research is the 
screening of suitable participants, which is a time consuming procedure. This thesis 
advocates the usage of online hypnosis screening over offline screening to foster the 
conduction of large-scale hypnosis studies. In addition, as this thesis used 2x2 designs in 
several chapters and in many cases Bayesian evidence for H1 in one condition and 
Bayesian evidence for H0 in the other condition was expected, the last chapter focuses on 
explaining why the test of the interaction is essential in these cases to draw any 
conclusion.  
Cognitive control 
Contemporary (neuro)cognitive research uses cognitive control as an umbrella term for 
cognitive functions that allow us to implement and maintain goal-directed behavior even 
in the presence of distractors (Gratton, Cooper, Fabiani, Carter, & Karayanidis, 2018). 
According to many models of cognitive control, consciousness is intimately related to 
control functions and intentional behaviour (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986; Jacoby, 
1991). This relation is well demonstrated in the influential and simple model of cognitive 
control of Norman and Shallice (1986; cf. Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996; Cohen, Dunbar, 
& McClelland, 1990), which postulates a central control system rather than independent 
control functions. In their model, actions are directly activated by action schematas, which 
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are regulated by a hierarchical system of cognitive structures. The default and lower-level 
system called contention scheduling. Contention scheduling handles and implements 
action schematas once they are activated by external and internal cues. Action schematas 
can be compatible and incompatible with one another: in the former case, they facilitate 
each other, whereas in the latter case they inhibit one another. Contention scheduling is 
essentially responsible for automatic, habitual responses and it is mostly driven 
externally. The higher-level part of the system, the supervisory attentional system (SAS), 
monitors and controls the operation of contention scheduling and the action schematas. 
For instance, the SAS is capable of biasing the activation of certain schematas by either 
facilitating or inhibiting them in order to achieve a goal-directed response. The SAS 
operates via conscious control, and its functioning demands the creation of intentions. 
The SAS is needed to create flexible responses, for instance, to override habitual 
responses when they cease to be useful, and to plan and form novel actions. Finally, SAS 
requires attentional resources and it is not capacity-free like contention scheduling. 
Later, the link between intentional acts and consciousness was redefined as being 
putative that needs to be tested and backed by empirical evidence (Jack & Shallice, 2001). 
The vast majority of research investigating this putative link focused on the demonstration 
that unconscious information can activate the formation of intentional control processes 
(e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Dehaene, Lau, & Kouider, 2017; Kunde, Reuss & Kiesel, 
2012;  Lau & Passingham, 2007; Marcel, 1983; van Gaal, De Lange, & Cohen, 2012; 
contrast Crick & Koch, 1998; Van Gulick, 1994). However, theories of cognitive control 
(e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986) motivate research beyond the relationship of unconscious 
information and control such as questions aiming to unravel the relation of consciousness 
and intention, which lies at the core of volition and voluntary acts. This thesis presents a 
framework in which consciousness can be systematically decoupled from intentions 
without directly influencing the operation of the latter. First, however, I shall discuss the 
operationalisation of cognitive control.  
Measuring cognitive control: the Stroop task 
Cognitive control can be probed in interference paradigms where participants are exposed 
to task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli (or stimuli features) at the same time. The 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; for a review see MacLeod, 1991) is one of many interference 
tasks, and is considered as the gold standard of attentional measures (MacLeod, 1992). In 
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the Stroop task, the participants are asked to name the color of the presented word while 
they disregard the meaning of it. On congruent trials, the meaning and the color of the 
words are in accordance (e.g., RED displayed in red), whereas on incongruent trials, the 
meaning and the color of the words mismatch (e.g., RED displayed in blue). Generally, 
neutral trials in which the meaning of the word is not related to colors (e.g., SHIP) or in 
which the presented stimuli are meaningless characters (e.g., xxxx) are used as well in the 
task. Performance on the task is measured by the accuracy and RTs of the responses. Due 
to the conflict between the meaning and the color of the incongruent words, people 
produce the slowest RTs on incongruent trials. The classic Stroop effect is indicated by 
the RT difference between the incongruent and congruent trials, whereas the Stroop 
interference effect is the RT difference between incongruent and neutral trials.  
The Stroop task is considered to be an index of the conflict between automatic 
and intentional processes. The Stroop interference effect stems from the fact that the 
participants read the words and process the meaning of them despite the fact that reading 
is not part of the task requirements (cf., Tzelgov, 1997, Posner & Snyder, 1975). Word 
reading qualifies as an automatic process as it is independent of attentional resources and 
it cannot be brought under control (Brown, Gore, & Carr, 2002; Neeley & Kahan, 2001; 
Moors, De Houwer, 2006). Nonetheless, Stroop interference is a multicausal phenomenon 
(e.g., Stirling, 1979): the effect is manufactured partly by the conflict between reading 
and color processing (e.g., Hock & Egeth, 1970), and partly by the conflict emerging 
between different response tendencies (e.g., Morton, 1969). In other words, the conflict 
at the stage of information processing (more precisely semantic conflict) cannot account 
for the full effect of Stroop interference. While semantic conflict meets the strict criteria 
of automaticity, the response conflict component of Stroop interference is not completely 
resistant to controlled processes (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2014). For instance, the 
presence of humans (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012b), and substantial training (MacLeod, 
1991) decrease the extent of response conflict. These findings challenge the traditional 
and dichotomous view of automaticity regarding the response conflict component of the 
Stroop effect. A computational model of the Stroop task focusing on the response conflict 
component addressed this issue by re-defining automaticity and proposing that 
automaticity can be graded and that its features depend on the strength of processing 
pathways (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; cf. Logan, 1985; MacLeod & Dunbar, 
1988). This model presumes that the Stroop interference effect emerges due to the conflict 
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between automatic and controlled processes while the size of the effect relies upon the 
involvement of intentional control.  
Understanding consciousness as a metacognitive experience  
Metacognition was first defined as cognition about cognition (Flavel, 1979). It is a mental 
process with which one can monitor (and control) one’s own mental processes (e.g., 
Koriat, Ma`yan, & Nussinson, 2006; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Some theories of 
metacognition deem metacognitive processes as inherently conscious (e.g., Koriat, 
Ma`yan, & Nussinson, 2006), whereas other theories assert that many metacognitive 
processes are unconscious (e.g., Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali & Cleeremans, 2012). 
A popular group of theories that defines conscious experience as being an inherently 
metacognitive process is the higher-order thought theories of consciousness (Rosenthal, 
1986; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011a). There are several variants of the theory but they share 
the core idea that conscious experience can be altered by a simple change in higher-order 
representations even if first-order representations remain untouched. A higher-order 
thought (HOT) is a mental representation that refers to a first-order mental state. For 
instance, imagine having a first-order state about the world (e.g., “there is a tree”).  
According to the theory, one has no conscious experience of the world until they possess 
a HOT asserting one has the first order state (e.g., “I see that there is a tree”). According 
to HOT theories, it is the HOT that determines the conscious experience of the world and 
so the conscious experience can be altered by influencing HOTs. Importantly, conscious 
experience created by a HOT is not the same as self-consciousness or introspection 
(Rosenthal, 2000; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011b). To be introspective, one needs a third-order 
state (e.g., “I am aware that I see a tree”) making one aware of the conscious first-order 
state (i.e., of the second order state, which renders the first order state conscious). A 
second-order state without a third-order state referring to it is unconscious, because one 
is not aware of that second-order state. ` 
HOTs are not restricted to perception, they can refer to any mental state, including 
those with control functions (i.e., intentions). Hence, HOT theories assert that intentional 
control processes can exist in an unconscious form as well (cf., Jack & Shallice, 2002; 
contrast Norman & Shallice, 1986). A special case of the HOT theories, the cross-order 
integration theory (COI; Kriegel, 2007) assumes that first-order states and HOTs are not 
independent representations. They can bind together to a unified conscious representation 
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and by that casually influence one another. However, the mainstream theories of HOT 
assume that first-order states and HOTs are independent representations and that HOTs 
have limited or even zero function regarding affecting first-order states (Lau & Rosenthal, 
2011; Rosenthal, 2008). This assumption is particularly interesting for intentions as it 
implies that if a HOT of an intention can be replaced without altering the first-order 
intenion, then control functions can be just as efficient when they are experienced as 
voluntary and involuntary. 
Hypnosis 
Richard Feynman underwent hypnosis once during his time at Princeton. He entered the 
situation with a sceptical mind, suspicious that he will not experience anything special. 
However, he was labelled as a good subject based on a pre-screening procedure and was 
selected to participate in the live hypnosis demonstration, where he responded to all kinds 
of hypnotic suggestions. Feynman summarised his experiences as follows: “So I found 
hypnosis to be a very interesting experience. All the time you’re saying to yourself, “I 
could do that, but I won’t”—which is just another way of saying that you can’t.” 
(Feynman & Leighton, 1992, p. 58). This summary highlights the two distinctive features 
of hypnosis: 1) responses to hypnotic suggestions feel involuntary as if they happen by 
themselves, 2) hypnotic responses are goal-directed and the control lies with the hypnotic 
subject. These features might strike us as being incompatible, but many theories of 
hypnosis managed to explain both of them within a single model.  
Before turning towards the theories of hypnosis let us review the empirical 
evidence supporting the notion that hypnotic responses are not simply faked by the 
subjects and that the subjects genuinely experience involuntariness while being in control 
of their responses. The feeling of involuntariness, which accompanies hypnotic 
suggestions, is also called the classic suggestion effect due to being intimately tied to 
hypnosis and hypnotic responses (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980). Our knowledge of the 
subjects` influenced behaviour and altered sense of reality comes from observations of 
overt behaviour and administration of subjective reports of experiences. However, 
subjective reports and overt behaviour are simple to fake and one should assume that it is 
done, for instance, by participants who are motivated to fulfil the wishes of the 
experimenter. To test whether participants responses are fabricated to satisfy demand 
characteristics, Orne (1959) created the real-simulator design in which low suggestible 
  
13 
 
 
people are asked to go along with the suggestions as if they would be highly suggestible. 
Interestingly, highs respond to suggestions even when they believe that they are not 
observed anymore whereas simulators stop responding to suggestions once they assume 
that they are not observed (Kirsch, Silva, Carone, Johnston, & Simon, 1989; Orne, 
Sheehan, & Evans, 1968; Perugini et al., 1998). Furthermore, simulators and hypnotised 
people produce different electrodermal skin conductance responses when they report their 
subjective experiences of suggestions. Specifically, by using a criterion of truthfulness on 
the skin conductance responses, a study found that 89% of the hypnotised participants` 
and 35% of the simulators subjective reports can be identified as truthful indicating that 
hypnotised people do not simply lie about their experiences as simulators (Kinnunen, 
Zamansky, & Block, 1994). The credibility of subjective reports is also corroborated by 
the finding that there is a correlation between the “pain matrix” (Derbyshire, 2000) and 
the subjective reports of  fibromyalgia1 patients on the successfulness of a hypnotic 
suggestion in reducing pain (Derbyshire, Whalley, & Oakley, 2009). 
The second defining characteristic of hypnotic responding is that it is goal-
directed (Coe, 1978; Spanos, 1986; Spanos & Barber, 1974). In other words, hypnotic 
subjects cannot be suggested to act against their own will or interest, and their responses 
are always appropriate to the context, more precisely, to the subjects’ understanding of 
the context. For instance, a hypnotic suggestion per se is not sufficient to induce anti-
social behaviour unless the subjects believe that it is appropriate in the current 
experimental context (Weitzenhoffer, 1949). In addition, being motivated to participate 
in a hypnotic session and having positive attitudes about it correlate with the 
successfulness of hypnotic responses and with the strength of experiences (Spanos & 
Barber, 1974).    
Theories of hypnosis can be assigned into three categories: 1) theories not 
involving cognitive control processes, 2) special process theories of hypnosis2, 3) 
metacognitive theories of hypnosis. A prominent theory of the first category is the 
response expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985), which provides a unifying explanation for 
hypnotic responses and responses to placebos. The theory presumes a simple mechanism: 
                                                 
1 A long-term neuropsychological condition inducing pain all over the body 
2 This term usually reflects that a theory asserts a special hypnotic state, which facilitates responses to 
suggestions, however, here it is used in reference to theories assuming cognitive processes that are unique 
to hypnosis and hypnotic responding.  
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responses to suggestions are produced by expectations and beliefs. According to the 
response expectancy theory, hypnotic procedures are useful tools to influence the 
expectations of the participants, which in turn create the experiences of an altered reality. 
These experiences are sensed to be involuntary as they are not produced by intentional 
cognitive control processes, they are directly created by the expectations themselves, 
hence, they are truly unintentional. Nonetheless, measured expectations cannot fully 
account for the variance in hypnotic responding (Benham, Woody, Wilson, & Nash, 
2006; Shor, Pistole, Easton, & Kihlstrom, 1984). These results may be due to measure 
unreliability but they also pave the way to alternative, cognitive ability based accounts of 
theories of hypnotic responding. Cognitive ability based theories are not mutually 
exclusive with the response expectancy theory, there might be multiple factors at play 
producing responses to suggestions. 
Special process theories of hypnosis presume an innate mechanism that is 
specifically related to hypnosis and hypnotic responding (though innate, its operation in 
any given person may have environmental influences; Hilgard, 1970). The first modern 
theory of its kind is the neodissociation theory (Hilgard, 1977) that revitalized the idea of 
dissociation and was part of a more general theory of cognitive control. Hilgard`s model 
of cognitive control strongly resembles the one proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986) 
in that they both assume that automatic action tendencies compete with one another to 
take control over behavior, while a central, intention driven structure (the ‘executive ego’) 
can override these actions. According to neodissociation theory, hypnosis targets the 
executive ego and splits it into a conscious and (from the perspective of the first part) 
unconscious part by creating an amnesic barrier between the two. Behaviour can be 
initiated by any part, but monitoring is operated by the unconscious one, hence, responses 
to suggestions are intentionally initiated and goal-directed but experienced as involuntary. 
The dissociated control theory (Bowers, 1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994) asserts that due 
to hypnosis one can dissociate controlled and automatic processes allowing external cues 
(i.e., the suggestions) to directly trigger automatic behaviours. In terms of the model of 
Norman and Shallice (1986), hypnosis targets the SAS and weakens its control over CS, 
hence, the suggestion can take control over habitual responses, which will be sensed as 
involuntary due to being genuinely unintentional. However, the idea that hypnosis 
dampens controlled processes and externally triggers automatic processes is challenged 
by the ample evidence supporting that hypnotic responding is created top-down (Terhune, 
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Cleeremans, Raz & Lynn, 2017). For instance, hypnosis does not deteriorate performance 
on the Stroop task as a model of general cognitive dampening would suggest (Jamieson 
& Woody, 2007). In addition, the phenomenon of self-hypnosis cannot be explained by a 
model assuming that hypnotic responding is solely driven by external cues (Kirsch & 
Lynn, 1998). The integrative model of dissociation theories (Woody & Sadler, 2008) 
asserts that dissociation due to hypnosis can happen between various cognitive processes: 
between cognitive control and subsystems of control (dissociated control), and between 
cognitive control and monitoring (dissociated experience). This latter mechanism 
assumes that hypnotic responding is controlled but it feels involuntary as monitoring is 
decoupled from the controlled processes. This mechanism resembles the one assumed by 
metacognitive theories of hypnosis, however, the metacognitive theories typically regard 
hypnosis as a non-special process. 
Theories from the sociocognitive tradition explain hypnotic phenomena as a 
metacognitive process in which hypnotic responses are delivered by general cognitive 
control processes. They stress the role of demand characteristics in forming the subjective 
experiences involved with hypnotic responding and describe hypnosis as “role playing” 
that is strategic and appropriate to the specific context (Comey & Kirsch, 1999; Sarbin & 
Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1986). According to the sociocognitive theories, motivation is 
fundamental in creating a response. Hence, subjects need to be convinced that behaving 
in line with the suggestion is in accordance with their goals. These theories assert that 
subjects volitionally engage in strategies to create the requested experiences (e.g., they 
divert their attention to reduce pain) while they manage to deceive themselves so that 
their actions feel involuntary. Nonetheless, these theories do not provide a clear cognitive 
model elaborating how one can make themselves believe that their action is not initiated 
internally. The neodissociation theory (Hilgard, 1977) offers a cognitive explanation for 
this by introducing the amnesic barrier. However, this model presumes the existence of a 
special, hypnosis-related mechanism as well as the division of the control structure, which 
results in simultaneous cognitive processing (Kihlstrom, 1997). These might be 
overcomplicated assumptions.  
A simple integration of the different theories is proposed by the cold control 
theory (Barnier, Dienes & Mitchell, 2008; Dienes, 2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007) as a 
synthesis of the sociocognitive and neodissociation theories. This theory draws from the 
higher-order thought theories of consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2005) 
  
16 
 
 
and offers a purely metacognitive approach to hypnotic responding that is compatible 
with the cognitive control model of Norman and Shallice (1986). Cold control theory 
posits that hypnotic responses are implemented by intentional cognitive control processes 
(e.g., by the SAS in the model of Norman and Shallice), the subjects produce first-order 
intentions that in turn create the behavior and experience requested by the suggestion. For 
instance, to experience the hallucination of a noise (e.g., the buzz of a mosquito), one has 
to have an intention to imagine that particular noise (e.g., an intention with the content 
“imagine a buzzing mosquito”). This means that subjects engage in intentional strategies 
just as it was proposed by both the neodissocaition theory (in that the SAS of the split off 
part can implement executive control) and especially the sociocognitive theories. This 
part of the theory explains how subjects play an active role in creating the response and 
why the hypnotic response is goal-directed. Outside of hypnosis, this response would 
simply feel as imagination as the first-order intention to imagine the buzzing mosquito 
would be accompanied by the HOT that one is intending to imagine it. Cold control theory 
posits that the mechanism by which this response becomes hypnotic (i.e., sensed as 
involuntary) is a process that allows people to replace the accurate HOTs about their 
intentions with inaccurate ones (Dienes, 2012). Sticking to the example about the 
hallucinated noise of a mosquito, one needs to form an inaccurate HOT about the first-
order intention (e.g. with the content, “I'm not intending to imagine a buzzing mosquito”) 
to experience the noise of the mosquito as perceived rather than as imagined. 
Consequently, cold control theory claims that the sense of involuntariness is an illusion. 
Hypnotic responses are only experienced as involuntary but  they are in fact products of 
intentional cognitive processes. The reach of cold control theory may go beyond the 
hypnotic phenomenon. There are various incidents in which people behave in a goal-
directed manner while they experience involuntariness regarding their own behaviour. 
For instance, cold control may be the underlying mechanism of spirit possession or 
channelling, automatic writing or glossolalia (Dienes & Perner, 2007).  
A central assumption of cold control theory is that one needs to be able to 
misattribute their intention to experience an act as hypnotic (i.e., involuntary). Hence, the 
theory predicts a negative relationship between accurate metacognitive monitoring 
(specifically the monitoring of intentions) and successful hypnotic responding. Indeed, 
individual differences in the tendency to generate inaccurate HOTs of intending are 
moderately associated with hypnotisability (Dienes, 2012). In addition, the temporary 
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disruption of brain areas associated with metacognitive functions enhances hypnotic 
responding (Coltheart et al, 2018; Dienes & Hutton, 2013; Semmens-Wheeler, Dienes & 
Duka, 2013). Other core assumptions of the theory are that hypnotic responses are created 
by intentional cognitive control processes and the sole difference between hypnotic and 
non-hypnotic responding is the nature of the accompanying HOT. An important 
prediction follows from these assumptions, namely, that subjects can create any response 
non-hypnotically that they can produce hypnotically.3 In other words, hypnosis cannot 
provide subjects with abilities that they do not possess outside of the hypnotic context. 
This is a controversial claim, many theorists and models of hypnosis argue otherwise 
(e.g., Brown & Oakley, 2004; Woody & Sadler, 2008). The empirical evidence in line 
with this prediction is overwhelming (e.g., Barber, 1966; Erdelyi, 1994; Levitt & Brady, 
1964; Nogrady, McConkey, & Perry, 1985; Milling, Kirsch, Meunier & Levine, 2002; 
Spanos, 1986), however, there are some phenomena that might call into question this idea. 
Here, I only present one of these phenomena, the word blindness suggestion effect. This 
effect poses the greatest challenge for the investigated prediction of the cold control 
theory. Other challenging phenomena and the corresponding counter arguments are 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
The word blindness suggestion instructs subjects to see the words during the 
Stroop task as a meaningless foreign script (Raz, Shapiro, Fan, & Posner, 2002). When 
this suggestion is given to highly (or sometimes moderately) suggestible people, they can 
halve the Stroop interference effect compared to a control condition in which they are 
instructed to not try to make the words meaningless (Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2013). 
This word blindness effect has been replicated by several independent labs (Augustinova 
& Ferrand, 2012; Casiglia et al., 2010; Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2012; Raz, Kirsch, 
Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006) and even with slightly different wording of the suggestion 
(Zahedi et al., 2017). The effect is particularly interesting as it is created by the reduction 
of incongruent RTs rather than the increase of neutral RTs making it unlikely that it would 
be the result of a simple hold back effect (MacLeod, 2011; Spanos, 1986; Zamansky, 
Scharf & Brightbill, 1964). Initially, it was proposed that this remarkable reduction is 
achieved by the de-automatisation of reading (Raz et al., 2002, 2006; Raz & Campbell, 
2011). This model posits that suggestion allows highs to take control over otherwise 
                                                 
3 Note that this prediction coincides with the idea that HOTs have limited or even zero capacity to directly 
influence first-order states (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2008). 
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automatic processes, and by influencing the neural processing of input words (i.e., 
hindering reading), the conflict can be evaded at an early stage of the process. As a 
competing model, the response competition account was put forward (Augustinova & 
Ferrand, 2012; Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2013). This model posits that reading is 
untouched by the suggestion and so semantic as well as response conflict emerges. The 
reduction in Stroop interference happens due to an enhanced conflict resolution that 
alleviates response conflict. The debate whether the word blindness suggestion helps 
subjects evading the conflict or resolving it is not settled yet as there is behavioral and 
neural evidence supporting both accounts. The relevant studies will be reviewed in more 
detail in the next Chapter that aims to investigate this matter in a behavioral experiment. 
The existence of the word blindness effect poses a challenge for the cold control theory 
and provides a great tool to understand the boundaries of the theory while raising several 
interesting questions. For instance, is there a voluntary way to reduce Stroop interference 
while mimicking the effect of the word blindness suggestion? More generally, does 
metacognition play a direct role in how well one can implement a first-order intention? 
Are there cases when an unconscious intention is more efficient than a conscious one? 
These are the main questions that the next three Chapters are striving to answer. 
Measuring individual differences in hypnotic suggestibility 
A well-established phenomenon within the field of hypnosis research is that there are 
substantial and reliable individual differences in the responsiveness to (hypnotic) 
suggestions (Hilgard, 1965; Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & du Chéné, 2008; Piccione, 
Hilgard, & Zimbardo, 1989). Basically, all contemporary theories of hypnotic responding 
are consistent with this observation, although they provide different explanations for it. 
For instance, cold control theory presumes that individual differences in responsiveness 
to suggestions are mostly shaped by the ability to monitor one's own intentions (Dienes 
& Perner, 2007); dissociation theories link responsiveness to dissociative mechanisms 
through which one can weaken executive control or create temporal unawareness of 
control processes (e.g., Brown & Oakley, 2004); while according to the response 
expectancy theory, responsiveness is defined by the beliefs and expectations of the 
individuals rather than by their cognitive skills (Kirsch, 1985).4 
                                                 
4 Note that all theories acknowledge that individual differences in responsiveness stems from multiple 
factors. For instance, motivation or cognitive skills such as imagination are needed to create the experience 
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The magnitude of individual differences in responsiveness is so remarkable that 
some people barely respond to any of the suggestions (lows), whereas others can easily 
create responses to the most difficult suggestions as well (highs) such as the auditory or 
visual percepts of things that are not present. Due to this, undertaking experimental 
hypnosis research requires the pre-screening of people in order to identify highs who can 
potentially create the suggested experience and lows who can be deemed as controls. The 
development of scales particularly focused on the improvement of three factors: 1) how 
to reduce the cost of the administration or how to make the procedure easier, 2) how to 
align measures with contemporary theories (e.g., Terhune & Cardena, 2016; Woody & 
Barnier, 2008), 3) how to improve the measurement properties of the scales. One of the 
first modern standardised scales is  the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale: Form A 
(SHSS:A; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959). Since the publication of SHSS:A, more than 
30 standardised scales have been developed and published in peer-reviewed journals 
(Acunzo & Terhune, 2019). Some of these are completely unique but the majority of the 
scales are updated versions of earlier ones. For instance, the SHSS:A quickly went 
through several modifications and a group version, the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility Form A (HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1963),  was created a few years after its 
publication to speed up the identification of highs and lows. The most recently published 
scale is the Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotizability (SWASH; Lush, Moga, McLatchie, 
& Dienes, 2018), which is a modified version of the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Susceptibility (WSGC; Bowers, 1993). The alterations were motivated by 
multiple reasons. For instance, the shortening of the induction procedure was justified by 
theoretical as well as practical reasons (i.e., quicker administration). The administration 
of the SWASH is very simple, it does not even require the experimenter to interact with 
the participants during the screening, as the script containing the induction and the 
suggestions are audio-recorded and played to the participants (Lush, Scott, Moga, & 
Dienes, 2019). Nonetheless, there is still room for improvement. For example, online 
measurement of hypnotic suggestibility would further reduce recruitment costs and it 
would facilitate the application of more heterogeneous samples (see Chapter V); or scales 
                                                 
of a percept that is not present. However, these theories diverge in how they explain the emergence of the 
feeling of involuntariness, which is a crucial constitute of a hypnotic responding. Hence, they hold different 
assumption on what specific cognitive ability or mental state plays the most important role in determining 
responsiveness. 
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that measure responsiveness to suggestions with multiple-trials rather than with a single 
trial would increase the precision of measurement (Acunzo & Terhune, 2019). 
Two reasons to use the Bayes factor instead of frequentists statistics to draw 
conclusions from the results 
Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) became the orthodox way of how 
experimental psychologists test their hypotheses and make inferences based on their 
results (Fisher, 1925; Neyman & Pearson, 1933). NHST operates through the calculation 
of the famous (or infamous) p-value, which is the probability that we observe a specific 
effect size or an effect size that is more extreme while assuming that the null effect is true. 
This tool provides us with a simple rule on when should we reject the null hypothesis 
(i.e., psychologists usually apply the threshold of .05), and allows us to control the long-
term error rates of our decisions. Nonetheless, NHST bore heavy criticism based on 
multiple grounds, it was challenged from a philosophical point of view (e.g., Dienes, 
2011; Wagenmakers, 2007) as well as due to the misuse and misinterpretation of the tool 
by researchers (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2004; Greenland et al., 2016; John, Loewenstein, & 
Prelec, 2012). These issues, among several others, played a critical role in the emergence 
of the current credibility crisis of psychological science (for a detailed discussion of other 
factors and the potential solutions, see Chambers, 2017). For instance, NHST is an 
asymmetrical procedure, when one fails to reject H0, no conclusion follows as a non-
significant p-value can either indicate evidence for H0 or insensitive evidence. Due to 
this, many non-significant findings remained unpublished (i.e., publication bias; Sterling, 
Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995) creating the (false) impression that the vast majority of 
psychological phenomena are robust (c.f., Open Science Collaboration, 2015). This 
asymmetric nature of NHST can lead to other problems, such as the misinterpretation of 
non-significant tests as clear evidence for the null (Aczel et al., 2018; Hoekstra, Finch, 
Kiers, & Johnson, 2006) or the invalidation of conclusions due to optional stopping 
(Armitage, McPherson, & Rowe, 1969). 
An alternative tool for hypothesis-testing, the Bayes factor (Jeffreys, 1961), has 
been proposed as a remedy for many of the issues regarding NHST (Dienes, 2011, 
Wagenmakers et al., 2011). Importantly, using the Bayes factor requires the researchers 
to ask fundamentally different questions than they would do when using the NHST. In a 
nutshell, NHST allows us to control the long-term error rates of our decisions (i.e., 
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rejecting the null hypothesis), whereas the Bayes factor offers a more intuitive approach 
to hypothesis testing. It allows us to calculate and continuously update the probability of 
a theory in light of new evidence by comparing the predictive ability of two competing 
models (for more information on the anatomy and calculation of the Bayes factor, see 
Chapter VI). Nonetheless, here, I am arguing from a pragmatic point of view for the 
application of the Bayes factor and present two reasons why it was more beneficial for 
the purpose of the current thesis to use it instead of NHST. First, one can discern evidence 
for the null from insensitive evidence with the Bayes factor. Second, the Bayes factor 
retains its meaning regardless of the applied stopping rule, allowing researchers to 
conduct sequential analyses without invalidating their conclusions.  
Frankly, inferring the null is possible within the frequentist framework as well, 
for instance, by applying equivalence-testing (Lakens, McLatchie, Isager, Scheel, & 
Dienes, 2018; Schuirmann, 1987). This tool requires the researcher to specify the lower 
equivalence  and the upper equivalence that define a null region containing effect sizes 
that are not meaningful for our alternative hypothesis. The upper boundary of this region 
is the smallest positive effect size of interest. To conduct the equivalence test, we need to 
run two one-sided significance tests assessing whether our data are consistent with the 
smallest effect sizes or not. Assuming that we observed a smaller effect size than the 
upper bound and our test is significant as well, we can reject the alternative hypothesis 
predicting positive effect sizes. If we can reject the alternative hypothesis predicting 
negative effect sizes as well, then we can assert equivalence, or in other words, we are 
left with the null (region) hypothesis. One might wonder if the assertion of null is possible 
within the realm of significance testing then why do we need a fundamentally different 
approach to draw conclusions about the null? A rather mundane reason is that the 
predictions of current psychological theories are vague and one can hardly ever pinpoint 
the smallest effect size of interest. It is difficult to imagine a psychological theory that is 
consistent with a standardized effect size of 0.20 but it is not consistent with 0.10. The 
Bayes factor evades this problem as it allows us to draw a conclusion about a point null 
hypothesis (Dienes, 2014).5 All we need for this is a model of H0 (which can be a point-
null or a null region model) and a model of H1 that represents the effect sizes that are in 
                                                 
5 This remains true as long as the Standard Error (SE) overlaps with a range of negligible effect sizes. For 
instance, extremely large sample sizes can create so narrow SEs that result in Bayesian evidence for H1 
against H0 even if the observed effect size is meaningless.  
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accordance with our pet theory. The latter should be less challenging than identifying the 
smallest effect size of interest. For instance, findings of earlier studies or contextual 
knowledge (features of a measurement tool such as its boundaries) can be applied to 
define the values that are consistent with a model (for a range of heuristics, see Dienes, 
2019). This feature of the Bayes factor was utilized on many occasions in Chapters II-IV 
of this thesis. For instance, in Chapter IV, the prediction of cold-control theory could be 
corroborated by demonstrating evidence for the null when response times of two 
experimental conditions are compared. The possibility to accept the null is also crucial 
when one is aiming to equalise a confounding factor (such as expectations) in the two 
conditions, and it is generally important for studies of unconscious mental states as these 
studies usually aim to demonstrate that the participants were unaware of the presented 
stimuli or the goal of the experiment (Dienes, 2015). 
Another useful feature of the Bayes factor, which stems from the fact that it is 
assessing evidence for two competing theories, is that its meaning is independent of the 
stopping rule used during data collection (Dienes, 2016, Rouder, 2014). That is, optional 
stopping is not a problem for Bayesian statistics - we can do sequential analysis and check 
the results after every new participant without invalidating the meaning of the Bayes 
factor. As long as all relevant evidence is taken into account, the Bayes factor remains a 
valid measure of relative evidence regarding the compared theories. Optional stopping 
has many pragmatic advantages over fixed designs from which this thesis benefitted to a 
great extent. Using sequential analysis until we reach good enough evidence one way or 
another allows us to minimise the number of participants we need to recruit in order to 
draw conclusions. The recruitment of highly suggestible people comes with a high cost 
as to find a single potential participant, one needs to screen ten people on average. 
Provided that we find good enough evidence for H1 or H0 by using optional stopping 
earlier than by using fixed design (i.e., collecting data until we recruited as many 
participants as an a-priori sample size estimation suggested), we can spare a substantial 
amount of time (e.g., we do not need to screen several groups to find a few more highs). 
In addition, using NHST combined with fixed designs many times requires us to suspend 
judgment as, for instance, the obtained p-value was just above the pre-set threshold of 
.05. In these cases, we would need to run a completely new experiment to settle the matter. 
However, this is not an issue for Bayesians -  if we use the Bayes factor, we can continue 
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data collection until we deplete our subject pool and even then we can ask collaborators 
to continue the process for us so that we can get good enough evidence for H1 or H0.  
Aims of the thesis 
The primary aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of metacognitive processes over 
intentional control functions by testing predictions derived from the cold control theory 
of hypnosis. The thesis applies hypnosis as an experimental tool that provides an 
opportunity to examine altered sense of reality and feeling of involuntariness regarding 
intentional acts in a controlled yet rich context. The most crucial question tested here is 
whether an unconscious intention can be more efficient than a conscious one. Cold control 
clearly predicts that hypnosis (i.e., reduced metacognition over control functions) cannot 
directly influence intentional behaviour, hence, a finding in which unconscious intentions 
are shown to be more efficient than conscious ones would require the revision of the cold 
control theory. The secondary aim of the thesis is to contribute to methodological 
advancements that have the potential to increase the credibility of hypnosis research. 
Specifically, this thesis advocates the usage of online hypnosis screening, the appropriate 
way of Bayesian hypothesis testing in 2x2 designs.  
Chapter II  presents two experiments providing a test of whether there is a negative 
relationship between the efficiency of the word blindness suggestion (i.e., extent of Stroop 
interference) and the proportion of incongruent trials of the experimental blocks. 
Supporting evidence for this phenomenon would imply two things. First, it would 
disconfirm the notion that word blindness suggestion deteriorates visual input during the 
Stroop task (de-automatisation of reading account) and it would support the response 
conflict resolution account of the word blindness suggestion. Second, assuming that 
hypnotic responding can be deemed as unconscious control (i.e., control without the 
feeling of voluntariness and effort), the results would corroborate the idea that cognitive 
conflict, indexed by the proportion of incongruent trials, plays a crucial role in the 
activation of control processes regardless of the form of the accompanying HOT over the 
intention. As a secondary interest, the conscious experience of word meaninglessness was 
measured via subjective reports. It was predicted that highs experience more meaningless 
words after the suggestion than in the control condition. As an exploratory question, we 
tested whether the conscious experience of meaninglessness is related to the reduction in 
the Stroop interference due to the suggestion. 
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Chapter III raises the question of whether the effect of the word blindness 
suggestion can be recreated via simple vision, attention or goal-maintenance related 
strategies. Cold-control theory asserts that changes in first-order states in hypnosis are the 
product of engagement in strategies. Hence, highs who reduce Stroop interference when 
they respond to the word blindness suggestion are expected to be engaged in a strategy or 
in multiple strategies. Three criteria were defined that a strategy must meet to be qualified 
as a plausible underlying mechanism of the suggestion: 1) reduce Stroop interference, 2) 
speed up RTs of incongruent trials, 3) affect solely the response conflict component and 
not the semantic conflict component of the Stroop interference effect. This question was 
tested in two experiments. In addition, the first experiment tested whether the extent to 
which a strategy reduces Stroop interference is related to hypnotic suggestibility 
measured by the SWASH. Cold-control theory assumes that hypnosis is a purely 
metacognitive phenomenon, hence, it predicts the lack of a relationship.  
Chapter IV presents a test of the idea that hypnosis is a purely metacognitive 
phenomenon. This notion follows from the cold control theory, which states that hypnosis 
solely affects the HOT of intending and therefore it should not provide abilities to subjects 
that they do not possess outside of the hypnotic context. A Registered Report, which was 
informed by a pilot study, compared the performance of highs on the Stroop task when 
they responded to the word blindness suggestion and when they responded to a volitional 
request to imagine that the word are meaningless throughout the task. Cold control 
predicted that highs should reduce Stroop interference to the same extent in suggestion 
and the volition conditions (after controlling for the effect of expectations), while they 
experience involuntariness in the first condition and voluntariness in the second one.  
Chapter V investigated whether the online assessment of hypnotic suggestibility 
is feasible and whether the offline procedure could be replaced by an online one so that 
the amount of time required to identify low and high suggestible people could be 
substantially reduced. Students, who completed an offline SWASH (Lush et al., 2018) 
screening as part of one of their modules, were invited to undertake the screening for a 
second time and they were randomly assigned to either an offline or an online group. To 
assess whether the online measurement is viable, the raw SWASH scores and 
psychometric properties of the offline and online measurement were evaluated and 
compared. It was required from the online measurement that it provides appropriate 
psychometric properties, that the scores of the online tool are consistent with the scores 
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of the offline one (i.e., a person scoring high offline should score high online), and that 
the online measurement does not create floor or ceiling effects. A secondary aim of the 
study was to estimate the extent to which the delay between the first and the second 
screening sessions can affect the raw scores or the psychometric properties of the 
measurement. 
Chapter VI aims to demonstrate that the adage that the difference between 
significant and non-significant is not necessarily significant by itself applies to Bayesian 
statistics just as it applies to NHST. This thesis used 2x2 designs in all chapters with 
hypothesis-testing (Chapters II-IV) and in many cases Bayesian evidence for H1 in one 
condition and Bayesian evidence for H0 in the other condition was expected. However, 
to properly test the predictions of the investigated theories, the test of the interaction must 
be conducted as well in these cases. The chapter serves as a tutorial and presents a case 
study with two scenarios to highlight the importance of the test of interaction in 2x2 
designs and to show that Bayesian evidence for H1 in one condition and Bayesian 
evidence for H0 in another condition does not necessarily indicate Bayesian evidence for 
the difference of the conditions. As a sideline to the primary goal, the chapter presents a 
simple rule with which researchers can calculate the “power” of their designs to find good 
enough Bayesian evidence for H1 or H0. 
  
  
26 
 
 
Chapter II: Does unconscious control depend on conflict? 
Introduction 
Cognitive control is the hallmark of human cognition as it allows people to achieve their 
goals, even in constantly changing environments, through processes of error monitoring, 
conflict resolution and response control. How people know when to intervene and activate 
control over their behaviour is a central question for cognitive science (Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). The conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004) provides a behavioural and neuropsychological 
account, according to which cognitive control can be triggered by the conflict of opposing 
responses, with this monitoring and evaluation process localised to the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC). In other words, humans are capable of activating and 
maintaining goal-directed behavior by constantly assessing task-demands in the form of 
the evaluation of response conflict. The theory has gained support from behavioural 
phenomena such as the Congruency Sequence Effect (CSE) and the Proportion 
Congruency Effect (PCE). These phenomena can be observed in various interference 
tasks, such as the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; see MacLeod, 1991, for a review), and their 
cornerstone is that people tend to adapt to incongruent tasks (trials in which two 
conflicting responses can be activated by the presented stimulus) owing to preceding 
conflicts (Botvinick et al., 2001). For example, the congruency effect (incongruent-
congruent trial performance) is shown to be decreased on trial n when trial n-1 is an 
incongruent trial compared to when it is a congruent trial (CSE; Duthoo, Abrahamse, 
Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014; Egner, 2007; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992).  
Moreover, the congruency effect is decreased in contexts where the proportion of 
incongruent trials is higher compared to contexts with lower proportions of incongruent 
trials (PCE; Bugg, 2012; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; 
Tzelgov, Henik & Berger, 1992). In both instances, incongruent trials are considered to 
be the index of conflict that eventually triggers cognitive control processes demonstrated 
by the enhancement of performance. 
Many models of cognitive control deem control processes to be inherently related 
to consciousness, particularly to the conscious awareness of one’s intentions (Jacoby, 
1991; Norman & Shallice, 1986). Empirical research called into question this putative 
link between control and consciousness by showing that control processes can be 
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activated by unconscious information about conflicting stimuli (Dehaene, Lau, & 
Kouider, 2017; Kunde, Reuss & Kiesel, 2012; Lau, 2011; van Gaal, De Lange, & Cohen, 
2012; van Gaal, Lamme & Ridderinkhof, 2010). Nonetheless, these studies did not 
challenge the premise that cognitive control is accompanied by the conscious feeling of 
effort and volition, and argued merely that the processing of conflict does not reach 
consciousness. Therefore, it is still unexplored whether the association between conflict 
and control holds when people experience involuntariness, the lack of intentions, 
regarding their own behavior. 
Building on the higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness (Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 1986, 2002), control processes can be labelled as 
unconscious, if the person who is acting cannot report on her intentions concerning the 
behaviour in question. HOT theories differentiate between mental states that reflect the 
external world (first-order mental states) and mental states about other mental states 
(second- or even higher HOTs). The theory postulates that one has to have a second order 
thought about the first order mental state to be aware of the first order state; therefore, 
having an intention, but lacking a HOT about it makes the intention unconscious. 
Possessing an inaccurate HOT about the intention can also indicate unconscious control, 
but it is not a necessary requirement. Here, we refer to involuntary, and so unconscious, 
control as a behavior derived from a first-order intent to act (e.g., with content “arm rise!”) 
that is either accompanied by a HOT about the lack of that intention (e.g., with content “I 
do not intend to raise my arm”) or is not accompanied by any HOT regarding the 
intention.  
Hypnotic responding can be understood as an instance of unconscious control, as 
its defining feature is the feeling of involuntariness that accompanies a usually mundane 
act such as raising one`s arm or hearing the tune of Happy Birthday (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 
1980; Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz & Lynn, 2017). Although  theories of hypnosis share 
the assumption that a hypnotic response feels like it is happening by itself, not all of them 
concur with the claim that the response is constructed by cognitive control processes. For 
instance, the response expectancy theory claims that expecting a behavior to happen can 
induce that particular behavior and so suggestions can be implemented without the 
involvement of intentional executive systems (Kirsch, 1985, 1997). Consequently, the 
theory assumes that behaviors following hypnotic suggestions feel involuntarily since 
they lack the intention and are driven by the expectation itself. This theory can partially 
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explain the effect of suggestions, however, it has been demonstrated that expectations 
cannot explain much variance in behavior (Benham, Woody, Wilson, & Nash, 2006), 
which may be due to measure unreliability but also leaves space for other, cognitive 
ability based models. Several theories, such as the sociocognitive (Comey & Kirsch, 
1999; Spanos, 1986) and dissociation theories (Bowers, 1990; Hilgard, 1977, 1991; 
Kihlstrom, 1985), emphasize that the subjects of hypnotic suggestions play an active role 
in creating the hypnotic response. By synthesizing these theories, the cold control theory 
offers a solution to how a strategic and intentional behavior can be sensed as involuntary. 
It posits that the key to responding hypnotically is to alter one`s monitoring of one's own 
intentions, thus, the feeling of involuntariness arises from possessing inaccurate HOTs 
about the intentions (e.g., “I am not intending to raise my arm”) and not from the lack of 
intentions (Barnier, Dienes & Mitchell, 2008; Dienes, 2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007). 
Hence, cold control theory postulates that a hypnotic response should be labelled as 
unconscious control. Although cold control theory provides a general explanation that 
suggestions are implemented by the involvement of executive functions, the mechanism 
by which control processes are activated, when the intentions are unconscious, is still 
unclear. 
The application of the word blindness suggestion (Raz, Shapiro, Fan, & Posner, 
2002; this term was coined by Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2012) offers a unique 
opportunity to investigate how unconscious control can be activated. The word blindness 
suggestion is an instruction for highly suggestible people (henceforth “highs”) that the 
words (i.e., stimuli of the Stroop task) will appear as a meaningless foreign script on the 
screen. The effect has been replicated by several independent research groups 
(Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Casiglia et al., 2010; Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2012; 
Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006), even with slightly modified wording 
(Zahedi et al., 2017), and it has been shown to be a reliable tool to halve the Stroop 
interference effect, as measured by the response time (RT) difference between 
incongruent and neutral trials (Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2013; See Table 1. for the 
results of a meta-analysis). Importantly, this reduced interference is not a consequence of 
participants slowing down on neutral trials in the suggestion conditions compared to the 
no suggestion conditions but it is the result of speeded responses on incongruent trials, 
making it unlikely that the enhancement of performance is faked (MacLeod, 2011). These 
studies attest to the robustness of the word blindness effect, however, the debate on the 
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underlying mechanisms of the suggestion remained unsettled between two classes of 
models. Distinguishing between these two competing models has broader implications 
than a mere understanding of the underlying mechanism of the word blindness effect. 
This issue is closely related to the main question of the current paper about the role of 
conflict in the activation of unconscious control.6 
The de-automatisation of reading model posits that the process of reading is not 
obligatory and it can be impaired or even hindered in a top-down way, by influencing the 
neural processing of input words (Raz et al., 2002, 2006; Raz & Campbell, 2011). 
Specifically, it assumes that the reduction of the Stroop interference effect, when the 
suggestion is active, is simply the result of a general impairing of the visual stimuli by 
which subjects cannot employ information about the meaning of the words, thereby, they 
experience congruent and incongruent trials as identical. Several studies provide evidence 
consistent with this model. First, it was demonstrated that the word blindness effect arises 
even when visual accommodation (e.g., visual blurring) and the usage of attentional 
strategies (e.g., looking away) are prevented (Raz et al., 2003) suggesting that a simple 
optical explanation cannot account for the phenomenon. Second, by applying the 
combination of neuroimaging methods (fMRI and EEG), Raz, Fan and Posner (2005) 
found that the suggestion mitigated the activity of the occipital cortex underscoring the 
idea that early visual information processing and not the operation of the visual sensory 
organs can be modulated by the application of the word blindness suggestion. In addition, 
a recent study using EEG showed evidence for increased theta-band and beta-band 
activity in the frontal-midline region in response to the activation of the word blindness 
suggestion, implying the increased involvement of top-down, cognitive control processes 
(Zahedi et al., 2017). This finding is in accord with the explanation of the de-
automatisation model that the suggestion dampens early visual processing by a top-down 
mechanism. Nevertheless, these data are also in line with other cognitive control based 
models. 
                                                 
6 Of note, the current study was not design to test the assumption of cold control theory (and several other 
theories of hypnosis) that responses to suggestions feel involuntary. We take this assumption for granted 
based on the abundant evidence from the field of hypnosis (e.g., Kihlstrom, 2008) and relying on another 
study demonstrating that highs and mediums report decreased control over the meaningfulness of the words 
in a suggestion condition compared to a no suggestion condition (Palfi, Parris, McLatchie, Kekecs & 
Dienes, 2018). 
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The response competition model proposes that the word blindness suggestion 
takes its effect at a later stage of the process, namely, at the level of response competition 
resolution (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2013). This model 
assumes that upstream information processing (e.g., semantic processing) remains mainly 
untouched by the suggestion and so word reading is not de-automatised. Hence, conflicts 
between word meaning and color can and will arise. According to the response 
competition driven model of word blindness suggestion effect, the resultant response 
competition is key in the application of the suggestion.  In accord with the prediction that 
conflict activates conscious cognitive control processes as portrayed in the conflict-
monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004), the 
response competition account argues that response competition triggers control processes 
required for the suggestion to take its effect. This is because the presence of response 
competition leads to an enhanced recruitment of control permitting the word blindness 
suggestion effect. Without response competition, for example when trials involve only 
semantic-associative conflict, the suggestion is not triggered, and the extra control 
permitted by the suggestion does not take effect.  
This model is also in accordance with the finding that cognitive control related 
brain activity increases in the suggestion conditions compared to no suggestion conditions 
(e.g., Zahedi et al., 2011), as response selection is a primary function of cognitive control 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001). A handful of behavioral studies have also provided evidence 
supporting this model. First, Augustinova and Ferrand (2012) compared the effect of the 
suggestion on a traditional and a semantic version of the Stroop task (Neely & Kahan, 
2001). The interference in the later version of the task is entirely the product of semantic 
factors (incongruent trials consist of words that are highly associated with colors but their 
font color does not match with it, such as sky presented in green) and it reduces conflict 
derived from response competition. Their results revealed that the word blindness 
suggestion could not reduce the interference effect on the semantic Stroop task, whereas 
it could mitigate the interference effect on the standard Stroop task, implying that not 
visual information processing but response competition is affected by the suggestion. 
Second, Parris, Dienes, and Hodgson (2013) analysed the distribution of the RTs of their 
earlier study by applying the ex-Gaussian approach7 and their results were in line with 
                                                 
7 The ex-Gaussian approach focuses on the distribution of the RTs and one of its parameters (µ, the mean 
of the Gaussian distribution) is known to be a useful tool for indexing response conflict (Steinhauser & 
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the view that the enhanced resolution of response competition is the underlying 
mechanism of the word blindness suggestion.   
At root, the two portrayed models of the word blindness suggestion have an 
opposing stance on how the suggestion itself, more generally unconscious control, is 
activated. The de-automatisation of reading model proposes that the suggestion can 
reduce Stroop interference by preventing the conflict from happening: if the meaning of 
a word is not processed then the conflict between the meaning and the color cannot occur. 
Consequently, the model assumes that conflict does not play an essential role in the 
activation of the suggestion. Alternatively, the response competition model suggests that 
conflict between the meaning and the color still emerges and the increased activation of 
control processes permits the influence of the suggestion. The latter position implies that 
the word blindness suggestion effect operates by somehow piggy-backing on existing 
control mechanisms.  
In order to disentangle these two models, we produced an experimental designs 
with altering levels of conflict from one block to another. Specifically, we manipulated 
the proportion of incongruent trials in the experimental blocks. By increasing the 
proportion of  incongruent trials one can raise the level of response conflict (e.g. Logan 
& Zbrodoff, 1979). When the proportion of incongruent trials is high, response 
competition occurs more frequently increasing the recruitment of control processes; under 
such conditions, the Stroop effect is reduced. When the proportion of incongruent trials 
is low, response competition occurs less frequently reducing the activation of control 
processes; under such conditions the Stroop effect is increased. If the word blindness 
suggestion effect is the result of top-down control over input words (as per the wording 
of the suggestion and Raz and colleagues’ conclusions) the proportion of incongruent 
trials should not affect the presence or magnitude of the effect. Alternatively, if the word 
blindness suggestion effect is dependent on the operation of mechanisms that control 
response competition, the effect should be larger when the proportion of incongruent trials 
is high (due to the enhanced activation of control processes). 
                                                 
Hübner, 2009; cf. White, Risko & Besner, 2016).  The ex-Gaussian function helps better exploit RT data 
and reveal effects which would remain hidden for the traditional analysis process (i.e., the exclusion of 
trials with prolonged RTs and aggregation of RT data in each condition can result in information loss for 
positively skewed distributions). 
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To supplement the analyses of the objective measures (RTs), we also assessed the 
conscious experience of word meaninglessness of the participants, and the expectations 
of the participants about seeing the words as meaningless characters by employing 
subjective reports. In a nutshell, we aim to discriminate between two accounts (de-
automatisation of reading vs. response competition) of the word blindness suggestion 
effect. If the response competition model is supported, the experiment addresses a key 
question raised earlier about the role of consciousness in cognitive control: When 
intentions are unconscious, what are the mechanisms by which control is triggered?  
Methods 
Participants 
We recruited 23 (21 females, M = 19.13, SD = 0.81) highs from the subject pool 
of the University of Sussex to participate in our experiment. The hypnotisability of these 
students was measured with the Sussex Waterloo Scale of Hypnotisability (SWASH; 
Lush, Moga, McLatchie & Dienes, 2018) on group screening session at the university. 
This scale is a modified version of the WSGC (Bowers, 1993), it is adjusted to be ideal 
for screenings with larger groups of people and it contains items for each suggestion 
assessing the subjective experiences of the participants. Students, whose hypnotisability 
score is in the top fifteenth percentile based on their composite score (arithmetic mean of 
the subjective and objective scores), were recruited via email to attend the experiment 
(this threshold is comparable with those of employed by other researchers in the field; 
e.g., Anlló, Becchio, & Sackur, 2017; Barnier & McConkey, 2004). Based on the 
preregistration of the project (see details below), the stopping rule was to cease 
recruitment when the Bayes factor of the critical test (see details below) reached good 
enough sensitivity (either below 1/3 or above 3) or when had run 20 participants. All 
participants were informed about the nature of the study and all of them signed the consent 
form before participation. After finishing the experiment, the participants were debriefed 
and received a payment of £7 or course credit. The Ethical Committee of the University 
of Sussex (Sciences & Technology C-REC) approved the study. 
Stimuli and apparatus 
The stimulus set of the experiment closely followed those of the stimuli used by 
Raz et al. (2002). The stimuli contained 4 color words (RED, BLUE, GREEN, YELLOW) 
and 4 neutral non-color words (LOT, SHIP, KNIFE, FLOWER). The displayed color of 
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the color words can be red, blue, green or yellow depending on the congruency type of 
the current trial. Each neutral word can be only presented in the colors to whose name it 
is not matched for length. For instance, the word LOT can be coloured in blue, green and 
yellow, but not in red. The words were written in upper-case font and their vertical size 
was 0.6 cm (visual angle of 0.5º from 65 cm) and their horizontal size varied between 1.3 
and 2.4 cm (visual angles of 1.146º - 2.115º). The stimuli were presented against a white 
background on a computer screen with a resolution of 1280x1024. The participants were 
able to indicate their answers about the displayed color of the words by pressing one of 
the following buttons on the keyboard: “V”, “B”, “N”, “M”. The Stroop task part of the 
experiment was run in Opensesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012). 
Design 
We employed a 2x2x3 within subjects design with independent variables: (i) 
presence of the word blindness suggestion (present vs. absent), (ii) proportion of 
incongruent trials in the current block (PI 10% vs. PI 80% where PI refers to the 
proportion of incongruent trials or simply proportion incongruence) and (iii) congruency 
type of the current trial (congruent vs. incongruent vs. neutral). The percentage of the 
neutral trials was held constant in all blocks (10%).  
Procedure 
Data collection was conducted in a small experimental room with the 
experimenter present. After providing informed consent, the participants were told that 
they will receive a hypnotic induction and a suggestion and that during the experiment 
they will be asked to report their subjective experiences and expectations about the effect 
of the suggestion. Next, they were informed that they will play a computer game where 
their task is to indicate the ink color of the word on the computer screen. They were asked 
to lay their left middle finger on V, left index finger on B, right index finger on N and 
right middle finger on M. The corresponding buttons of red, blue, green and yellow will 
be V, B, N and M, respectively. The buttons on the keyboard were neither color labelled 
nor marked. The importance of speed and accuracy were equally highlighted in the 
instructions (“Please respond as quickly and as accurately as you can.”). The participants 
were asked to focus on a black fixation cross that appeared in the middle of the screen 
and was replaced by a colored word after 500ms. They had 2000ms to indicate their 
answers, and after pressing one of the buttons, a feedback indicating the correctness of 
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their last answer appeared on the screen for 500ms (the word `CORRECT` or 
`INCORRECT` in black color). The interstimulus interval was 2000ms. 
Figure 1 shows the process of the administration of the experiment. As a first step, 
the participants received 36 practice trials (12 trials from each congruency type). 
Performance was not assessed in the training session and all participants continued the 
experiment after finishing the practice block by receiving a standard hypnotic induction. 
.The hypnotic induction was followed by a single question to measure the `depth` of 
hypnosis (Hilgard & Tart, 1966; “How deeply hypnotised are you?”; 0 – normal state, 1 
– relaxed, 2 – hypnotised, 3 – deeply hypnotised): . Next, we introduced the word 
blindness suggestion of Raz et al. (2002). To check the effect of the suggestion, 
participants were asked to rate the meaninglessness of a presented colored word on a 4 
point Likert scale (“How strongly do you experience the word as meaningless?”; 1 – 
completely clear, 2 – little unclear, 3 – unclear, 4 – completely unclear). Participants 
answering 3 or 4 received the deactivation of the suggestion and the de-induction, while 
participants choosing 1 or 2 heard the following script from the experimenter before the 
deactivation of the suggestion and the de-induction to help them achieve the full potential 
of their response to the suggestion: 
“Notice how as you look at the word on the screen, you can look at it with the 
meaning fading to the background of your mind. We have found even when people 
consciously experience some meaning after this suggestion, they still process the words 
differently at a deeper level. You know you are capable of not reading meaning fully, 
remember how you have zoned out while reading a book.” (Raz et al., 2002) 
After the de-induction, participants were asked again to report the depth of 
hypnosis they currently experience. Next, the participants engaged in four Stroop blocks: 
they received both types of blocks (PI 80% vs. PI 10%) with and without the suggestion. 
A clap activated and a double clap deactivated the suggestion. In each block, they received 
120 trials. The order of the trials within the blocks was randomly generated and the order 
of the four blocks was counterbalanced between the participants. Before each Stroop 
block, the participants were asked to rate on a 5 point Likert scale how strongly they 
expected that the words on the screen would be meaningless. After each block, 
participants were asked to report their subjective experience about the effect of the word 
blindness suggestion by indicating the percentages of the trials with clear and meaningful 
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words. The subjective experience of meaninglessness was assessed with four items each 
time. In addition, we also asked them to indicate their experience about the depth of 
hypnosis they experienced during the last Stroop block. For the exact questions and 
choice options see Appendix A. These questions and the options were read out by the 
experimenter and were provided on a paper for the participants. Finally, the participants 
were thanked for attending and debriefed. 
 
Figure 1. Flowchart depicting the four versions in which the experiment was conducted. 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four versions. The clap was used 
as a cue to activate the word blindness suggestion and the double clap was used to deactive 
the suggestion. The proportions of the incongruent, neutral and congruent trials in the 
PI80% and PI10% Stroop blocks were 80%, 10%, 10% and 10%, 10%, 80%, respectively. 
Data analysis 
Statistical analyses.  We conducted the data transformation and ran all analyses 
with the statistical software R 3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016). The R markdown script about 
data processing and the analyses can be retrieved from osf.io/pk2st. We had a within-
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subjects design and, therefore, we simplified all of our tests to direct comparison of two 
conditions so that they could be conducted by running paired t-tests or simple linear 
regressions. We define Stroop interference as the RT difference between incongruent and 
neutral trials, and Stroop effect as the RT difference between incongruent and congruent 
trials. To explore the relationship between the RTs, the subjective reports and 
expectations, we ran linear regressions and tested the slopes against zero.  In addition to 
the p-values, we calculated Bayes factors (Bs) and used them as a basis of decision 
making about the hypotheses. Moreover, to explore the extent to which the participants 
experienced being in a hypnotic state during the Stroop task, we conducted parameter 
estimation and reported the raw effect sizes (condition means) with the 95% Credibility 
Intervals (CIs). We calculated the 95% CIs by assuming a uniform prior distribution, thus, 
the values of the 95% CIs are numerically identical to the 95% Confidence Intervals. 
Bayes factor.   We used the Dienes and McLatchie (2018) calculator to compute 
the Bayes factor and extended it so that it can model the predictions of the alternative 
hypotheses (H1s) with a uniform distribution (See the R script of the calculator in 
Appendix B.). We employed t-likelihood function for each analysis and we set the degrees 
of freedom of the theory to 1010 so that the distribution of the likelihood function was 
comparable with a normal distribution. We report Bs as evidence for H1 over H0 in the 
following formats depending on the model of H1: BH(0, X) or BU[0, X)]. The H in the 
subscript indicates that we used a half-normal distribution and the U indicates that we 
used a uniform distribution to model the predictions of the alternative hypotheses. For the 
half-normal models, the first character within the brackets indicates that the mode of the 
distribution was zero and X stands for the SD of the distribution, which varied among the 
analyses. For the uniform models, the first value within the brackets is the lower limit of 
the distribution, which was zero in all cases, and X marks the upper limit, which differed 
across the analyses.  
We used half-normal models for the outcome neutral and crucial tests (i.e., 
analyses of RTs) as its application fits the scientific intuition that small effect sizes are 
more probable than large effect sizes; and we employed uniform distributions for the 
supporting and exploratory tests (all labelled as exploratory analyses in the 
preregistration) as we had no prior information about these questions. Nonetheless, a 
small effect size is more probable than a large one (Dienes, 2017), thus, we recalculated 
the Bs based on uniform distributions to test the robustness of their conclusions to the 
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shape of the distribution modelling the predictions of H1 (See Supplementary Materials 
for results). To determine the parameters of the models, we used two strategies throughout 
the analyses. When we had estimates of effect sizes from the relevant literature, we 
applied those as the SDs of the half-normal models. For instance, for the analyses of the 
Stroop interference, the Stroop and the Suggestion effects (difference in the reduction of 
the interference effect between no suggestion and suggestion conditions), we informed 
our models based on the meta-analysis of Parris et al. (2013, Table 1) who summarized 
the results of 7 studies on the word blindness effect. We used the means of the Stroop 
interference, the Stroop and the Suggestion effects, which are 62ms, 90ms and 64ms, 
respectively. In the absence of prior information about the expected effect size, we 
derived the parameters of the models from the maximum effect size (Dienes, 2014). For 
the analysis with half-normal models, we took the half of the maximum effect size as the 
SD of the distribution. For instance, we halved the SD that we used to test the Stroop 
effect and employed it as the expected effect size for the test of the proportion congruency 
effect (that is, the Stroop effect is expected to be smaller in the blocks with higher 
proportion of incongruent trials). For the analyses with uniform models, we took the 
maximum effect size as the upper limit and zero as the lower limit of the distribution. For 
example, to test the effect of suggestion on the self-report scales, we simply used the 
maximum value of the scale as the upper limit, and the minimum value of the scale as the 
lower limit of the uniform distribution. For the regression analyses, the maximum of the 
possible effect size was the perfect linear relationship between the examined variables 
(from the minimum of each scale to the maximum, e.g., 100/4 for the test of the subjective 
measures and expectations: the ratio of scales heuristic), therefore, we used 100/4 as the 
upper and 0 as the lower limit of the model of H1s. 
To distinguish good enough and insensitive evidence, we used the convention 
suggested by Jeffreys (1961), which is 3 for H1; and thus, by symmetry, 1/3 for H0. We 
also employed the evidence labels used by Lee & Wagenmakers (2013) to further 
differentiate between moderate (3< B <10 or 1/10< B <1/3) and strong evidence (B > 10 
or B < 1/10).  Finally, as the value of a B depends on the features of the distribution we 
choose to model the predictions of a hypothesis (e.g., the SD of the half normal 
distribution; Rouder, Morey, Verhage, Province & Wagenmakers, 2016; Rouder, Morey 
& Wagenmakers, 2016), we report Bayesian robustness regions (RR) to assess the 
robustness of the conclusions of the acquired Bs to the value of the applied SDs. The 
  
38 
 
 
robustness regions are notated as RR[x1, x2] in which x1 is the smallest SD of the model 
that would produce a qualitatively identical conclusion as the chosen SD (e.g., if the B 
was greater than 3 then the B calculated with x1 equals to or is slightly greater than 3), 
whereas x2 is the largest SD that would bring us to the same conclusion. 
Implementation of the preregistration 
 The protocol and the analysis plan were preregistered here https://osf.io/7ma4t/. 
The materials and procedure of the experiment closely followed those of that were 
determined in the preregistration. For the analysis, at a handful of steps, however, we 
deviated from this plan for either theoretical or practical reasons. First, consider our main 
hypothesis, which aimed to test whether a minimum amount of conflict is required to 
trigger the word blindness suggestion. We planned to use the extent of the Stroop effect 
as the index of conflict. However, based on a more thorough review of the literature (see 
introduction), we chose the proportion of incongruent trials as the index of conflict. Thus, 
the minimal required conflict hypothesis predicts that the suggestion should be more 
efficient in the high incongruence proportion blocks compared to the low incongruence 
proportion blocks. In addition, we tested the efficiency of the suggestion on the ability to 
reduce the Stroop interference effect rather than the Stroop effect as Parris et al. (2013) 
demonstrated in their meta-analysis that the suggestion affects the interference 
component of the Stroop effect robustly and the facilitation component (mean RT of 
neutral trials – mean RT of congruent trials) less often. In the main analyses. we also 
desisted from the usage of ratio scores (e.g., Stroop effect would have equalled to the 
congruent RTs divided by the incongruent RTs) to calculate the extent of the Stroop effect 
and employed the same procedure as other studies in the field of the word blindness effect, 
namely, the difference scores (e.g., Stroop effect equals to the difference of incongruent 
and congruent RTs, Stroop interference equals to the difference of incongruent and 
neutral RTs). Supplementary Materials presents the results with ratio scores; the pattern 
and conclusions are the same; in light of this, to aid the comparison of our results to other 
studies of the word blindness effect, we present the results of the difference score analyses 
here, and ratio scores in the Supplementary Materials. Second, we included an extra 
outcome neutral test to examine whether the manipulation of the proportion of 
incongruent trials successfully influenced the extent of the Stroop interference and Stroop 
effects in the different blocks (we expect larger effects in blocks with smaller 
incongruence proportions).  
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Results 
Data transformation  
Following Raz et al`s (2002) procedure, we excluded trials with errors and missed 
trials (8.09%). In addition, trials with response times (RTs) 3 standard deviations either 
above or below the mean (separately for each participant and experimental condition) 
were considered as outliers and omitted from all the further analyses (0.98%). In order to 
directly test our main hypothesis (three-way interaction of interference, incongruence 
proportion of the block and suggestion), we computed variables of difference scores. We 
calculated the extent of the Stroop interference (mean RT of Incongruent trials - mean RT 
of Neutral trials) in each block and suggestion condition.  
Outcome neutral tests: Was there a Stroop interference effect and did the 
proportion of incongruent trials influence the extent of Stroop interference? 
First, we confirmed that the latencies of the incongruent trials were the longest (M 
= 911 ms, SD = 146) followed by the neutral trials (M = 807 ms, SD = 113) and the RTs 
of the congruent trials were the shortest (M = 714 ms, SD = 112); see also panel A of 
Figure 2. There were Stroop interference (t(22) = 5.82,  p < .001, Mdiff = 104 ms, dz = 
1.21, BH(0, 62) = 6.97*103, RR[8, 3.18*104]) and Stroop effects (t(22) = 13.42,  p < .001, 
Mdiff = 197 ms, dz = 2.80, BH(0, 90) = 3.80*109, RR[10, 6.74*104]). Furthermore, the extent 
of the Stroop interference effect was influenced by the type of the block (t(22) = 2.94,  p 
= .008, Mdiff = 68 ms, dz = 0.61, BH(0, 31) = 11.78, RR[13, 691]). Panel B of Figure 2 shows 
that the interference effect was larger in the low incongruence block (M = 138, SD = 124) 
than in the high incongruence block (M = 70, SD = 74). There was an interaction between 
the extent of the Stroop effect and the type of the block (t(22) = 5.75,  p < .001, Mdiff = 
125 ms, dz = 1.20, BH(0, 45) = 1.58*103, RR[10, 3.79*104]). Finally, the extent of the Stroop 
effect was larger in the low incongruence (M = 260, SD = 111) than in the high 
incongruence block (M = 134, SD = 55).  
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Figure 2. Panel A represents the distribution of the RTs broken down by the congruency 
type of the Stroop trials indicating the size of the Stroop interference (difference of 
incongruent and neutral condition) and the Stroop effects (difference of incongruent and 
congruent conditions). Panel B the extent of the Stroop interference effect separately for 
the high and low proportion incongruence blocks. 
Crucial test: Is the suggestion more effective in the high incongruence than 
in the low incongruence block? 
We examined the main question of interest by comparing the extent to which the 
suggestion reduced the interference effect in the high incongruence and low incongruence 
blocks. The results showed supporting evidence for the effect of the block (t(22) = 1.86,  
p = .076, Mdiff = 74ms, dz = 0.39, BH(0, 64) = 3.30, RR[43, 101]) as the interference was 
diminished to a larger extent  by the suggestion in the high incongruence block (M = 
58ms, SD = 113) than in the low incongruence block one (M = -16ms, SD = 161). Separate 
analysis of the two blocks revealed that the suggestion worked only in the high 
incongruence block (t(22) = 2.46,  p = .022, Mdiff = 58ms, dz = 0.51, BH(0, 64) = 7.79, 
RR[15, 247]). There was anecdotal evidence that the suggestion did not lower the 
interference in the low incongruence block (t(22) = -0.49,  p = .629, Mdiff = -16ms, dz = -
0.10, BH(0, 64) = 0.34, RR[0, Inf66]). Figure 3 shows a violin plot of the word blindness 
effect broken down by the type of the proportion incongruence block. For an exploratory 
analysis on the influence of the suggestion on the facilitation effect (mean RT of neutral 
trials - mean RT of congruent trials) see the Supplementary Materials. Table 1 depicts the 
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descriptive statistics broken down by suggestion conditions and proportion incongruence 
blocks.  
Figure 3. The violin plot shows the distribution of the extent of the word blindness effect 
in the high and low proportion incongruence blocks separately. The black dots on the 
plots indicate the average response of a particular participant. 
Supporting test 1: Does the suggestion, the type of the block and their 
interaction influence subjects` experiences of word meaninglessness? 
The participants experienced more meaningless words in the suggestion than in 
the no suggestion condition for all four items (all Bs > 4.15). There was strong evidence 
for the absence of the main effect of block for all items (all Bs < 0.08). Finally, the test 
of the interaction between the type of the block and the suggestion showed moderate 
evidence for the null for Q3 and Q4 (Bs < 0.17) and indicated data insensitivity for Q1 
and Q2 (B equals to 1.13 and 0.47, respectively). Table 2 summarises the results of the 
statistical analyses. 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Response Times and Self-report Measures Broken Down by 
Suggestion Conditions and Proportion Incongruence Blocks 
  Low incongruence High incongruence 
Category Item (scale) No 
Suggestion 
Suggestion No 
Suggestion 
Suggestion 
Response 
times (RTs) 
Incongruent 
(ms) 
955 (225) 911 (187) 930 (178) 847 (152) 
Neutral (ms) 826 (150) 766 (131) 831 (149) 805 (152) 
Congruent (ms) 680 (121) 669 (92) 778 (171) 731 (127) 
Expectations Expecting the 
words to be 
meaningless 
(0-4) 
0.32 (0.63) 1.35 (1.16) 0.34 (0.66) 1.08 (0.76) 
Subjective 
experience of 
meaninglessn
ess 
Q1 (%) 80 (25) 61 (30) 86 (21) 55 (31) 
Q2 (%) 15 (23) 32 (27) 13 (24) 38 (30) 
Q3 (%) 17 (23) 32 (26) 16 (24) 36 (32) 
Q4 (%) 17 (26) 37 (30) 13 (19) 34 (30) 
Depth of 
hypnosis 
Experienced 
depth of 
hypnosis (0-3) 
0.57 (0.72) 0.93 (0.74) 0.46 (0.69) 1.00 (0.90) 
Note. The Standard Deviations (SD) of the means are shown within the brackets. Q1 is a 
reversed item compared to the other three subjective experience measures. 
Table 2. 
Results of the t-tests Investigating the Effect of Suggestion, Block and their Interaction on 
Subjective responses of meaninglessness 
 Statistics 
Item Predictor Mdiff 
(%) 
dz t p BU[0, 
100] 
RR 
Q1 Suggestion 25 0.91 4.38 < .001 196 5, 6.51*103 
Block 0 -0.02 -0.08 .936 0.04 13, Inf 
Suggestion*Block 12 0.43 2.09 .048 1.13 8, 339 
Q2 Suggestion 22 0.88 4.22 < .001 120 5, 3.99*103 
Block 2 0.17 0.83 .418 0.08 25, Inf 
Suggestion*Block 8 0.35 1.67 .110 0.47 0, 140 
Q3 Suggestion 17 0.56 2.67 .014 4.15 7, 138 
Block 2 0.12 0.58 .565 0.06 20, Inf 
Suggestion*Block 5 0.17 0.82 .420 0.17 52, Inf 
Q4 Suggestion 21 0.76 3.65 .001 33.66 5, 1.12*103 
Block -4 -0.22 -1.07 .294 0.02 7, Inf 
Suggestion*Block 0 0.01 0.05 .960 0.08 24, Inf 
 
  
43 
 
 
Supporting test 2: Does the suggestion affect subjects' expectations? 
The participants expected to have a stronger experience of word meaninglessness in the 
suggestion condition (M = 1.22, SD = 0.81) than in the no suggestion condition (M = 0.39, 
SD = 0.64), (t(36) = 3.85,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.83, dz = 0.80, BU[0, 4] = 50.71, RR[0.18, 67]). 
Exploration 1: Is there any relationship between expectations and the 
subjective experiences of the suggestion? 
In order to explore whether the expectations to experience the words as 
meaningless characters can predict participants` subjective experience of 
meaninglessness, we conducted linear regression analyses. We computed the raw 
regression slope in the suggestion and no suggestion conditions separately as well as the 
slope of the difference scores (ExpectationSuggestion - ExpectationNo Suggestion as a predictor 
and Subjective experienceSuggestion - Subjective experienceNo Suggestion as an outcome). In 
the no suggestion condition, the slope differed from zero for all items (all Bs > 3.97 and 
all bs > 13) apart from Q2 (B = 1.73, b = 10). In the suggestion condition there was strong 
evidence for Q1, Q2 and Q3 (Bs > 8.08*102and bs > 23) and the results were insensitive 
for Q4 (B = 2.54, b = 12). Lastly, the analysis of the difference scores revealed a positive 
relationship between expectations and subjective experiences for all four items (Bs > 
2.32*102 and bs > 16). Table 3 depicts the results of the regression analyses. 
Exploration 2: Is there any relationship between the objective responses and 
the expectations of the participants? 
Next, we investigated the link between expectations and objective responses, specifically, 
the extent of the interference effect in the high incongruence blocks (as we only found 
evidence for the presence of the word blindness effect in the high incongruence blocks). 
Similar to the previous analysis, we calculated the raw regression slopes in the suggestion 
and in the no suggestion conditions as well as for their interaction by running the analysis 
on the difference scores. The test of the slopes against zero revealed insensitive evidence 
in all cases. For the no suggestion condition (t(22) = 1.97,  p < .001, b = 57ms, β = 0.39, 
BU[0, 25] = 2.07, RR[0, 1.38*103]); for the suggestion condition (t(22) = 0.89,  p = .384, b 
= 20ms, β = 0.19, BU[0, 25] = 1.35, RR[0, 204]); and for the interaction of the conditions 
(t(22) = -0.02,  p = .987, b = 0ms, β = 0.00, BU[0, 25] =0.85, RR[0, 94]). 
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Table 3. 
Results of the Regression Models Predicting the Experience of Word Meaninglessness 
Based on the Subjects` Expectations 
 Statistics 
Item Condition b (%) β t p BU[0, 25] RR 
Q1 No 
Suggestion 
28 0.86 7.70 < .001 2.99*105 4, 8.30*104 
Suggestion 26 0.74 4.98 < .001 1.39*103 4, 2.76*104 
Difference 22 0.82 6.68 < .001 9.26*104 3, 6.40*104 
Q2 No 
Suggestion 
10 0.29 1.40 .177 1.73 0, 131 
Suggestion 23 0.71 4.63 < .001 8.08*102 4, 1.05*104 
Difference 16 0.66 4.04 < .001 2.32*102 4, 1.95*103 
Q3 No 
Suggestion 
19 0.57 3.14 .005 36.14 6, 352 
Suggestion 25 0.73 4.85 < .001 1.15*103 4, 1.84*104 
Difference 24 0.78 5.78 < .001 1.03*104 4, 6.38*104 
Q4 No 
Suggestion 
13 0.39 1.98 .063 3.97 10, 34 
Suggestion 12 0.34 1.68 .109 2.54 0, 196 
Difference 18 0.66 4.08 < .001 271 3, 573 
Note. The raw slopes are indicated by b, whereas the standardised effect sizes are 
indicated by 𝛽.  
Exploration 3: Is there any relationship between the subjective and objective 
responses of the participants? 
The logic of the analysis of the question whether the subjective reports of 
meaninglessness can predict the extent of the Stroop interference effect in the different 
conditions closely followed that of Exploration 1 and 2. The regression slopes in the no 
suggestion condition suggest that seeing more words as meaningless characters predict 
faster RTs (note that positive bs indicate reduction in RTs owing to the increase of the 
experience of meaninglessness), whereas the slopes in the suggestion condition and the 
slopes calculated from the difference scores depicted mixed results. The statistical 
analyses showed that the evidence is not enough in any case to come to a decision whether 
the experience of word meaninglessness can predict RTs. Table 4 summarises the results 
of the regression models. 
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Table 4. 
Results of the Regression Models Predicting Response Times Based on Subjects` 
Experience of Word Meaninglessness 
 Statistics 
Item Condition b (ms) β t p BU[0, 1] RR 
Q1 No Suggestion 0.57 0.11 0.53 .603 1.11 0, 6.61 
Suggestion 0.00 0.00 0.00 .998 0.65 0, 2.15 
Difference 0.07 0.02 0.11 .915 0.77 0, 2.72 
Q2 No Suggestion 0.64 0.15 0.68 .505 1.19 0, 6.81 
Suggestion 0.25 0.10 0.44 .663 0.91 0, 3.24 
Difference 0.38 0.11 0.50 .622 1.04 0, 4.51 
Q3 No Suggestion 0.93 0.21 1.00 .326 1.45 0, 9.82 
Suggestion -0.17 -0.07 0.32 .753 0.52 0, 1.63 
Difference 0.14 0.05 0.24 .813 0.80 0, 2.77 
Q4 No Suggestion 0.76 0.14 -0.64 .529 1.17 0, 1.27 
Suggestion -0.76 -0.29 -1.37 .185 0.33 0.98, Inf 
Difference -0.23 -0.07 -0.32 .754 0.63 0, 2.18 
Note. The raw slopes are indicated by b, whereas the standardised effect sizes are 
indicated by 𝛽. 
Discussion 
In the current study, we manipulated the proportion of incongruent Stroop trials 
across blocks, in order to influence the level of conflict and so to test whether the 
activation of the word blindness suggestion requires a minimum level of conflict. Our 
results revealed that highly suggestible people can reduce the Stroop interference effect 
(respond to the suggestion) to a greater extent in a Stroop task with high levels of conflict 
(high incongruence block), compared to a Stroop task with low levels of conflict (low 
incongruence block). This finding supports the response competition model (Augustinova 
& Ferrand, 2012; Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2013) of the word blindness suggestion, 
over the de-automatisation of reading model (Raz et al., 2002, 2006; Raz & Campbell, 
2011). The former model predicts that a minimum amount of conflict is necessary for the 
activation of the suggestion, whereas the latter assumes that the operation of the 
suggestion is independent of the registered conflict.  
Given the assumption of cold control theory (Barnier, Dienes & Mitchell, 2008; 
Dienes, 2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007) that the sole difference between hypnotic and non-
hypnotic responding is the form of the accompanying HOT of intending, our findings 
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imply that conflict plays a crucial role in the activation of unconscious control. This 
indicates that the conflict-monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & 
Carter, 2004) might be generalizable for unconscious control and the awareness of the 
intention may not be a requisite of this monitoring process. Coinciding with this view, 
Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson (2012) found that the word blindness suggestion is subject to 
the same time constraints as the CSE (Egner, Ely & Grinband, 2010), namely, shorter 
Response-Stimulus Interval (RSI, 500 ms) results in a stronger suggestion effect (stronger 
reduction in the interference effect) than a long RSI (3500 ms). To test the similarity of 
the mechanisms underlying the activation of regular control processes and the hypnotic 
response, they tested whether the congruency type of a trial can modulate the efficiency 
of the suggestion on a subsequent trial. They found no evidence for the idea that the 
suggestion reduces interference more strongly after an incongruent trial than after a 
neutral or congruent one. Nevertheless, the analysis of the traditional CSE effect revealed 
no evidence in either direction, implying that the design itself was not sufficient to test 
the effect of preceding conflict on the activation of control. Indeed, it has been 
demonstrated that in Stroop tasks that employ four colors and color words the emergence 
of a CSE effect is unlikely (Puccioni & Valessi, 2012). Future research could shed more 
light on whether hypnotic responding and so unconscious control can be triggered by 
recently registered conflict as well or it is only subject to the relative frequency of 
conflicting trials. 
The application of multiple experimental manipulations that affect the extent of 
the Stroop interference effect in tandem (i.e., the proportion of incongruent trials within 
a block and the word blindness suggestion) can necessitate a different analysis plan than 
a simple calculation of difference scores. Blocks with low proportion of incongruent trials 
tend to have a greater baseline of Stroop interference than blocks with high proportion of 
incongruent trials (PCE). Therefore, a three-way interaction with difference scores can be 
found even when the suggestion, for instance, halves the interference effect in both of the 
blocks. In this case, a difference score analysis would give the false impression that the 
suggestion is more effective in the low incongruence than in the high incongruence block. 
Using ratio rather than difference scores overcomes this issue as the test of the ratio scores 
would only be sensitive if the suggestion is proportionately more effective in one block 
compared to the other (e.g., interference reduces to its half in one block and to its quarter 
in the other block). Nonetheless, it worked out in our case that the ratio score analysis 
  
47 
 
 
yielded the same conclusion as the difference score analysis, because the largest 
differences occurred for the smallest baselines.. Thus, we reported the classical difference 
score analysis in the main paper so that our results can be directly contrasted to other 
studies of the word blindness effect and the dependent variable can be unambiguously 
interpreted (See the Supplementary Materials for the analysis of the ratio scores). 
Choosing one analysis specification over another can increase the researchers’ degrees of 
freedom exacerbating the rate of false-positive findings (Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 
2011). Multiverse analyses (Steegen, Tuerlinckx, Gelman & Vanpaemel, 2016) and 
specification curves (Simonsohn, Simmons & Nelson, 2015) can reduce the possibility of 
selective reporting and enhance the credibility of reported findings through an increased 
transparency of the consequences of the analytic choices.  
The participants` subjective reports of word meaninglessness differed in the 
suggestion and no suggestion conditions but, interestingly, they did not discriminate 
between the high and low conflict environments, implying that the subjective experience 
of meaninglessness is unrelated to the level of Stroop interference (see also Parris, Dienes 
& Hodgson, 2012). Nonetheless, these results proved to be dependent on the shape of the 
distribution used to model the predictions of H1, and the evidence for the null is 
insensitive when  a plausible  model favouring small effect sizes is contrasted to H0 
(Tables S2-S3, Supplementary Materials). Moreover, the direct tests of the link between 
the subjective experiences of meaninglessness and the objective scores of the Stroop 
interference reductions were all insensitive (with both uniform and half-Cauchy 
distributions) precluding any robust conclusion about the relation between the subjective 
experience of meaningless and Stroop reduction. Demonstrating support for the null 
hypothesis has proven to be challenging for experimental psychologists as the classical 
procedure of null hypothesis significance testing cannot provide evidence for the null 
even for a relatively large p-values (Fisher, 1935, Royal, 1997). Despite this, non-
significant tests are still frequently used to support claims about the absence of effects 
(Aczel et al., 2018). The application of the Bayes factor overcomes this issue by allowing 
us to assess the relative strength of evidence for two competing models (Dienes, 2014, 
2016), however, B depends on the shape and parameters of the distribution chosen to 
represent the predictions of H1 and H0 (Dienes, 2017; Rouder et al., 2016; Rouder, Morey 
& Wagenmakers, 2016). For instance, putting too much weight on large effect sizes when 
modelling the predictions of H1 could result in evidence for H0, but it is evidence against 
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only a vague model of H1, which precludes inference about theories (when there is 
information for the theory to be more precise). Thus, to make theoretically-motivated 
inferences based on Bs, one needs to ensure that the predictions of the theories under 
comparison are represented fairly by the models. This is the main reason why we refrain 
from drawing specific conclusions based on the Bs calculated with uniform distribution 
as a model of H1s. 
The impact of expectations 
The response expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985, 1997, Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Lynn, 
1997), emphasise the causal role of expectancies in the activation and modulation of 
responses (e.g., subjective experiences, behaviors) to suggestions. Our results are in line 
with this theory insofar as participants expected to see more meaningless words in the 
suggestion condition, compared to the no suggestion condition. Moreover, the difference 
of the expectations strongly predicted the difference of the subjective experiences of 
meaninglessness between suggestion and no suggestion conditions (for all four items), 
implying that the participants were able to produce the anticipated subjective responses.  
The evidence for the relationship between the expectations to see meaningless 
words and the capacity to reduce the interference effect was not decisive, since all 
regression analyses were insensitive. Nonetheless, it is important to note that our 
expectancy measures assessed word meaninglessness and not the experience of increased 
control. This difference might prove to be crucial as the current study provided further 
evidence for the notion that enhanced control over response competition, and not the de-
automatisation of reading, is responsible for the reduction of the interference effect. Thus, 
future studies should consider including a new item measuring the expected ease of 
naming the color of the words during the Stroop task. Acquiring sensitive data here would 
help us understand whether placebo-suggestions and imaginative suggestions can both 
modulate behavior by influencing expectancies (Kirsch, 1985, 1999). For instance, a 
recent study demonstrated that the Stroop interference measured as the difference 
between the accuracy on incongruent and neutral trials can be modulated by a placebo-
suggestion (persuading people that in the placebo condition the accuracy of their color 
discrimination will be enhanced), whereas an imaginative suggestion (a suggestion to 
imagine the ability of having an improved color perception) worded akin to the placebo-
suggestion did not modulate the Stroop interference (Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama, 
Slama, Caspar, Gevers, & Cleeremans, 2013). These results seemingly count against the 
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response expectancy theory, however, the participants in this study were not screened for 
hypnotisability and so only a fraction of them were highly suggestible; and it has been 
shown that only highs and mediums can respond to imaginative suggestions that help 
them enhance the resolution of response competition (Parris & Dienes, 2013). Therefore, 
additional inquiry is needed to address whether expectancies are reliable predictors of 
responses (i.e., performance on the Stroop task) not just to placebo-suggestions but to 
imaginative suggestions as well. 
Limitations 
It is to be noted that the current study used a specific sample, namely highly 
suggestible individuals, and so the finding that unconscious control can be triggered by 
conflict may not be generalizable to non-highs. In addition, we applied a single 
interference task and suggestion, which may also restrict the generalizability of our 
findings and so future research could aim to implement conceptual replications of our 
study by employing suggestions claimed to reduce the Flanker compatibility (Iani, Ricci, 
Gherri, & Rubichi, 2006), the Simon (Iani, Ricci, Baroni, & Rubichi, 2009) or the 
McGurk effects (Lifshitz, Bonn, Fischer, Kashem, & Raz, 2013). 
The most distinctive feature of a hypnotic response is the experience of 
involuntariness (Weitzenhoffer, 1980) and this sensation is also the key element of an 
unconscious control process (Dienes, 2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007). Although in the 
presented experiment, we did not gauge directly whether our participants were aware of 
their intentions to impair the meaningfulness of the words, in another study of ours, we 
have demonstrated that highs report reduced control over how meaningful the words 
appear to them when the word blindness suggestion was activated compared to the case 
when it was not (Palfi, Parris, McLatchie, Kekecs & Dienes, 2018). This finding 
underscores the idea that the implementation of this suggestion is accompanied by an 
inaccurate HOT about the intention and it is in accord with the interpretation of hypnotic 
responses to the word blindness suggestion as unconscious control processes. Future 
studies using (post)hypnotic suggestions as tools to examine unconscious control 
processes should consider collecting subjective reports measuring the extent to which 
participants experience involuntariness during the execution of the hypnotic response 
(e.g., Polito, Barnier, & Woody, 2013; Polito, Barnier, Woody, & Connors, 2014). 
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Conclusion 
In sum, the moderating effect of conflict on the operation of the word blindness 
suggestion demonstrates compelling evidence for the notion that the suggestion takes its 
effect on response competition rather than on semantic processing. This finding supports 
also the idea that conflict plays a crucial role in the activation of the word blindness 
suggestion by enhancing the recruitment of control processes. Hence, given the 
assumption that hypnotic responding is intentional and it is accompanied by the feeling 
of involuntariness, this study is the first to indicate that cognitive control with and without 
the awareness of intentions can be activated by the very same process, namely, the 
monitoring and registration of conflict as outlined in the conflict-monitoring theory 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). This explanation is in line 
with the view about the strategic nature of hypnotic responding (Spanos & Barber, 1974; 
Comey & Kirsch, 1999; Hilgard, 1977; Spanos, 1986) as it depicts a model in which the 
extent of the exerted control is determined by the demands of the environment, namely, 
by the difficulty of the current proportion incongruence block. Of interest is that the 
present results suggest that the suggestion does not operate according to the instructions 
in the suggestion itself. Participants are processing the words to the level of meaning 
acquisition and even if they report to perceive them as words of a foreign language or as 
gibberish, this experience of meaninglessness is not a consequence of a deteriorated 
reading ability. Instead, participants seem to understand the desired outcome and 
unconsciously simulate that outcome by operating over existing control mechanisms 
conferring a level of control in the Stroop task difficult to achieve by conscious means. 
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Chapter III: Strategies that reduce Stroop interference 
Introduction 
An essential feature of the human cognitive system is its ability to attend to and utilise 
goal-related stimuli while it ignores the distractors of the environment. The Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935; for a review see MacLeod, 1991) provides a window into selective 
attention and since its publication it has inspired many theories of attention and cognitive 
control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Cohen, Dunbar, & 
McClelland, 1990; Engle & Kane, 2004; Kalanthroff, Davelaar, Henik, Goldfarb, & 
Usher, 2018; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000). This task requires participants to name the 
displayed color of the presented words while they should disregard the meaning of the 
words. People produce the quickest responses on congruent trials in which the meaning 
of the presented word is in accordance with its displayed color (e.g., RED displayed in 
red), followed by the neutral trials in which the meaning of the presented words is 
unrelated to colors (e.g., LOT displayed in red). The slowest response times (RTs) can be 
observed on incongruent trials where the displayed color and the meaning of the words 
are not in harmony (e.g., RED displayed in blue). Performance on the task can be assessed 
by computing the RT differences between these experimental conditions. The Standard 
Stroop effect is the RT difference of incongruent and congruent trials, and it can be broken 
down to two components. Namely, the Stroop interference effect which is the RT 
difference of incongruent and neutral trials, and the Stroop facilitation effect, which is the 
RT difference of the neutral and congruent trials.  
 The Stroop effect is remarkably large, and many report experiencing the 
accompanying cognitive conflict during an incongruent trial (MacLeod, 1991). A long 
line of research has demonstrated that the Stroop effect is very robust, it persists despite 
long term training (e.g., MacLeod, 1998) and bringing it under control through the 
application of deliberate strategies is difficult (MacLeod, 1991). Whilst methods have 
been reported that result in reduced Stroop effects (De Jong, Berendsen & Cools, 1999; 
Besner, Stolz, Boutillier, 1997; Parris, Sharma & Weekes, 2007) all involve a 
manipulation of the stimulus context (e.g. coloring a single letter instead of all letters or 
decreasing the response-stimulus interval) so as to provide exogenous support to control 
mechanisms, and are thus not likely the consequence of deliberate, top-down control. 
Even financial rewards offered to increase motivation to perform well results in either no 
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effect on reaction times other than a general speeding up on all trial types (Krebs et al., 
2010; Veling & Aarts, 2010) or only small (~10ms) reductions of the Stroop effect (Krebs, 
Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010).  
One of the few exceptions to the robustness of the Stroop effect may be provided 
the by the word blindness posthypnotic suggestion (Raz, Shapiro, Fan, & Posner, 2002; 
Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2012). When the word blindness suggestion, a suggestion to 
see the words during the Stroop task as gibberish or meaningless characters, is given to 
highly suggestible people (henceforth highs), they can reduce and sometimes even 
eliminate the Stroop effect compared to the standard, no suggestion condition. This 
finding has been replicated by the original authors as well as independent labs (e.g., 
Augustinova & Ferrand 2012; Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2012; Parris & Dienes, 2013; 
Raz et al., 2003, 2005; Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006). The magnitude of 
the Stroop interference in the suggestion condition is usually half the size of the effect in 
the no suggestion condition (for a meta-analysis see Table 1 of Parris, Dienes & Hodgson, 
2013). Nonetheless, the influence of the word blindness effect on the facilitation 
component of the Stroop effect appears to be more volatile. Importantly, responding to 
the suggestion speeds up the RTs of the incongruent trials compared to the no suggestion 
condition as well as compared to the control group of low suggestible people. Hence, the 
effect is an interesting use of cognitive control that is not produced simply by holding 
back on neutral and congruent trials (thereby equalising RTs on all trials; MacLeod, 
2011). 
The question arises of what exactly happens when highs respond to this 
posthypnotic suggestion? Many of the theories of hypnosis concur that responding to a 
hypnotic suggestion involves top-down cognitive control processes and that the feeling 
of involuntariness, which is the central feature of the hypnotic phenomena 
(Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980), is the result of a deteriorated or relinquished metacognition 
(Bowers, 1990; Dienes & Perner, 2007; Hilgard, 1991; Kihlstrom, 1985; Spanos 1986; 
for a review see Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz & Lynn, 2017)8. Cold control theory takes 
                                                 
8 One exception to this is the response expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985, Kirsch & Lynn, 1997), which 
provides a clear explanation of hypnotic responding that does not involve altered metacognitive processes. 
The theory postulates that expectations, produced by hypnotic suggestions, are enough by themselves to 
create the experiences and behaviour of hypnotic subjects. The subjects feel these responses involuntary 
due to the processes being truly unintentional, as there is no need to involve intentional cognitive control 
processes. This theory is not mutually exclusive with the theories involving cognitive control and 
metacognitive processes. However, measured expectations do not fully account for hypnotic responding 
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reduced metacognition as the fundamental process of hypnotic responding. Specifically, 
it asserts that hypnotic responding is implemented by intentional control, the subjects 
engage in strategies to create the experiences described in the suggestion but they are able 
to alter their monitoring over their intentions and make themselves believe that they are 
not acting deliberately (Barnier, Dienes & Mitchell, 2008; Dienes, 2012; Dienes & 
Perner, 2007). The theory draws on the higher order thought (HOT) theories of 
consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2005) according to which a mental 
state becomes conscious by virtue of a higher order state referring to it. For instance, to 
create the experience of a buzzing mosquito, one can form the following first-order 
intention: “imagine a buzzing mosquito”. To be aware that one is engaged in imagination, 
one would need a second-order state that refers to the first-order state (i.e., “I intend to 
imagine a buzzing mosquito”). One can also create the experience of this noise without 
being aware of the first-order intention (i.e., “I do not intend to imagine a buzzing 
mosquito”), and in that case it would feel as if it happened by itself akin to the experience 
of hallucination. Importantly, this experience of involuntariness is what hypnotic subjects 
report about their behaviour when they respond to suggestions. Taken together, according 
to cold control theory, responding to a suggestion consists of engaging in a strategy to 
produce the experience described in the suggestion without being aware of using a 
strategy. From this assumption, it follows that the sole difference between a hypnotic and 
a non-hypnotic response is the form of the accompanying second-order state. Therefore, 
if one is capable of reducing the Stroop interference effect by responding to the word 
blindness suggestion, one should be able to do it by voluntary, non-hypnotic means as 
well, using the very same strategy that they used when they responded to the suggestion.  
To create the experience of meaninglessness and reduce the Stroop interference 
effect, subjects may use a specific strategy or they might engage in different strategies to 
achieve the same outcome (Egner & Raz, 2007). We review four unique strategies here 
that have the potential to be regarded as an underlying mechanism of the word blindness 
suggestion. The most straightforward candidate is the looking-away strategy. Subjects 
may divert their attention from the word so that they can easily process the color but not 
the meaning of the word, which can result in a reduced interference. Indeed, it has been 
                                                 
(Benham, Woody, Wilson, & Nash, 2006; Shor, Pistole, Easton, & Kihlstrom, 1984). These findings may 
be due to measure unreliability but they also give rise to alternative accounts such as the metacognitive 
theories of hypnotic responding. Therefore, in this paper we focus on the explanation and predictions of the 
metacognitive theories to understand the underlying mechanism of the word blindness suggestion. 
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demonstrated that lows can reduce the Stroop interference by diverting their attention 
from the words (Raz et al., 2003). However, Raz et al. (2002, 2003) argued that it is 
unlikely that highs engage in this strategy when they respond to the suggestion. First, 
subjects reported that they observed the words in all instances and that they claimed that 
they did not engage in any attention related strategies. Second, the experimental sessions 
were videotaped and independent judges were unable to distinguish between highs and 
lows based on their eye-movement patterns. Nonetheless, these arguments are not 
bulletproof. As stated earlier, it is the essence of hypnosis that when subjects respond 
hypnotically, they can engage in strategies without being aware of doing so (Dienes & 
Perner, 2007; Spanos 1986), hence, asking them whether they used any strategies may 
not be a sensitive way to explore the underlying mechanism of the suggestion. Moreover, 
human judges might not be able to pick up on eye-movement patterns, rather an objective 
criterion based on, for instance, the fixation time outside of the area of interest defined 
around the words, which could provide a more severe test of the strategy.  
A more subtle form of the looking-away strategy is when subjects focus their 
attention towards a single-letter or a portion of a letter of the word so that they can more 
easily name the color of the word. There is ample evidence that coloring only the last or 
the first letter of a Stroop word compared to the middle letter decreases the size of the 
Stroop interference effect (Augustinova, Flaudias & Ferrand, 2010; Besner et al., 1997; 
Parris et al., 2007; for a review see Flaudias & Llorca, 2014). Moreover, highs can 
respond more quickly on incongruent trials when this strategy is given to them in a 
hypnotic context (Sheehan, Donovan, & Macload, 1988; cf., Jamieson & Sheehan, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the Sheehan et al. study lacked a non-hypnotic strategy condition, hence, it 
is unclear whether the inclusion of hypnosis in the strategy condition did not increase the 
motivation and expectations of highs compared to the non-hypnotic baseline condition. 
The lack of appropriate control could create a “hold back” effect (Spanos, 1986; 
Zamansky, Scharf & Brightbill, 1964) in the non-hypnotic baseline condition as a way of 
satisfying demand characteristics.  
Another vision-related candidate strategy is blurring. Subjects may adjust visual 
accommodation (e.g., by relaxing of the muscles around their eyes) so that the image of 
the word does not fall on the retina. Blurring may help them prioritise the color of the 
word over the meaning. Raz et al. (2003) provided a test of this strategy by giving a 
pharmacological agent to highs to disrupt visual accommodation, or in other words induce 
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the state of cycloplegia. The subjects were exposed to 2 drops of 1% cyclopentolate 
hydrochloride and their vision was corrected by lenses so that they saw the words crisply 
during the Stroop task. Highs still decreased the Stroop interference effect when they 
responded to the suggestion compared to the no suggestion condition. One might 
therefore conclude that highs achieved the reduction by means other than visual blurring. 
However, this conclusion is conditional on the participants being in a state of complete 
cycloplegia. There was no outcome neutral test testing whether the participants had 
completely lost their ability to accommodate. The authors point out that residual 
accommodation can still occur, especially for younger participants, when this particular 
agent is used.  
Finally, there is evidence that subjects spontaneously resort to a strategy that 
involves the rehearsal of the task instructions, such as “focus on the color of the word” 
(Sheehan, Donovan, & Macload, 1988). Goal-maintenance has been shown to play a 
critical role in task performance in the Stroop task, therefore, a strategy that sustains an 
active goal representation might help participants mitigate Stroop interference (De Jong 
et al., 1999; Kane & Engle, 2003; Parris, Bate, Brown & Hodgson, 2012).  
The purpose of this project is to explore the underlying mechanism of the word 
blindness suggestion by testing whether any of these four strategies (looking-away, visual 
blurring, single-letter focus and goal-maintenance) could be one that highs use when they 
respond to the suggestion. To this aim, we designed a fully within subjects experiment in 
which participants undertook the Stroop task in five blocks: in four blocks they were 
explicitly asked to use one of the mentioned strategies and in one block they were told to 
not use any of these strategies. According to the cold control theory, if a strategy can be 
applied hypnotically to reduce the Stroop effect, it should be available and applicable 
non-hypnotically as well. Hence, the experiment was administered outside of the hypnotic 
context; in fact, no reference was made to hypnosis or to the word blindness suggestion. 
The prime test was whether each strategy could reduce Stroop interference. 
As a secondary analysis, we were able to test whether or not the efficiency of a 
specific strategy is related to hypnotisability beyond the effect of expectations and 
motivations conditional on a hypnotic context. Cold control theory postulates that 
individual differences in hypnotisability are grounded in differential metacognitive skills 
(which may or may not be limited to the domain of intentions). Consequently, lows and 
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mediums should be able to use a specific strategy just as efficiently as highs, when they 
are sufficiently motivated. If the results revealed a positive relationship between 
hypnotisability and strategy usage outside of the hypnotic context, the purely 
metacognitive account of hypnosis would need to be revised. To test this assumption, we 
recruited participants from a subject pool where the majority of the people were screened 
for hypnotic hypnotisability so that we would not need to disclose this hypothesis to the 
participants. The consent to link results to hypnotisability scores was acquired after the 
experiment; therefore, it is unlikely that they could associate the current experiment in 
any way with hypnosis or hypnotisability.  
The word blindness effect is a unique phenomenon in which highs can reduce the 
Stroop interference in a way that is not fully understood yet. Unravelling its mechanisms 
should allow testing of theories of hypnotic responding as well as theories of the Stroop 
effect and more broadly theories of cognitive control. 
Experiment 1  
Methods 
Participants.  We recruited 78 participants from which 57 (mean age = 19.61, SD 
= 1.47, females = 51) had been screened for hypnotisability with the Sussex-Waterloo 
Scale of Hypnotisability (SWASH; Lush, Moga, McLatchie & Dienes, 2018). As we 
specified in the pre-registration, we excluded the data of those who did not have a 
SWASH score from all of the analyses. The experiment was advertised for first and 
second year psychology students of the University of Sussex who finished a module 
earlier in which they had the opportunity to participate in a hypnosis screening session. 
High and low hypnotisability were defined as scoring in the top and bottom 15% of the 
SWASH, respectively. We calculated the cut-off a priori based on the composite 
(objective and subjective) SWASH scores of all the first and second year students in our 
database. The cut-off for highs was 5.35 whereas the cut-off for lows was 2.00 (on a scale 
of 0 to 10). From the 57 participants, 10 were high, 39 medium and 8 low hypnotisables. 
The participants were proficient readers of English and they attended the experiment in 
exchange for course credits. All participants gave their informed consent before the 
experiment as well as after the experiment when we revealed that we wished to correlate 
their performance with their hypnotisability scores. The Ethical Committee of the 
University of Sussex approved the study. 
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Stimuli and apparatus.  In order to aid comparability of the current experiment 
and the experiment of Raz et al. (2002), the stimuli closely followed those used by Raz et 
al. (2002). The stimulus set included 4 types of color words (RED, BLUE, GREEN, and 
YELLOW) and 4 types of neutral words (LOT, SHIP, KNIFE, and FLOWER). The 
congruent trials consisted of color words presented in colours matching the meaning of 
the words (e.g., RED in the color red). The incongruent trials were color words displayed 
in colours mismatching the meaning of the word (e.g., RED in the color blue). The color 
and the neutral words were frequency and length matched. All words were written in 
upper-case font and presented against a white background. The vertical visual angle of 
the stimuli was 0.5º, while the horizontal visual angle of the stimuli lied between 1.3º and 
1.9º depending on the length of the word. The distance between the participants` eyes and 
the computer screen was approximately 65cm. The response keys used in the experiment 
were “V”, “B”, “N”, “M” for the colours red, blue, green and yellow, respectively. The 
keyboard buttons were not colour-labelled. The experiment was produced in and run by 
the software Opensesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) on a computer with a 
screen resolution of 1366 x 768. 
Design and procedure.  The study had a 3x5x3 mixed design with the 
independent variables of the congruency type of the trial (congruent vs. neutral vs. 
incongruent), the strategy used in the conditions (no strategy, looking-away, blurring, 
single-letter focus, goal-maintenance) and hypnotisability (low, medium or high)9. The 
proportion of congruent, neutral and incongruent trials was equal (33%) in each. The 
order of conditions as well as the order of the Stroop trials (144 per condition) were 
randomised across participants. 
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room with the experimenter present and 
only one participant at a time. After providing their informed consent to the study, the 
participants engaged in a practice Stroop task (36 trials). The participants were instructed 
to lay their left middle finger on “V”, left index finger on “B”, right index finger on “N” 
and right middle finger on “M” while undertaking the Stroop task. The participants were 
instructed to focus at fixation cross and retain their focus the centre of the screen during 
the Stroop task. After 1500ms, the fixation cross was replaced by one of the Stroop words 
and remained on the screen for 2000ms. Finally, a feedback (“CORRECT” or 
                                                 
9 Note that hypnotisability was measured as a continuous variable and we created groups using cut-off 
described in the Participants subsection of the Methods section. 
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“INCORRECT”) flashed in black on the screen and then a new trial started with the 
fixation cross. The response to stimulus interval was 2000ms. This sequence remained 
constant across all conditions. 
 Next, the participants undertook the five experimental conditions. The 
order of the conditions was randomly generated for each participant. In the no strategy 
condition, the participants were asked to not use any of the mentioned strategies, and to 
respond as fast and as accurately as they could. All of the strategy conditions started with 
a screen explaining the strategy they are asked to use on each trial. For the visual 
strategies, an example word was presented so that the participants could practice the 
strategy (See the Appendix C for exact instructions). Before the start of the condition, the 
experimenter asked the participants whether they had understood how to use the strategy 
and provided clarification on request. After each strategy condition, the participants were 
asked to report the percentage of the trials on which they managed to use the strategy 
(“What do you think, on what percentage of the trials did you use the strategy? Please 
answer with a number between 0 and 100.”). After finishing the last condition, the 
participants were thanked and debriefed.   
Data analysis  
Statistical analyses.  We conducted all of our analyses with the statistical 
software R 3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016). We calculated difference scores for the RTs so 
that we were able to directly test all of our hypotheses with Bayesian paired t-tests 
(comparing two conditions or testing whether a regression slope is different from zero) 
or Bayesian independent t-tests. Note that we did not run any omnibus tests (e.g., F test 
including all five conditions at a time) as it would not be informative in respect of 
hypotheses of the current project. We reported p-values for each statistical test, but we 
used the Bayes factor (B) to draw conclusions. 
Bayes factor. We applied the R script of Dienes and McLatchie (2018) to 
calculate the Bayes factors. This calculator has a t-distribution as a likelihood function 
for the data as well as for the model of H1. We set the degrees of freedom of the model 
of H1 to 10,000 in each analysis to have a likelihood function for the theory following a 
normal distribution. To calculate the B, one also needs to specify the prediction of the 
two models (H1 and H0) under comparison. Every tested hypotheses had directional 
prediction, hence we applied a half normal distribution with a mode of zero to model the 
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predictions of H1. We specified the distribution as a half-normal since it is in line with 
the assumption that smaller effects are more probable than larger effects (Dienes, 2014). 
We report Bs as BH(0, X), in which H indicates that the model is half-normal, the first 
parameter (0) indicates the mode of the distribution and the second parameter (X) 
represents the SD of the distribution. We used various strategies to define the SDs of the 
different H1s.  
Concerning the outcome neutral tests of the Stroop interference and the Stroop 
effects, we informed the SD of the model based on results of the baseline condition of a 
recent study of ours that used identical Stroop materials (Palfi, Parris, McLatchie, Kekecs, 
& Dienes, 2018). That is, the SD of the models were 60ms and 105ms, respectively. For 
the critical analysis, testing the efficiency of the strategies, we used 30ms, which is the 
half of the baseline Stroop interference. This value is based on the finding that the word 
blindness suggestion usually halves the baseline Stroop interference and we expect that a 
successful strategy should produce about the same effect size (Parris, Dienes & Hodgson, 
2013). Incidentally, this value is exactly the same that we would obtain by using the room-
to-move heuristic to define the maximum possible effect size, provided that the baseline 
Stroop interference is 60 ms (Dienes, 2019). The SD of the model predicting a positive 
relationship between hypnotisability and reduction in Stroop interference by strategy 
application was 5ms and it was based on the findings of Parris and Dienes (2013) who 
demonstrated a positive link between hypnotisability and the imaginative word blindness 
effect. In other words, H1 predicts that one unit increase on the SWASH aids the ability 
to reduce the Stroop interference using one of the strategies with about 5 ms. 
 In order to draw conclusions about the compared models, we used the convention 
of B > 3 to distinguish between insensitive and good enough evidence for the alternative 
hypotheses (Jeffreys, 1961). By symmetry, we used the cut-off of B < 1/3 to identify good 
enough evidence for the null hypothesis. To evaluate the robustness of our Bayesian 
conclusions to the SDs of the H1 models, we report a robustness region for each B, 
providing the range of SDs of the half-normal models that qualitatively support the same 
conclusion (using the threshold of 3 for moderate evidence for H1 and ⅓ for moderate 
evidence for H0) as the chosen SD10. The robustness regions are reported as: RR [x1, x2] 
where x1 is the smallest and x2 is the largest SD that gives the same conclusion.  
                                                 
10 Thanks to Balazs Aczel for this suggestion 
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Pre-registration 
The design and analysis plan of this experiment was pre-registered at 
https://osf.io/4z3xu. We closely followed the steps of the pre-registration when running 
the experiment and the analysis. Nonetheless, we added an analysis to the set of the crucial 
tests (Crucial test 1): the test of the efficiency of the strategies with all participants who 
had SWASH scores. This analysis is critical to demonstrate whether or not there is a main 
effect of successful strategy application irrespective of the participants` hypnotisability. 
We also included an auxiliary explorative analysis (Exploration 1). For the justification 
and interpretation of this analysis, see the discussion section of the first experiment. 
Finally, exploratory analyses assessing the strength of the relationships between self-
reports of strategy usage and reduction in Stroop interference are reported in the 
Supplementary Materials. 
Results 
Data processing.  We excluded the trials with errors from the analyses (8.2% in 
total from which 1.3% from the no strategy, 2.1% from the looking-away, 1.6% from the 
blurring, 1.7% from the single letter focus and 1.5% from the goal-maintenance 
conditions). Following the outlier exclusion criterion of Raz et al. (2002), we omitted 
trials with RTs that were 3 standard deviations either above or below the mean (1.2% of 
the correct trials from which 0.2% from the no strategy, 0.3% from the looking-away, 
0.3% from the blurring, 0.2% from the single letter focus and 0.2% from the goal-
maintenance conditions). 
Outcome neutral checks 1 (non-preregistered): On what percentage of the 
trials did the participants use the strategies? The conditions in descending order based 
on the means of the reported percentages of strategy usage: goal-maintenance (M = 86%, 
95% CI [82%, 90%]); looking-away (M = 83%, 95% CI [80%, 87%]); blurring (M = 
73%, 95% CI [68%, 78%]); and single-letter focus conditions (M = 66%, 95% CI [61%, 
71%]). 
Outcome neutral tests 2: Is there a Stroop interference effect in the No 
strategy condition?  As anticipated, the RTs in the no strategy condition were the fastest 
in the congruent trials followed by the neutral trials and then the incongruent trials (See 
Table 1 for condition means and SDs). The comparison of the incongruent and neutral 
trials yielded evidence for the Stroop interference effect (t(56) = 7.74,  p < .001, Mdiff = 
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78 ms, dz = 1.03 , BH(0, 60) = 1.49*108, RR[3, 2.76*104]). The contrast of the incongruent 
and congruent trials revealed evidence in support of the Stroop effect (t(56) = 11.73,  p < 
.001, Mdiff = 126 ms, dz = 1.55, BH(0, 105) = 2.23*1014, RR[4, 4.62*104]).  
Table 1 
Summary Table about the Means of the RTs (ms) in the five Strategy Conditions 
  Congruency type 
Strategy condition Incongruent Neutral Congruent 
No strategy 808 (127) 730 (101) 682 (94) 
Looking-away 815 (94) 802 (94) 771 (97) 
Blurring 821 (121) 776 (119) 739 (114) 
Single letter focus 880 (157) 812 (133) 766 (130) 
Goal-maintenance 804 (142) 726 (107) 689 (90) 
Note. The Standard Deviations (SD) of the means are shown within the brackets.  
Crucial test 1 (non-preregistered): Are the strategies effective in reducing the 
Stroop interference effect?  Using the data of all the participants we tested whether any 
of the four strategies decreased Stroop interference. Comparing the no strategy and 
strategy conditions revealed evidence for the effectiveness of the looking-away (t(56) = 
4.99, p < .001, Mdiff = 65 ms, dz = 0.66, BH(0, 30) = 3.93*103, RR[5, 2.05*104]) and the 
blurring (t(56) = 2.85, p = .006, Mdiff = 33 ms, dz = 0.38, BH(0, 30) = 20.05, RR[6, 365]) 
strategies. There was anecdotal evidence for no difference between no strategy and the 
single-letter focus (t(56) = 0.73, p = .469, Mdiff = 9 ms, dz = 0.10, BH(0, 30) = 0.73, RR[0, 
74]), and between the no strategy and goal-maintenance strategies (t(56) = 0.01, p = .993, 
Mdiff = 0 ms, dz = 0.00, BH(0, 30) = 0.38, RR[0, 34]). The Bayes factor of the latter two tests 
did not reach the level of good enough evidence. See Figure 1 for the distribution of the 
Stroop interference scores broken down by the experimental conditions.  
Interestingly, the mean RTs of incongruent trials in the looking-away and blurring 
conditions were numerically higher than that of the no strategy condition. We found 
evidence that neither of the looking-away (t(56) = 0.46, p = .647, Mdiff = -7 ms, dz = 0.06, 
BH(0, 30) =0.34, RR[0, 30]) nor the blurring strategies (t(56) = 0.86, p = .392, Mdiff = -13 
ms, dz = 0.11, BH(0, 30) = 0.27, RR[23, ∞]) reduced the RTs of incongruent trials.  
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Figure 1. Violin plot depicting the distribution of Stroop interference scores (ms) in the 
no strategy and in the four strategy conditions. Each black dot represent the Stroop 
interference score of a single participant.  
Crucial test 2: Can highs and lows employ the strategies to reduce the Stroop 
interference effect?  Is there any difference between the groups in this aspect? Highs 
managed to reduce the Stroop interference by using the looking-away (t(9) = 3.50, p = 
.007, Mdiff = 104 ms, dz = 1.11, BH(0, 30) = 19.66, RR[20, 1.49*103]) and the blurring 
strategies (t(9) = 2.22, p = .054, Mdiff = 81 ms, dz = 0.70, BH(0, 30) = 2.97, RR[0, 30]), 
although the latter test did not reach the conventional threshold of good enough evidence. 
We found data insensitivity regarding the effectiveness of the single-letter focus (t(9) = 
1.26, p = .238, Mdiff = 45 ms, dz = 0.40, BH(0, 30) = 1.69, RR[0, 431]) and the goal-
maintenance strategies (t(9) = 0.54, p = .605, Mdiff = 20 ms, dz = 0.17, BH(0, 30) = 1.05, 
RR[0, 182]). The pattern of results was similar for lows. Namely, there was evidence for 
the effect of the blurring strategy (t(7) = 3.37, p = .012, Mdiff = 70 ms, dz = 1.19, BH(0, 30) 
= 9.41, RR[15, 669]) and the raw effect size of the looking-away strategy was comparable 
to that of the highs (t(7) = 1.60, p = .154, Mdiff = 75 ms, dz = 0.56, BH(0, 30) = 1.88, RR[0, 
929]). The level of evidence regarding the single-letter focus (t(7) = 1.06, p = .324, Mdiff 
= 36 ms, dz = 0.38, BH(0, 30) = 1.48, RR[0, 307]) and goal-maintenance strategies (t(7) = 
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1.07, p = .322, Mdiff = 23 ms, dz = 0.38, BH(0, 30) = 1.40, RR[0, 202]) remained insensitive 
for the lows as well. Importantly, comparing lows and highs revealed data insensitivity in 
all four cases: looking-away (t(12.24) = 0.53, p = .605, Mdiff = 29 ms, dz = 0.25, BH(0, 30) 
= 1.09, RR[0, 261]), blurring (t(13.90) = 0.26, p = .797, Mdiff = 11 ms, dz = 0.12, BH(0, 30) 
= 0.92, RR[0, 149]), single-letter focus (t(15.91) = 0.19, p = .856, Mdiff = 9 ms, dz = 0.09, 
BH(0, 30) = 0.92, RR[0, 165]), and goal-maintenance (t(14.09) = - 0.08, p = .941, Mdiff = -3 
ms, dz = 0.04, BH(0, 30) = 0.79, RR[0, 117]).11  
 Crucial test 3: Is there a relationship between hypnotisability and the 
extent to which people can reduce the Stroop interference by the tested strategies? 
To this aim, we regressed the SWASH scores on the extent of the reduction in the Stroop 
interference by the strategies and tested the regression slopes against zero. Even though 
the raw regression slopes are comparable to zero, we did not gain good enough evidence 
for the null in any case. The raw regression slopes in descending order: blurring (t(55) = 
0.91, p = . 368, b = 1.74 ms/SWASH unit, β = 0.03, BH(0, 5) = 0.91, RR[0, 24]), single-
letter focus (t(55) = 0.11, p = . 920, b = 0.79 ms/SWASH unit, β = 0.01, BH(0, 5) = 0.92, 
RR[0, 23]), looking-away (t(55) = 0.06, p = .950, b = 0.49 ms/SWASH unit, β = 0.01, 
BH(0, 5) = 0.86, RR[0, 23]) and goal-maintenance strategy (t(55) = -0.11, p = . 911, b = -
0.81 ms/SWASH unit, β = -0.2, BH(0, 5) = 0.78, RR[0, 18]). Figure 2 depicts the 
scatterplots, regression slopes and their 95% Confidence Intervals for each strategy 
separately. 
                                                 
11 Note that we used the Welch t-test for these four comparisons as the groups had non-equal samples. 
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Figure 2. Scatterplots showing the relationship between hypnotisability (measured by 
the SWASH) and the reduction in the Stroop interference induced by the four strategies. 
The four panels indicate the Looking-away (Panel A), Blurring (Panel B), Single-letter 
focus (Panel C) and Goal-maintenance (Panel D) strategies. 
Exploration  (non-preregistered): What is the strength of the relationship 
between the extent of the Stroop interference and the general speed of the responses 
in each condition?  One way strategies might reduce Stroop interference is simply by 
changing overall RTs.  Pratte, Rouder, Morey, and Feng (2010) found that Stroop effects 
became smaller as RTs became smaller. Thus, a strategy may work by moving subjects 
along the regression line of Stroop interference (incongruent - neutral RTs) against RT 
(e.g. incongruent plus neutral RT).  The estimate of the slope in the no strategy condition 
was moderately strong and the values in the 95% CI show a positive rather than negative 
relationship between general speed and the magnitude of the interference (b = 0.13ms, 
95% CI = [0.04, 0.21], β = 0.36). Do the other strategies simply move along this line?  
The estimates in the looking-away (b = -0.003ms, 95% CI = [-0.11, 0.11], β = -0.01) and 
blurring strategy conditions (b = 0.01ms, 95% CI = [-0.07, 0.08], β = 0.03) were close to 
zero. Figure 2 depicts the three regression slopes separately with their 95% CIs. To 
compare the slopes, we conducted multilevel linear regression analyses estimating the 
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interaction of condition and general speed, while allowing different intercept for every 
subject. Contrasting the no strategy and looking-away conditions yielded a negative rather 
than positive slope and a fairly wide 95% CI nearly including zero (b = -0.13ms, 95% CI 
= [-0.26, -0.01]). The comparison of the no strategy and the blurring strategy yielded a 
negative slope as well (b = -0.11ms, 95% CI = [-0.22, -0.01]). Finally, the comparison of 
the two strategies revealed the slope to be reasonably close to zero (b = -0.01ms, 95% CI 
= [-0.14, 0.12]). 
 
Figure 2. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between general response speed (i.e., 
sum of incongruent and neutral RTs) and the extent of the Stroop interference effect 
separately for the no strategy condition (Panel A) and the two conditions in which the 
strategies managed to reduce the interference. Looking-away (Panel B) and blurring 
strategies (Panel B).  
Discussion 
In this experiment, we tested four strategies that putatively reduce the Stroop 
interference effect to examine whether any of these strategies can be the underlying 
mechanism of the word blindness suggestion. The crucial test of the strategies provided 
insufficient evidence either way for whether the single-letter focus or the goal-
maintenance strategies could mitigate the extent of the interference. On the other hand, 
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the looking-away and the visual blurring strategies passed the crucial tests and so there is 
evidence for them as plausible underlying mechanisms of the word blindness suggestion. 
These strategies aided the subjects to decrease the extent of the interference drastically 
for all levels of hypnotisability. Moreover, the blurring strategy approximately halved the 
extent of the Stroop interference (reduction of 33ms from the baseline of 78ms), which is 
precisely what the word blindness suggestion achieves in general (Parris, Dienes & 
Hodgson, 2013). However, as mentioned earlier, the word blindness effect has another 
distinctive feature: it realizes the reduction of the interference effect by reducing the RTs 
of incongruent trials (MacLeod, 2011; See Supplementary Materials Table S1 for a meta-
analysis of studies demonstrating the word blindness effect). Surprisingly, our results do 
not match this pattern, there is evidence that neither of the strategies managed to decrease 
the RTs of the incongruent trials (for the looking-away strategy as the corresponding B = 
0.34 was just above the conventional cut-off of B < 1/3). If this finding is robust, it 
challenges the idea that these strategies are the underlying mechanisms of the suggestion. 
Therefore, in the next experiment, we preregistered reduction in incongruent RTs as a test 
of the strategies. 
Another key characteristic of the word blindness suggestion is that it seems to 
reduce interference by attenuating response competition and not by de-automatising 
reading per se (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Palfi et al., 2018; Parris, Dienes & 
Hodgson, 2013; contrast Raz, Fan & Posner, 2005). Hence, the strategy that underlies the 
suggestion should not dampen the visual input of the meaning of the words; rather it 
should aid the subjects to handle response conflict between the competing response 
options. It is not clear, however, how looking-away or visual blurring would be in 
accordance with this notion. Nonetheless, the way with which the strategy takes its effect 
is testable by an experimental design in which the semantic and response conflict 
components of the interference effect are distinguishable. If the extent of the semantic 
conflict is identical in the no strategy and strategy conditions then one can conclude that 
the strategy leaves semantic processing and so reading itself untouched (for the original 
argument see Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012). Thus, we specify this outcome as a 
condition that needs to be met in the next experiment by the strategies to be deemed as 
plausible underlying mechanisms of the suggestion. 
Finally, in many cases, the word blindness suggestion impacts the RTs of neutral trials 
as well, and surprisingly, it reduces them (e.g., Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Parris et 
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al., 2012; Raz et al., 2002). This feature of the suggestion is completely in harmony with 
a strategy that condenses the interference by simply speeding up all responses. To test 
this notion, one can, for instance, compare the conditions in terms of the patterns of the 
relationship between the general speed of responses and the magnitude of the interference 
effect (cf., De Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Pratte, Rouder, Morey, & Feng, 2010). 
However, data of the current experiment suggest that this relationship is weak in the 
looking-away and blurring conditions, and it is strong in the no strategy condition. 
Nonetheless, our analysis was not pre-registered and so the findings need to be replicated. 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we aim to test whether the beneficial effects of the looking-
away and visual blurring strategies on the mitigation of Stroop interference can be 
replicated. Furthermore, we defined two conditions that the strategies ought to meet to be 
considered as appropriate underlying mechanisms of the word blindness suggestion: they 
need to reduce incongruent RTs and they should alleviate response conflict rather than 
semantic conflict. In order to test the latter assumption, we added non-response set 
incongruent trials to all of the experimental conditions. These trials consist of color words 
that are not part of the response set (e.g., brown) displayed in one of the colors of the 
response set. Therefore, responding to these types of trials should not involve response 
competition, and the non-response set interference (RT difference between non-response 
set incongruent and neutral trials) can be taken as an index of conflict that occurs during 
semantic processing (Klein, 1964; Sharma & McKenna, 1998).12 Henceforth, we refer to 
the non-response set interference effect simply as semantic conflict or semantic 
interference effect. Finally, we repeated the exploratory analyses of the first experiment 
intending to test whether or not there is a relationship between general speed of responses 
and the extent of the Stroop interference in any of the conditions. Moreover, we were 
interested whether or not the slopes in the strategy conditions are qualitatively identical 
to the one in the no strategy condition.  We defined these analyses merely as supporting 
                                                 
12 To distinguish between the semantic and response conflict components of the Stroop interference effect, 
one can also use color-associated words (e.g., sky) that tend to produce longer RTs than neutral words but 
shorter RTs than response set incongruent trials (Klein, 1964). For instance, Augustinova and Ferrand 
(2012) applied color-associated words in their experiments to assess the magnitude of semantic conflict and 
to present evidence that the word blindness suggestion influences solely the response conflict component 
of the interference effect. Nonetheless, their experiments employed vocal responses and when it comes to 
manual responses, the color-associated interference effect is volatile (Sharma & McKenna, 1998; 
Kinoshita, Mills, & Norris, 2018).  
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tests of interest as it is not an established feature of the word blindness suggestion that it 
produces an identical slope as a control condition. 
Methods 
Participants.  We recruited 35 participants, however, one of the participants 
claimed that they did not follow the instructions closely and used visual blurring in the 
no strategy condition. We excluded the data of that participant and all analyses were run 
on the data of 34 participants (mean age = 21.82, SD = 4.38, females = 27). The 
participants received either course credits or payment (£5) in exchange for attending the 
study. 
Stimuli and apparatus.  The materials of the registered experiment closely 
followed those of the first experiment. We added four color words to the stimulus set 
(BROWN, PINK, GREY, ORANGE) so that either these four or the original four color 
words could be used in the non-response set incongruent trials. We ran the experiment in 
OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) and the resolution of the computer 
screen was 1920x1080. 
Design and procedure. There were three major changes in this experiment: we 
did not include the single-letter and goal-maintenance strategy conditions; there were 
more trials in each condition as we included non-response set trials as well; we did not 
take into account the hypnotisability of the participants. The experiment had a 4x3x2 
mixed design with congruency type (congruent, neutral, incongruent non-response set, 
incongruent response set) and strategy condition (no strategy, looking-away, visual 
blurring), and non-response set groups (response set being equivalent [A] vs not 
equivalent to the first experiment [B]) as independent variables. The participants were 
assigned to response set groups A or B based on the parity of their subject number. Group 
membership determined whether the colors of A or B would have corresponding response 
buttons. For instance, if someone was assigned to group B, then the colors brown, pink, 
grey and orange had the corresponding response buttons of “V”,”B”,”N” and “M”, 
respectively. In this case, none of the words were displayed in red, blue, green or yellow. 
Apart from this, the procedure of the experiment was identical to that of the first 
experiment. 
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Data analysis 
The steps of the data analysis are in line with those of the first experiment, 
including the exclusion criterion regarding RT data and how we drew conclusions based 
on the results of the Bayes factors. We informed the parameters of the model predicting 
the presence of the semantic interference effect based on the findings of Augustinova and 
Ferrand (2012), who found in two experiments that the size of the semantic interference 
(using color-associated words) was about 20ms. We expect that an intervention impacting 
semantic processing should approximately halve this effect. For the test of the regressions 
slopes investigating the relationship of general response speed and the extent of the Stroop 
effect, the model parameters of H1 were stemmed from the finding that the slope was 
0.13 ms in the no strategy condition in the first experiment. We used this value as the SD 
of H1 for the tests of the slopes against zero as well as for their comparisons. 
Pre-registration 
The design and analysis plan of the experiment was pre-registered and they can 
be accessed at https://osf.io/gbsaf. We closely followed the steps of the design and of the 
analysis plan. There was one deviation in terms of the implementation of the comparison 
of the regression slopes. We pre-registered that we will compare regression slopes by 
calculating difference scores of the dependent variable and running the regression 
analysis on these difference scores. However, this implementation is incorrect and does 
not produce the intended outcome of the comparison of the slopes. Therefore, we ran 
multilevel linear regressions that allow the comparison of slopes of dependent data by the 
test of the interaction. 
Results 
Data processing.  First, we omitted trials with errors from the analyses (10.4% in 
total from which 2.3% from the no strategy, 4.4% from the looking-away, 3.7% from the 
blurring conditions). Next, we eliminated trials with RTs that were 3 standard deviations 
either above or below the mean (1.2% of all correct trials from which 0.5% from the no 
strategy, 0.4% from the looking-away, 0.3% from the blurring conditions). 
Outcome neutral checks 1 (non-preregistered): On what percentage of the 
trials did the participants use the strategies? The participants reported that, on average, 
they used on 80% (95% CI [75%, 85%]) of the trials the looking-away strategy, and on 
73% (95% CI [66%, 81%]) of the trials the blurring strategy. 
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Outcome neutral tests 2: Is there a difference between the two response set 
groups regarding the magnitude of the Stroop interference and the sematic Stroop 
effect (in the No strategy condition)?  Before collapsing the data across response set 
groups, we compared the two groups in terms of the extent of the Stroop interference and 
semantic Stroop effects. The size of the Stroop interference effect was comparable in the 
two response set groups (MA = 78 ms, MB = 79 ms) and there is some evidence in favour 
of the model predicting no difference (t(30.66) = -0.05,  p = .958, Mdiff = 1 ms, dz =, BN(0, 
60) =0.38, RR[0, 69]), however the strength of evidence did not reach the conventional 
cut-off of good enough evidence. The size of the semantic Stroop effect was numerically 
larger in the group with the response set of the first experiment (MA = 49 ms, MB = 15 
ms), however the analysis yielded data insensitivity (t(29.46) = 1.27,  p = .212, Mdiff = 35 
ms, dz =, BN(0, 20) = 1.08, RR[0, 179]). Consequently, we decided to conduct all of the 
subsequent analyses on the collapsed data. 
Outcome neutral tests 3: Is there a Stroop interference and a semantic Stroop 
effect in the No strategy condition?  As in the first experiment, the RTs in the no strategy 
condition were the fastest in the congruent trials followed by the neutral trials. The RTs 
of the non-response set incongruent trials were slower than those of the neutral trials, and 
the longest RTs were observed in the incongruent trials (See Table 2 for condition means 
and SDs). The analyses revealed strong evidence for Stroop interference (t(33) = 6.56,  p 
< .001, Mdiff = 79 ms, dz = 1.12 , BH(0, 60) = 2.48*105, RR[5, 2.6*104]) as well as for the 
Stroop effect (t(33) = 10.16,  p < .001, Mdiff = 130 ms, dz = 1.74, BH(0, 105) = 3.36*109, 
RR[6, 4.57*104]). Moreover, the contrast of the non-response set incongruent and the 
neutral trials yielded evidence for the semantic Stroop interference effect (t(33) = 2.53,  p 
= .016, Mdiff = 34 ms, dz = 0.43 , BH(0, 20) = 8.29, RR[8, 177]). 
Table 2 
Summary Table about the Means of the RTs (ms) in the three Strategy Conditions 
 Congruency 
Strategy condition Incongruent Incongruent 
non-response set 
Neutral Congruent 
No strategy 791 (131) 746 (112) 712 (97) 661 (81) 
Looking-away 838 (126) 822 (126) 830 (127) 790 (118) 
Blurring 822 (130) 812 (130) 786 (128) 737 (119) 
Note. The Standard Deviations (SD) of the means are shown within the brackets.  
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Crucial test 1: Are the strategies effective in reducing the Stroop interference 
effect?  First, we examined whether or not the beneficial effect of the looking-away and 
blurring strategies replicated in the current experiment. We found strong evidence that 
both of the looking-away (t(33) = 4.42,  p < .001, Mdiff = 71 ms, dz = 0.76 , BH(0, 30) = 
297.77, RR[7, 1.93*104]) and the blurring strategies (t(33) = 3.05,  p = .005, Mdiff = 43 
ms, dz = 0.52 , BH(0, 30) = 24.93, RR[7, 632]) helped the participants to reduce the Stroop 
interference compared to the no strategy condition. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of 
the Stroop interference scores broken down by the strategy conditions. 
As an additional analysis, we tested whether the strategies reduced the response 
conflict component (incongruent RTs – non-response set RTs) of the Stroop interference 
effect so that our results can be compared to those of Augustinova and Ferrand (2012). 
The analyses revealed moderate evidence supporting that the blurring strategy reduced 
response conflict (t(33) = 1.98,  p = .056, Mdiff = 34 ms, dz = 0.34 , BH(0, 30) = 3.94, RR[16, 
64]) and anecdotal evidence that looking-away strategy reduced response conflict (t(33) 
= 1.61,  p = .117, Mdiff = 29 ms, dz = 0.27 , BH(0, 30) = 2.40, RR[0, 364]) compared to the 
no strategy condition. Note these two latter tests were not pre-registered. 
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Figure 4. Violin plot portraying the distribution of Stroop interference scores (ms) in the 
no strategy and in the two strategy conditions. Each black dot represent the Stroop 
interference score of a single participant.  
Crucial test 2: Do the strategies diminish the RTs of the incongruent trials?  
We found moderate evidence supporting the claim that neither the looking-away (t(33) = 
-2.35,  p = .025, Mdiff = -47 ms, dz = -0.40 , BH(0, 30) = 0.22, RR[19, ∞]) nor the blurring 
strategy (t(33) = -1.99,  p = .055, Mdiff = -31 ms, dz = -0.34 , BH(0, 30) = 0.19, RR[16, ∞]) 
reduced the incongruent RTs compared to the no strategy condition.  
Crucial test 3: Do the strategies influence the magnitude of the semantic 
Stroop interference effect?  There was anecdotal evidence that the looking-away 
strategy reduced the semantic Stroop interference effect (t(33) = 2.41,  p = .022, Mdiff = 
42 ms, dz = 0.41 , BH(0, 10) = 2.80, RR[0, 11]). In fact, the strategy eliminated the semantic 
Stroop effect in the looking-away strategy condition (t(33) = -1.06,  p = .296, Mdiff = -8 
ms, dz = -0.18 , BH(0, 20) = 0.20, RR[12, ∞]). In case of the blurring strategy, there was no 
evidence either way for whether or not semantic Stroop interference was reduced (t(33) 
=0.50,  p = .617, Mdiff = 8 ms, dz = 0.09, BH(0, 10) = 1.07, RR[0, 74]). 
Supporting test of interest: Is the relationship between the extent of Stroop 
interference and the general speed of the responses different from zero in each 
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condition? We found strong evidence in the no strategy condition that there was a 
positive relationship between general speed and the magnitude of the interference (t(33) 
= 3.33,  p = .002, b = 0.16ms, β = 0.51 , BH(0, 0.13) = 49.05, RR[0.03, 4.46]). As expected 
based on the results of the first experiment, there was good enough evidence supporting 
the notion that there is no relationship between general speed of the responses and the 
extent of the interference both in the looking-away (t(33) = -0.10,  p = .920, b = -0.004ms, 
β = -0.02 , BH(0, 0.13) = 0.31, RR[0.12, ∞]) and blurring strategy conditions (t(33) = 0.27,  
p = .792, b = 0.01ms, β = 0.05 , BH(0, 0.13) = 0.30, RR[0.12, ∞]). Inspecting the raw effect 
sizes reveals that both of the slopes were virtually zero (Figure 2 depicts the three 
regression slopes separately with their 95% CIs.). The comparison of the no strategy and 
looking-away conditions yielded strong evidence supporting their difference (t = 2.71, b 
= 0.15ms, BH(0, 0.13) = 13.50, RR[0.04, 0.80]). Contrasting the no strategy and the blurring 
strategy revealed good enough evidence for their difference (t = 2.49, b = 0.17ms, BH(0, 
0.13) = 8.81, RR[0.04, 1.14]). Finally, we found anecdotal evidence that the slopes in the 
looking-away and blurring conditions were identical (t = 0.14, b = 0.01ms, BN(0, 0.13) = 
0.39, RR[0, 0.15])13.  
                                                 
13 Note that for this comparison, we modelled the predictions of H1 with a normal distribution (rather than 
a half-normal) as there was no directional hypothesis. Hence the “N” instead of “H” in the subscript of B. 
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Figure 5. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between general response speed (i.e., sum 
of incongruent and neutral RTs) and the extent of the Stroop interference effect separately 
for the no strategy condition (Panel A) and the looking-away (Panel B) and blurring 
(Panel B) strategy conditions. 
Discussion 
Once more, both of the looking-away and blurring strategies were demonstrated to be 
useful in reducing Stroop interference, and the blurring strategy approximately halved the 
Stroop interference effect as the word blindness suggestion tends to do when it is given 
to highly suggestible people. We also replicated the finding that neither of the strategies 
can speed up responses on the incongruent trials. By introducing non-response set 
incongruent trials, we were able to distinguish the semantic and response conflict 
component of the interference effect, and we found that some evidence that the looking-
away strategy works by alleviating both sources of conflicts, whereas for the blurring 
effect, the evidence is not clear whether it solely reduces response conflict or it may 
diminish semantic conflict as well. Importantly, we specified these two latter analyses as 
severe tests that can disconfirm the idea that looking-away or blurring could be the 
underlying mechanism of the word blindness effect. Consequently, we ought to conclude 
that none of the strategies have met the criteria and are unlikely to be the strategies that 
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highs resort to when they respond to the word blindness suggestion. Finally, the 
differential relationship between the general speed of the responses and the size of the 
interference effect was replicated as well. We found evidence for a positive relationship 
in the no strategy condition, and evidence for no relationship in the looking-away and 
blurring conditions, as well as evidence for the difference between no strategy and the 
strategy conditions. 
General Discussion 
The purpose of the project was to investigate whether or not simple strategies, such as 
blurring one`s vision can attenuate the Stroop interference effect. According to cold-
control theory of hypnotic responding (Dienes & Perner, 2007), people use strategies to 
create the experience that was described to them in the suggestion. Hence, identifying 
successful strategies is crucial to understand how highs can manage to reduce the 
interference effect when they respond to the word blindness suggestion, and by this we 
can unravel the mystery surrounding the suggestion. Importantly, the ability of highs to 
respond hypnotically (with the feeling of involuntariness) seems to be independent of 
their first-order executive functions, such as cognitive inhibition (Dienes et al., 2009) and 
selective attention (Varga, Németh, & Szekely, 2011), that could help them overcome 
cognitive conflict during the Stroop task (see Parris, 2017, for a review). We found no 
evidence one way or the other for a correlation between hypnotisability and the extent to 
which any of the strategies could decrease Stroop interference. Reaching good enough 
evidence for the null usually demands many participants in correlational designs. For 
instance, assuming that the estimates of the slopes are zero, the standard deviation of 
hypnotisability and of the reduction in Stroop interference by the given strategy remains 
identical to those of that we observed in the first experiment (and the correlations of these 
variables are zero), we would need to recruit 825 and 1052 participants for the blurring 
and looking-away conditions respectively to have a 50% probability of obtaining Bs 
smaller than 1/3. 
Next, we probed the efficiency of the four strategies: looking-away, visual 
blurring, single letter focus, and goal-maintenance. Importantly, looking-away and 
blurring strategies were shown to be useful in diminishing the interference effect in both 
of the experiments substantiating that participants are able to reduce the Stroop 
interference by consciously engaging in simple strategies, a finding that has been rarely 
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demonstrated in the Stroop literature (cf. Raz et al., 2003). Nonetheless, none of these 
strategies should be considered as likely candidates of being the underlying mechanism 
of the word blindness suggestion, as they did not meet other criteria such as reducing the 
RT of incongruent trials.  
The idea that goal-maintenance plays a crucial role in responding quickly and 
accurately to a Stroop word is well established (e.g., De Jong et al., 1999; Kane & Engle, 
2003) and it is embedded in many of the cognitive control models (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar, 
& McClelland; Roelofs, 2003). It is important to note that our findings do not challenge 
this idea. In this project, we solely aimed to test whether a simple way to update one`s 
goal (i.e., rehearsal of the target) is sufficient to improve performance in the Stroop task. 
We did not provide good enough evidence one way or the other for whether highs achieve 
the reduction of the Stroop interference, when they respond to the word blindness 
suggestion, by the internal rehearsal of the task instructions. However, it is still possible 
that the strategy with which highs reduce Stroop interference facilitates goal-
maintenance. In fact, based on the finding that the word blindness suggestion operates 
better when the response-stimulus interval is short (500 ms) than when it is long (3500 
ms), we can assume that the strategy that highs employ influences processes related to 
goal-maintenance (Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2012).  
We found in both of the experiments that when people applied the blurring and 
looking-away strategies, then the relationship between general speed and interference 
disappeared. These results deem it unlikely that either the blurring or the looking-away 
strategy would work by speeding up responses and condensing the Stroop interference 
effect simply by moving along a fixed interference-overall RT slope. Another possibility 
is that moving along the interference-overall RT slope is a strategy in itself. For example, 
a simple model of motivation is that it moves people along this slope, speeding up overall 
RT and hence reducing Stroop interference (cf. Pratte et al., 2010). Indeed, enhanced 
motivation has most commonly lead to an overall speeding up of responses (Krebs et al., 
2010; Locke & Braver, 2008; Veling & Aarts, 2010). Nonetheless, the introduction of a 
reward has not often produced large reductions in Stroop effects (Krebs et al., 2010; 
Veling & Aarts, 2010). More promising, setting up competition for reward in the presence 
of a competitive other has been shown to result in a greater than 50% reduction in Stroop 
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interference (Huguet, Dumas & Monteil, 2004)14. One might argue that the hypnotic 
context provides stronger motivation for highs than monetary reward by itself or 
combined with competition. However, the re-analysis of an earlier study of ours that had 
an identical design to the current experiment in terms of the Stroop test, but used the word 
blindness suggestion, revealed evidence for a raw slope of zero (B = 0.19) between Stroop 
interference and overall RT (sum of RTs of incongruent and neutral trials) in the 
suggestion condition (Pilot study of Palfi, Parris, Mclatchie, Kekecs, & Dienes, 2018). 
That is, it does not appear that in the suggestion condition people simply move along a 
fixed slope, generally speeding up and thereby reducing interference. Instead, people 
typically reduce the RT in especially the incongruent condition when responding to the 
suggestion. A proper understanding of the relation of motivation to the word blindness 
suggestion remains to be explored. 
One strategy still remains that was not tested in the current experiment. When 
highs are suggested to see meaningless words throughout the Stroop task, perhaps, they 
take the instructions literally, and they create the experience of meaninglessness by 
imagining a counterfactual world in which words are truly meaningless. Imagining a 
counterfactual world might influence top-down cognitive control processes in a way that 
helps subjects reduce Stroop interference. There are two reasons why this notion is 
plausible. First, imagination can have an impact on behaviour as well as on cognitive 
processes. For instance, mental practice can improve one`s performance in golf (Ploszay, 
Gentner, Skinner, & Wrisberg, 2006). Imagination can advance self-regulation (Taylor, 
Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998), confirm or in some cases challenge and mitigate 
prejudice (Slusher & Anderson, 1987), create false autobiographical memories (Mazzoni 
& Memon, 2003), and, finally, even enhance performance of visual search (Davoli, & 
Abrams, 2009; Witt & Proffitt, 2008). Second, cognitive penetrability is not completely 
unprecedented in the Stroop task. For instance, expectations modulated by placebo-
suggestion were shown to influence performance, measured by accuracy (Magalhães De 
Saldanha da Gama, Slama, Caspar, Gevers, & Cleeremans, 2013), though such placebo 
Stroop reduction does not appear to match the word blindness suggestion in reducing 
Stroop interference in RTs (contrast response expectancy theory, Kirsch, 1985). 
                                                 
14 But note in the Huguet et al. study the baseline level of interference (and reaction times) were unusually 
large, resulting in reduced manual response Stroop interference values still greater than 70ms, considerably 
larger than in the typical word blindness suggestion (about 35 ms). 
  
78 
 
 
Depending on the instructions of the placebo-suggestion, it can either enhance or impair 
the accuracy of the responses. There is, however, evidence from independent labs that a 
prime to deteriorate one`s reading abilities by imagining what is it like to have dyslexia, 
can help people reduce the Stroop interference effect compared to a baseline condition 
with a neutral prime that has no reference to reading (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2014b; 
Goldfarb, Aisenberg, & Henik, 2011).  
Interestingly, the dyslexia prime and word blindness suggestion phenomena share 
many properties. They both substantially decrease the interference effect by speeding up 
the RT of incongruent trials compared to no suggestion / no prime baseline conditions 
when the response mode is manual (See Experiment 1 of Augustinova & Ferrand, 2014b; 
and Experiment 1 of Goldfarb et al., 2011). The dyslexia prime, similarly to the word 
blindness suggestion, affects the response competition component of the interference 
while it leaves the semantic conflict component untouched (Augustinova & Ferrand, 
2012, 2014). This latter feature of the dyslexia prime is particularly important in 
challenging the initially proposed mechanism, namely the de-automatisation of reading 
account that putatively underlies these phenomena. An even more remarkable similarity 
between the instructions of the dyslexia prime and the word blindness suggestion 
experiments is that both invite the participants to think about disrupting one`s reading 
abilities. One could further this line of thought and propose that both of these effects are 
achieved via deliberate strategy engagement, specifically the imagination of a 
counterfactual world in which words are meaningless. Theories of social priming argue 
that responses to primes are unintentional and purely triggered by the activation of a 
specific social concept (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis, & van 
Knippenberg, 1998). However, there are many reasons to be sceptical about the 
unintentional nature of the responses to social primes, such as the presence of clear 
demand characteristics or the absence of valid and reliable outcome neutral tests 
demonstrating that the participants were not aware of the link between the social prime 
and the dependent variable of the experiment (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 
2012; Newell & Shanks, 2014; Shanks et al., 2013). These criticisms apply to the dyslexia 
studies as well, deeming it plausible that the participants reduced the Stroop interference 
via intentional strategy usage rather than via the unintentional or automatic activation of 
the concept of dyslexia. 
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Nonetheless, the idea that imagining that one is unable to take meaning from the 
Stroop words facilitates the resolution of response competition is a conjecture that needs 
to be tested. Currently, a Registered Report is undertaking such a test by requesting highs 
to voluntarily imagine the words during the Stroop task as meaningless characters so that 
they can reduce the Stroop interference compared to a baseline condition in which they 
are asked to not engage in imagery strategies (Palfi et al., 2018). Provided that highs can 
decrease the Stroop interference by voluntarily imagining that the words are meaningless, 
it would still need to be explored whether everyone can use this strategy to alleviate the 
interference, and whether the power of imagination could be generalised to other 
cognitive tasks, such as the flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) or Simon task (Simon & 
Wolf, 1963).  
In sum, reducing interference in the Stroop task via intentional means is difficult 
and the current study provided compelling evidence that there are at least two strategies, 
looking-away from the target word and visual blurring, that any subject can apply. Sadly, 
none of these strategies met the criteria to be considered as potential underlying 
mechanisms of the word blindness suggestion deferring the resolution of the question of 
how exactly highly suggestible people diminish the interference when they respond to the 
suggestion. Although these findings further the mystery surrounding the word blindness 
suggestion, we hypothesize that imagination (i.e., imagining that the Stroop words are 
meaningless) may be the key strategy with which subjects reset top-down cognitive 
processing to comply with the request of the suggestion, and lead to the reduction of the 
Stroop interference.  
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Chapter IV: Can unconscious intentions be more effective than conscious 
intentions? Test of the role of metacognition in hypnotic response 
Introduction 
The cornerstone of hypnotic responding is the feeling of involuntariness that accompanies 
an otherwise goal-directed behaviour (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980; Terhune, Cleeremans, 
Raz & Lynn, 2017). Responses to hypnotic suggestions vary widely in terms of their 
difficulty. Some motor actions can be done by almost everyone (e.g., feeling a magnetic 
power between the palms that is pulling them towards each other), whereas the 
imaginative exercise to produce vivid hallucinations of noises can only be performed by 
a minority of the population (usually highly suggestible people, henceforth highs). The 
question of how these alterations in cognition can be implemented with a disrupted sense 
of agency has been the focus of scientific endeavour for decades.  Theories from the 
sociocognitive tradition of hypnosis stress the role of demand characteristics in forming 
the subjective experiences involved with hypnotic responding and often highlight the 
strategic nature of the action as appropriate to the specific context (Comey & Kirsch, 
1999; Spanos, 1986). The cognitive approach also often underscores the active role of the 
participants in creating an altered sense of reality (e.g., Kihlstrom, 1998) and several 
theories of this tradition, the dissociation theories (Bowers, 1990; Hilgard, 1977, 1991; 
Kihlstrom, 1985), propose that the sense of involuntariness can emerge by dampening the 
monitoring of one's own control processes. Recently, a theoretical attempt has been made 
to synthesize these views by depicting a metacognitive account of hypnosis, namely the 
cold control theory (Barnier, Dienes & Mitchell, 2008; Dienes, 2012; Dienes & Perner, 
2007), that draws from the higher-order thought theories (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; 
Rosenthal, 2005) of consciousness. 
The (higher-order thought) HOT theory of consciousness postulates that a 
representation or a state is only conscious if one becomes aware of its content by the 
existence of a “higher-order thought” or state (HOT) that refers to it (Rosenthal, 2005). 
A higher order mental state is a mental state not just about the world (which is first order) 
but about a mental state. For instance, imagine having a first-order state about the world 
(e.g., “there is a tree”).  According to HOT theories, one has no conscious experience of 
the world unless one possesses in addition a second-order thought about that first-order 
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state (e.g., “I see that there is a tree”). HOTs are not restricted to perception, thus they can 
refer to any mental state, including those with control functions.  
Cold control theory stresses that the mechanism by which hypnotic responding 
(behavior accompanied by the feeling of involuntariness) emerges is a process that allows 
people to replace the HOTs about their intentions with inaccurate ones (Dienes, 2012). 
For instance, to create the experience of the hallucination of a noise (e.g., the buzz of a 
mosquito), one has to have an intention about imagining that particular noise (e.g., an 
intention with the content “imagine a buzzing mosquito”), while forming an inaccurate 
HOT about the intention (e.g. with the content, “I`m not intending to imagine a buzzing 
mosquito”). The theory also claims that the intention to produce the appropriate response 
is formed by the actor and it is implemented by regular cognitive control processes 
implying that the behaviour will be in accord with the goals of the actor and that a 
hypnotic response cannot be more efficient than a non-hypnotic one (if a simple first-
order intention is logically sufficient to produce the response). In a nutshell, cold control 
theory posits that hypnosis is solely a metacognitive phenomenon, and, in the simplest 
version of cold control, the theory assumes that hypnosis is targeting specifically the HOT 
of intending thereby leaves the first-order states untouched.15 The latter assumption 
coincides with the idea that HOTs, or in other words, being conscious of mental states, 
have only limited or zero function in terms of influencing first-order states (Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2008)16. In addition, this assumption also implies that the 
theory deems hypnotic responding as a form of unconscious control as it claims that 
responses to suggestions are intended (implemented by executive control processes) 
while the intention to act is unconscious by virtue of possessing an inaccurate HOT that 
the intention does not exist. 
The notion that hypnotic responses are produced by a strategically relinquished 
metacognition of one's intentions has gained some support. For instance, individual 
differences in metacognition, particularly the tendency to generate inaccurate HOTs of 
intending, are moderately associated with hypnotisability (Dienes, 2012). Further, 
                                                 
15 Cold control theory assumes that hypnotic response involves strategic changes in HOTs about solely 
intentions. This claim is independent of whether or not there is domain specificity in metacognitive abilities 
(e.g. Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos & Blackmon, 2014), or whether hypnotisability involves alterations in 
metacognition over other domains as well, such as perception. 
16 Of note, a special case of HOT theories, the cross-order integration theory (COI; Kriegel, 2007), stresses 
that first-order states and HOTs can causally influence each other by binding together to a unified conscious 
representation, which can, for instance, enhance cognitive functioning. 
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experimental evidence suggests that the temporary disruption of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which has a vital role in the functioning of metacognition 
(Lau & Passingham, 2006; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham & Lau, 2010), 
with rTMS ( Coltheart et al, 2018; Dienes & Hutton, 2013) or alcohol (Semmens-
Wheeler, Dienes & Duka, 2013) facilitates hypnotic responding17. Another line of 
research also corroborates the idea that hypnotic responding is the product of a purely 
metacognitive process by revealing that behaviors created by hypnotic suggestions are 
not related to  first-order abilities of cognitive functioning (apart from metacognition). 
For example, several studies have presented evidence that performance on tasks involving 
first-order abilities of executive functioning such as inhibition (Dienes et al., 2009) or 
sustained attention (Jamieson & Sheehan, 2002) do not predict hypnotisability. Moreover, 
evidence counts against the claim that responses to hypnotic suggestion can enhance first-
order abilities compared to responses that are non-hypnotic. For instance, there is no 
evidence for the superiority of hypnotic suggestions in recollection (Erdelyi, 1994; 
Nogrady, McConkey, & Perry, 1985), (more controversially) analgesia (Milling, Kirsch, 
Meunier & Levine, 2002; Spanos, 1986; for a counter-argument: e.g. Derbyshire, 
Whalley & Oakley, 2009; Hilgard, 1977; Miller & Bowers, 1993) and endurance (Barber, 
1966, Levitt & Brady, 1964).  However, an experimental finding, the word blindness 
effect (Raz, Shapiro, Fan & Posner, 2002; the term was first used by Parris, Dienes & 
Hodgson, 2012), calls into question the key statement of the theory, as it suggests that 
highs can acquire abilities through hypnosis that they do not possess when responding 
non-hypnotically. 
The word blindness phenomenon can be induced by suggesting to highs that they 
will see words as meaningless characters, or as words of a foreign language, while they 
are engaged in a color naming Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). Generally, the suggestion is 
applied post-hypnotically, which means that it is provided during a hypnotic induction 
prior to the Stroop task and only later activated by a clue (e.g., a clap). It has been shown 
by various independent laboratories that when this suggestion is given to highs, they can 
                                                 
17 It is to be noted that none of the experimental manipulations were exclusive in a sense that they might 
impaired cognitive functions aside from metacognition (Dienes, 2012), allowing for theories focusing on 
the role of disrupted executive functioning (Woody & Sadler, 2008) to account for the data. Moreover, a 
recent replication failure of the Rounis et al. (2010) study suggests that the stimulation of the DLPFC with 
rTMS might not impair visual awareness (Bor, Schwartzman, Barrett & Seth, 2017); the meaning of these 
findings is a matter of ongoing debate (Ruby, Maniscalco & Peter, 2018; c.f., Bor, Barrett, Schwartzman 
& Seth, 2018).  
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lower the interference and the Stroop effects (as measured by the difference in response 
times (RTs) between the incongruent and neutral, and the incongruent and congruent 
trials, respectively) compared to their own performance in a non-hypnotic condition 
(Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Parris et al., 2012; Raz et al., 2002; Raz, Kirsch, Pollard 
& Nitkin-Kaner, 2006). Moreover, low suggestible people cannot reproduce this 
improvement in performance (Casiglia et al., 2010; Raz & Campbell, 2011; Raz et al., 
2002, 2003) further underlining the notion that hypnosis and so the ability to respond 
hypnotically can have a causal influence on first-order states. It has been proposed that 
the word-blindness suggestion allows people to gain control over otherwise automatic 
processes (i.e., reading), specifically, by being able to dampen the processing of input 
words (Raz et al., 2002; Raz et al., 2006; Raz, Fan & Posner, 2005).  
Overall, these findings cast doubt on the idea that a response by becoming 
hypnotic only impacts HOTs of intending and cannot alter first order abilities, but the 
findings do not refute the cold control theory per se. First, the cold control theory 
postulates that to produce the word blindness effect, one has to have a first-order intention 
to create the experience of the script as being meaningless by using a strategy at the 
disposal of the person without having an accurate HOT about intending to do so. 
Consequently, cold control theory asserts that the mere comparison of a suggestion and a 
no suggestion (Stroop task under normal circumstances) condition overlooks the fact that 
people have been (implicitly) instructed to create an experience of meaninglessness in the 
former case but they were told not do so in the latter one (Dienes, 2012). Therefore, this 
contrast cannot inform us whether the power of imagination (i.e., creating a counterfactual 
model of reality in which meaning cannot be extracted from the script) depends on the 
form of the accompanying HOT. Second, individual differences between highs and lows 
in the ability to create word blindness can account for the disparity in their performance, 
and indeed, it has been found that highs and not lows can produce the word blindness 
effect as a response to suggestions in the absence of a hypnotic induction (Parris & 
Dienes, 2013). This latter finding may seem to settle the matter in favour of cold control: 
subjects have no more first-order abilities responding hypnotically as non-hypnotically. 
However, this conclusion depends on hypnotic responding being entirely conditional on 
a previous hypnotic induction. If a subject can, without an induction, respond 
hypnotically, then the mere presence or absence of a hypnotic induction is irrelevant to 
theory testing. Indeed, it has been shown that highs can for example produce 
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hallucinations in response to suggestion, or dramatically relieve pain, without a previous 
hypnotic induction (e.g., Kirsch et al., 2008; Milling et al., 2002). Moreover, it has been 
demonstrated that the induction procedure might be irrelevant to the production of the 
feeling of involuntariness, which is the core feature of a hypnotic response; for example, 
highs reported comparable levels of involuntariness after a suggestion to experience a sex 
change with and without a prior induction (McConkey, Szeps & Barnier, 2001). Thus, 
the use of an induction or not is not relevant to testing the prediction of cold control 
theory. What is relevant is requesting subjects to have the same first-order intentions 
while having an accurate or inaccurate HOT about the intention. That is, a clear test of 
the key prediction of cold control theory necessitates the contrast of the control of highs 
experienced as voluntary with the control of highs experienced as involuntary (henceforth 
voluntary and involuntary control) in the capacity of reducing the Stroop interference 
effect while asked to achieve this by having the same first-order intention. By this, we 
could investigate whether hypnosis is purely a metacognitive phenomenon. Cold control 
theory defines hypnotic responding as nothing more nor less than acting intentionally 
while having the inaccurate HOT that one is not intending to perform that action. This is 
perhaps one of the simplest theories of hypnosis one could have: the essence of a response 
being hypnotic lies only in a type of metacognitive monitoring. Thus, critically testing 
the theory is important: Is a more complex theory needed or not? 
One might argue that former research has already tested the core claim of cold 
control theory in studies investigating the efficiency of imagination compared to hypnotic 
responding to suggestions and that the theory has been disconfirmed. For instance, there 
is evidence that the fusiform activation of highs is bilateral when they are responding to 
a hypnotic suggestion to hallucinate colours whereas only the right fusiform shows 
activation when they are requested to imagine a grey-scale pattern in color, indicating that 
voluntary imagination might not produce the same visual experience as hypnotic 
responding (Kosslyn, Thompson, Costantini-Ferrando, Alpert & Spiegel, 2000). In 
addition, it has been shown that highs produce stronger pain experience of heat when 
responding to a hypnotic suggestion contrasted with a request to imagine the same type 
of pain (Derbyshire, Whalley, Stenger & Oakley, 2004). However, in both of these studies 
other factors than a mere change in monitoring of the HOT of intending might have been 
in play to produce varying experiential and neuropsychological responses. For example, 
if the wording is not carefully phrased in the non-hypnotic and hypnotic conditions than 
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it can create demand characteristics resulting in a “hold back” effect (Spanos, 1986; 
Zamansky, Scharf & Brightbill, 1964) or stronger expectations in the hypnotic condition 
(Braffman & Kirsch, 1999), as the participants aim to please the experimenter or they do 
not believe that their non-hypnotic response can be as effective as the hypnotic one. We 
argue that none of these studies provide an unequivocal test of the prediction of cold 
control theory as the expectations of the subjects were not measured in any of them. The 
wording of the conditions in Kosslyn et al.`s (2000) experiment were not designed to 
convince the participants that they can and should try to create comparable responses in 
the different conditions. Further, and crucially, it was not demonstrated in these examples 
that the imagination condition involved greater feelings of voluntariness than the hypnotic 
condition; thus cold control may have been the mechanism in both conditions. Therefore, 
a genuine test of the prediction of cold control theory need to possess a volitional request 
that can create equal level of expectations about the efficiency of non-hypnotic and 
hypnotic responses ensuring that the participants expect to perform the same with and 
without the HOT of intending. 
To address this issue, we constructed a fully within-subjects design experiment in 
which the performance of involuntary and voluntary control can be directly compared. 
We employed three experimental conditions using highly suggestible subjects. In the 
posthypnotic suggestion condition (henceforth simply “suggestion” condition), we used 
the word-blindness posthypnotic suggestion to see the words as meaningless characters 
during the Stroop task. In the volition condition, we told the participants to reproduce the 
effect of the word blindness suggestion by responding to our volitional request to imagine 
the words as meaningless characters while doing the Stroop task. In the no suggestion 
condition, we asked the participants to undertake the Stroop task with the instruction of 
not imagining the words as meaningless so that we can measure their baseline 
performance. In this scenario, the cold control theory predicts that people can overcome 
the Stroop interference to the same extent in the suggestion and volition conditions when 
compared to the no suggestion condition. Therefore, if the results show a stronger 
reduction of the interference effect in the suggestion compared to the volition condition 
then one has to conclude that there is more to hypnosis then the strategic relinquishment 
of metacognitive monitoring in the form of accurate HOTs of intending. The experiment 
is testing a core prediction of the simplest version of cold control theory and so if it is 
disconfirmed, we need to revise the theory to fit the data.  The key assumption of cold 
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control theory is that the difference between hypnotic versus non-hypnotic responding is 
just the difference between having and not having a HOT; if this assumption is retained, 
the finding of a greater Stroop reduction in the suggestion rather than volition condition 
would imply that the HOT of an intention can have a causal influence on first order states 
by hindering cognitive control processes (a rare finding of conscious executive processing 
being less effective than unconscious, contrast Cleeremans, 2006). 
A key relevant outcome neutral test is that subjects experienced the word 
blindness effect as more volitional in the volition condition than in the suggestion 
condition. This would be the evidence that there was a difference in the presence of 
relevant HOTs of intending. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that 
measured the subjects’ conscious experience of control over ‘word meaninglessness’ to 
unravel whether such an experience feels like something that has been intentionally 
imagined or merely perceived. Investigating the phenomenological level of the 
participants’ cognition can inform us whether their behaviour felt involuntary when the 
suggestion was active compared to the volitional control. Moreover, controlling the 
potentially confounding role of expectations is imperative (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999), so 
we implemented a self-report measure to gauge the participants` expectations about 
seeing the words as meaningless characters. If subjects reported different levels of 
expectation for producing a word blindness effect in the suggestion than in the volition 
condition, expectations alone may explain differences in Stroop reduction in the two 
conditions (Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama et al, 2013). In addition, we took the 
participants` subjective experiences of `word meaningfulness` to explore the extent to 
which voluntary and involuntary control can alter the conscious experiences of the world. 
The measures reflect the extent to which subjects subjectively responded to the 
suggestions and to the volitional request; they could therefore constitute the crucial test 
of whether suggestions and volitional requests are equally effective. However, as the 
apparent problem for cold control lies with the objective measure of Stroop reduction, it 
is the RT measures that form the crucial test. Finally, we measured the ` depth` of hypnosis 
to shed more light on the nature of the experienced state that accompanies the 
implementation of both types of control. This is an exploration, a sideline from the main 
point of the experiment, testing the assumption that the experience as of being in a 
hypnotic state, as interpreted by the participants, does not accompany post-hypnotic 
suggestion (e.g., Terhune, Luke & Cohen Kadosh, 2017). 
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First, we report a pilot experiment using this procedure. While the results yielded 
moderate evidence against cold control theory, the procedure and analyses were not pre-
registered. Further, there was not a strict stopping rule (albeit Bayesian analyses were 
used). Thus, the pilot study will serve as a basis for a proper pre-registered test of cold 
control theory. 
Pilot Experiment  
Methods 
Participants.  Thirty-three highly suggestible students of the University of 
Sussex, all proficient readers of English, attended the experiment in exchange for course 
credits or payment. Eleven participants were recruited in 2013 and twenty-two students 
were recruited in 2014.  The students had been screened in group sessions for being highly 
suggestible prior to the study. Students scoring 9 or higher on the Waterloo-Stanford 
Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form C (WSGC; Bowers, 1993) were recruited 
to the study. The participants granted their informed consent before participation and the 
Ethical Committee of the University of Sussex has approved the study. 
Stimuli and apparatus.  The stimuli of the experiment closely followed those 
used by Raz et al. (2002). The stimuli consisted of 4 types of color words (RED, BLUE, 
GREEN, and YELLOW) and 4 types of neutral words (LOT, SHIP, KNIFE, and 
FLOWER). The stimuli set of the congruent condition included the color words presented 
in colours matching the meaning of the words (e.g., RED in the color red). The 
incongruent items were color words displayed in colours mismatching the meaning of the 
word (e.g., RED in the color blue). The neutral words were length-matched to the color 
words and so all items had their corresponding presentation color (e.g., LOT presented 
always in red). All words were written in upper-case font and presented against a white 
background. The vertical visual angle of the stimuli was 0.5º, while the horizontal visual 
angle of the stimuli lied between 1.3º and 1.9º depending on the length of the word. The 
distance between the participants` eyes and the computer screen was approximately 
65cm. The response keys used in the experiment were “V”, “B”, “N”, “M” for the colours 
red, blue, green and yellow, respectively. The keyboard buttons were not colour-labelled. 
The experiment was produced in and run by the software Experiment Builder (SR 
Research Ltd, Ottawa, ON, Canada). 
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Design and procedure.  The study had a 3x3 within subjects design with the 
independent variables of the congruency type of the trial (congruent vs. neutral vs. 
incongruent) and the experimental condition (no suggestion, suggestion, volition). The 
proportion of congruent, neutral and incongruent trials was equal (33%) in each condition 
and the presentation of color and neutral words was frequency and length matched. The 
conditions were counterbalanced across participants and the Stroop trials (144 per 
condition) were displayed in a random order within each condition. 
The experiment took place in a small room with the experimenter present and only 
one participant at a time. After providing their informed consent to the study, the 
participants engaged in a practice Stroop task for 5 minutes. The participants were asked 
to lay their left middle finger on “V”, left index finger on “B”, right index finger on “N” 
and right middle finger on “M” while undertaking the Stroop task. The participants were 
told to focus on the middle of the screen during the Stroop task, where a black fixation 
cross appeared for 1500ms at the beginning of each trial. The fixation cross was replaced 
by one of the Stroop stimuli and remained on the screen until response. Finally, a feedback 
(“CORRECT” or “INCORRECT”) flashed in black on the screen and then a new trial 
started with the fixation cross. The response to stimulus interval was 2000ms. This 
sequence remained constant among the experimental conditions. 
Next, a hypnotic induction18 with the post-hypnotic suggestion to see the words 
as meaningless characters (Raz et al., 2002) was delivered by the experimenter and the 
participants were told that a clap would activate and a double clap would deactivate this 
suggestion. To test the effectiveness of the suggestion, the experimenter activated it by 
the clap and asked the participant to rate the meaningfulness of a presented coloured word 
on the following scale: 1 - completely clear, 2 - little unclear, 3 - unclear, 4 - completely 
unclear. Those who reported to see the word completely clear or little unclear received an 
additional instruction: “Notice how as you look at the word on the screen, you can look 
at it with the meaning fading to the background of your mind. We have found even when 
people consciously experience some meaning after this suggestion, they still process the 
words differently at a deeper level. You know you are capable of not reading meaning 
fully, remember how you have zoned out while reading a book.”. Finally, the suggestion 
                                                 
18 Although, according to the cold control theory, the usage of the induction procedure is not necessary to 
produce a hypnotic response to a suggestion, we included the induction in the protocol to make sure that 
the responses of the subjects can unambiguously be considered as hypnotic.  
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has been deactivated, and the participants have been brought back to wakefulness by a 
deinduction. For the exact wording of the protocol, see Appendix D.  
 Subsequently, the participants undertook the three experimental 
conditions in a random order. In the no suggestion condition, the participants were told 
to respond as fast and as accurately as they could, and they were asked not to make any 
attempt to see the words as gibberish or words of a foreign language. The suggestion 
condition started with a clap accompanied by a sentence highlighting that the suggestion 
had been activated. At the end of the condition, the suggestion was deactivated by the 
double clap. In the volition condition, the participants were requested to voluntarily 
reduce the Stroop interference:  
“Highly hypnotisable individuals such as you have been shown to be able to 
eliminate the interference from the irrelevant word when under the influence of the post-
hypnotic suggestion and even when the suggestion is given without hypnosis.  We would 
like you to voluntarily strongly and clearly imagine the irrelevant words as gibberish, 
words of a foreign language so that no meaning can be taken from them.  This is not a 
hypnotic suggestion and we have not hypnotised you for this part of the task. You'll notice 
we have not initiated a suggestion by clapping or giving any other cue. You have the 
ability to do that anytime you please, under your control, as effectively as you just did. 
Please now voluntarily remove meaning from the words. You can do this so that it is 
under your control, just by exercising your imagination. You can be aware it is your 
imagination at the same time as it produces powerful effects.” 
 Throughout the experiment, we administered several self-report measures, 
and in each case, the experimenter read out loud the question and provided the answer 
options on a sheet for the participants. Before the start of the Stroop task in each condition, 
the participants reported their expectations on how certain they are that the words will be 
meaningless. When they finished the Stroop task, the following measures were taken: 
four items assessing the subjective experience of the meaningfulness of the words; a task 
to recall the words they have seen19; depth of hypnosis scale (Hilgard & Tart, 1966); an 
item gauging the experienced control over the meaningfulness of the words; a 
dichotomous question whether they perceived or imagined the words as meaningless20. 
                                                 
19 The data regarding this question have not been utilised for this project. 
20 This question was omitted from the no suggestion condition 
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For the exact questions and answer options see Appendix E. After finishing the last 
condition, the participants were thanked and debriefed.  
Data analysis  
Statistical analyses.  We conducted all of our analyses with the statistical 
software R 3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016). Since we had a fully within subjects design, we 
calculated difference scores so that we were able to test directly all of our hypotheses with 
Bayesian paired t-tests (we only conducted direct contrasts; i.e. not an omnibus F or B 
comparing the three conditions as the omnibus statistic would not be informative in terms 
of our hypotheses). Along with frequentist statistics, we calculated the corresponding 
Bayes factor (B) which was used as the basis of decision making in respect of the 
compared hypotheses.  
Bayes factor. The Dienes and McLatchie (2018) calculator in the R environment 
was used to calculate the Bayes factors, which has a t-distribution as a likelihood function 
for the data, and we set the degrees of freedom of the theory to 10,000 in each analysis to 
have a likelihood function for the theory close to normal. The computation of the B 
requires the specification of the prediction of the two models that we intend to compare. 
We applied a half normal distribution with a mode of zero to model the predictions of the 
alternative hypotheses, as the tested hypotheses have directional predictions and assume 
that smaller effects are more probable than larger effects (Dienes, 2014). We report Bs in 
the following format: BH(0, X), in which H indicates that the model is half-normal, the first 
parameter (0) stands for the mode of the distribution and the second parameter (X) is the 
SD of the distribution. To specify the standard deviation of the alternative models, we 
applied the following strategies. Based on the meta-analysis of Parris, Dienes & Hodgson 
(2013) who have found that the word blindness suggestion generally halves the 
interference effect of the baseline (no suggestion) condition, we employed half of the 
interference effect observed in the no suggestion condition as the SD of all models testing 
the difference between the suggestion and volition and the no suggestion conditions. In 
order to test the traditional Stroop and interference effects, we used the average of the 
Stroop and interference effects found among studies containing the word blindness 
suggestion (See Table 1 of Parris et al., 2013). Concerning the self-report measures, we 
applied the rule of thumb of Dienes (2014) that suggests, in the absence of prior 
information, to halve the scale of measurement and use it as the SD of the one-sided 
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model (if that matches scientific intuitions closely enough: In this case a population mean 
difference anywhere on the scales is not completely unreasonable).  
Although, B is a continuous measure of evidence by definition, we used the 
convention of 3 and 1/3 to distinguish between no evidence and good enough evidence 
for the alternative and null hypotheses, respectively (Jeffreys, 1961). Moreover, we use 
the label of moderate evidence for the values between 3-10 or 1/3-1/10, and the label of 
strong evidence for Bs greater than 10 or smaller than 1/10, in order to highlight the 
strength of the evidence (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013). 
A Bayes factor is the strength of evidence for one model over another and thus 
depends on what the models are (Rouder, Morey, Verhage, Province & Wagenmakers, 
2016; Rouder, Morey & Wagenmakers, 2016). We have endeavoured to keep the models 
simple and otherwise scientifically informed; nonetheless, the chosen parameters (e.g., 
the SD of a half-normal distribution) could be motivated in different ways. Therefore, to 
ascertain the robustness of our Bayesian conclusions to the SDs of the H1 models, we 
report a robustness region for each B, providing the range of SDs of the half-normal 
models that qualitatively support the same conclusion (using the threshold of 3 for 
moderate evidence for H1 and ⅓ for moderate evidence for H0) as the chosen SD21. The 
robustness regions are notated as: RR [x1, x2] where x1 is the smallest and x2 is the 
largest SD that gives the same conclusion.  
Bayesian parameter estimation with 95% Credibility intervals.  To explore 
the extent to which the post-hypnotic suggestion or the voluntary control reactivates a 
hypnotic trance, we applied parameter estimation rather than hypothesis testing. To 
conduct the estimation, we report the condition means of the depth of hypnosis with the 
95% Credibility Intervals (CI). Note that the 95% CIs are numerically identical to the 
95% Confidence Intervals as we employed uniform prior distributions.  
Results 
Data transformation.  The data of three participants were partially missing (one 
participant had only response time data whereas two participants had only self-reported 
data), and therefore they were excluded from the analyses. Trials with errors were omitted 
from the analysis of the response times (RTs) data (4.7% in total from which 1.4% from 
                                                 
21 Thanks to Balazs Aczel for this suggestion 
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the no suggestion, 1.9% from the suggestion and 1.5% from the volition conditions)22. 
Moreover, using the outlier exclusion criterion of Raz et al. (2002), we deleted RTs that 
were 3 standard deviations either above or below the mean (1% of the correct trials from 
which 0.2% from the no suggestion, 0.3% from the suggestion and 0.4% from the volition 
conditions). In order to test the congruency related effects, we computed new variables. 
We calculated the extent of interference effect (RT incongruent – RT neutral) in the 
different suggestion conditions for each participant. The interference effect was 
specifically identified by Parris et al. (2013) as the Stroop component most reliably 
affected by the word blindness suggestion. 
Outcome neutral tests 1: Was there a Stroop effect and did the suggestion 
work?  As expected, the RTs were the longest in the incongruent (M = 811, SD = 182) 
followed by the neutral trials (M = 766, SD = 177) and the fastest in the congruent trials 
(M = 729, SD = 173). Comparing the conditions revealed support for the Stroop 
interference (t(29) = 6.34,  p < .001, Mdiff = 45 ms, dz = 1.16 , BH(0, 62) = 8.1*103, RR[3, 
1.47*105]) and the Stroop effects (t(29) = 8.09,  p < .001, Mdiff = 82 ms, dz = 1.48, BH(0, 
90) = 7.4*105, RR[5, 2.79*105]). Also importantly, we found moderately strong evidence 
for the classical word blindness effect (t(29) = 1.99, p = .056, Mdiff = 34 ms, dz = 0.36, 
BH(0, 30) = 3.99, RR[15, 63]), as the extent of the Stroop interference was reduced from the 
baseline of 60 ms to 26 ms in the suggestion condition.  
Outcome neutral tests 2: Did suggestion and volition conditions differ in 
experienced degree of control?  The analysis of the experienced level of control over 
the meaningfulness of the words indicated that the instruction to imagine the word as 
meaningless characters triggered a process experienced as more controlled than the 
suggestion (t(29) = 5.34,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.9, dz = 0.98, BH(0, 1.5) = 5.4*103, RR[0.07, 
2.75*102]). Although, the participants tended to report that they perceived the script as 
meaningless in the suggestion condition (64% of the participants reported that they 
perceived rather than imagined the meaninglessness) and they rather imagined it in the 
volition condition (57% of the participants reported that they imagined and not perceived 
the meaninglessness), the results remained insensitive concerning whether the two 
                                                 
22 Note that we do not possess the raw data collected in 2013 anymore (only the RTs averaged across trials 
and within conditions and participants), therefore, these percentages have been based on the data collected 
from 22 participants in 2014. 
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procedures are different in nature (t(25) = 2.00,  p = .056, Mdiff = 0.23, dz = 0.39, BH(0, 0.5) 
= 2.78, RR[0.45, 4.8]).23 
Crucial test: Is the suggestion equally effective for suggestion and volition 
conditions?  Next, we tested the key prediction of the cold control theory by comparing 
the suggestion and volition conditions in terms of the RTs of interference effects, and the 
analysis yielded supporting evidence of a smaller interference effect in the suggestion 
condition (t(29) = 2.03, p = .052, Mdiff = 25 ms, dz = 0.37, BH(0, 30) = 4.00, RR[11, 50]). 
The participants managed to decrease the interference by 34 ms in the suggestion 
condition and only by 9 ms in the volition one compared to the no suggestion condition. 
However, the evidence regarding the difference between the volition and no suggestion 
conditions remained insensitive (t(29) = 0.51, p = .611, Mdiff = 9 ms, dz = 0.09, BH(0, 30) = 
.74, RR[0, 81]). Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the RTs in the congruency 
conditions broken down by the experimental conditions. Figure 1 depicts the distribution 
of the Interference scores in the three experimental conditions. 
  
                                                 
23 Note that the corresponding item of the questionnaire had only two levels (either imagination or 
perception), but we analysed the data as a continuous variable to make it comparable with the measure we 
will use in the pre-registered experiment. The Supplementary Materials include an analysis of these data 
that considers this item as a dichotomous variable and aims to estimate the effect size. The results are in 
accordance with those in the main text, namely, the estimation revealed that the effect size lies within a 
broad range covering values larger as well as smaller than 1(OR = 4, 95% CI[0.64-25.02]). 
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Figure 1. Violin plot portraying the distribution of interference scores in the three 
experimental conditions. The black dots indicate individual data points; one dot 
represents the interference score of a single participant.  
The expectations to see the words as meaningless characters were raised in both 
of the suggestion (t(29) = 5.99,  p < .001, Mdiff = 1.7, dz = 1.09,BH(0, 2.5) = 3.19*104, 
RR[0.11, 5.42*102]) and the volition conditions (t(29) = 5.65,  p < .001, Mdiff = 1.58, dz 
= 1.03, BH(0, 2.5) = 1.27*104, RR[0.11, 4.93*102]) compared to the no suggestion condition. 
Yet, these increments were comparable (See Table 1) and there is evidence for no 
difference between the suggestion and volition conditions (t(29) = 0.38, p = .710, Mdiff = 
0.12, dz = 0.07, BH(0, 2.5) = 0.18, RR[1.33, Inf]) implying that the the suggestion effect was 
enhanced  hypnotically versus volitionally beyond the impact of expectations (we have 
not regarded this as an outcome neutral test, in that if there had been an difference in 
expectancies we still could have conducted a version of the crucial test by partialling out 
expectancy effects). 
Supporting test of interest: Do suggestions and volitional requests produce 
the same subjective response?  We investigated whether the manipulation of the 
meaninglessness of the words was successful on the subjective level of the participants, 
and whether the posthypnotic suggestion and volitional request produced similar 
subjective responses. The descriptive statistics about the subjective experience of 
meaninglessness are shown in Table 2 for each question and condition separately. Note 
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that the first question was phrased reversed compared to the other three questions, thus, 
smaller values indicate stronger experience of meaninglessness in that case. The results 
of the phenomenological data on how the meaninglessness was sensed were only partly 
in line with the findings of the RTs. Statistically speaking, we found strong evidence 
favoring suggestion and volition over no-suggestion in creating vivid experiences of 
meaninglessness. Although, the participants reported that they sensed more meaningless 
words in the suggestion than in the volition condition (in case of three measures from the 
four) the evidence regarding the advantage of the posthypnotic suggestion over volition 
remained insensitive in each case.  
Q1.  We found strong evidence for a difference between no-suggestion and each 
of the suggestion (t(29) = 5.78,  p < .001, Mdiff = 45, dz = 1.05, BH(0, 50) = 2.04*104, RR[3,  
1.42*104]) and volition conditions (t(29) = 4.29,  p < .001, Mdiff = 36.8, dz = 0.78, BH(0, 50) 
= 4.15*102, RR[4, 9.45*103]). However, the evidence is insensitive in respect of the 
difference between these latter two conditions(t(29) = 1.56,  p = .13, Mdiff = 8.2, dz = 0.29, 
BH(0, 50) = 0.65, RR[0, 99]). 
Q2.  The results revealed strong evidence in favour of the difference between no 
suggestion and suggestion conditions (t(29) = 4.69,  p < .001, Mdiff = 34.1, dz = 0.86, BH(0, 
50) = 1.10*103, RR[3, 9.65*103]) and moderate evidence favouring  a difference between 
no suggestion and volition conditions: (t(29) = 2.64,  p = .013, Mdiff = 19.6, dz = 0.48, 
BH(0, 50) = 6.90, RR[5, 1.23*102]). The data show insensitivity whether the suggestion and 
volition conditions differ (t(29) = 2.04,  p = .0502, Mdiff = 14.5, dz = 0.37, BH(0, 50) = 1.99, 
RR[31, 3.14*102]). 
Q3.  The results indicate strong evidence favouring a difference between no 
suggestion and suggestion conditions (t(29) = 3.66,  p < .001, Mdiff = 24.5, dz = 0.67, BH(0, 
50) = 71.47, RR[3, 1.35*103])  and between no suggestion and  volition conditions (t(29) 
= 3.32,  p = .002, Mdiff = 28.7, dz = 0.61, BH(0, 50) = 36.9, RR[4, 7.33*102]). Moreover, we 
have strong evidence that the suggestion and volition do not differ (t(29) = -.59,  p = .557, 
Mdiff = -4.3, dz = -0.11, BH(0, 50) = 0.09, RR[14, Inf]). 
Q4.  Similarly to Q2, we found strong evidence for  a difference between the no 
suggestion and suggestion conditions (t(29) = 5.31,  p < .001, Mdiff = 34.4, dz = 0.97, BH(0, 
50) = 5.51*103, RR[3, 1.05*104]), moderate evidence for a difference between no 
suggestion and the volition condition (t(28) = 2.60,  p = .015, Mdiff = 17, dz = 0.48, BH(0, 
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50) = 5.71, RR[4, 100]) and insensitive evidence for the difference between suggestion 
and volition conditions (t(28) = 2.05,  p = .049, Mdiff = 15.2, dz = 0.38, BH(0, 50) = 2.11, 
RR[33, 3.35*102]). 
Exploration: Do post-hypnotic suggestions produce a hypnotic trance at the 
time of activating the suggestion?  The suggestion might not be truly post-hypnotic as 
the participants reported being relaxed or even hypnotised (M = 1.37, 95% CI[1.06 – 
1.67]) when the post hypnotic suggestion was triggered, indicating that a hypnotic state 
might have been experienced. Seemingly, voluntary control does not involve 
experiencing this hypnotic state, as the upper bound of the 95% CI (M = 0.8, 95% CI 
[0.52 - 1.08]) barely exceeded the level of being relaxed.  
Table 1 
Summary Table about the Means of the RTs and Self-report Measures in the three 
Experimental Conditions 
  Experimental condition 
Category Item (scale) No Suggestion Suggestion Volition 
Response 
times (RTs) 
Incongruent (ms) 853 (187) 775 (207) 805 (213) 
Neutral (ms) 793 (183) 749 (205) 755 (198) 
Congruent (ms) 748 (141) 712 (212) 726 (214) 
Expectations Expecting the 
words to be 
meaningless (0-5) 
0.59 (1.03) 2.29 (1.40) 2.17 (1.28) 
Experienced 
Control 
Control over 
meaningfulness 
(0-3) 
2.33 (0.84) 1.1 (0.69) 2 (0.71) 
Perception vs. 
Imagination (% of 
perception) 
- 64% (49) 43% (50) 
Depth of 
hypnosis 
Depth of hypnosis 
during the task (0-
3) 
0.43 (0.5) 1.37 (0.81) 0.8 (0.76) 
Note. The Standard Deviations (SD) of the means are shown within the brackets.  
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Table 2 
Summary Table of the four Items Measuring the Subjective Experience of 
Meaninglessness 
Item Experimental condition 
No suggestion Suggestion Volition 
Q1: „Was the meaning of the words on 
the screen completely clear to you”  
 
81.8% (25.9) 36.8% (28.5) 45% (35) 
 
Q2: „Were you aware of only an 
unclear meaning of the words on the 
screen” 
 
13.7% (25.7) 47.8% (34.3) 33.3% 
(30.6) 
 
Q3: „Were you just aware of the color 
and had no idea of what script of the 
words were written in” 
20.9% (29.3) 45.3% (31.8) 49.6% 
(33.7) 
Q4: „Were the words on the screen 
written in a clear yet meaningless 
script” 
12.6% (23.1) 47% (30.5) 30% (31) 
Note. The Standard Deviations (SD) of the means are shown within the brackets. 
Discussion 
In this experiment we aimed to discover whether highly suggestible people can produce 
the word-blindness effect outside of hypnotic context by voluntarily imagining the words 
as meaningless. The results provided moderate to strong evidence supporting the 
successfulness of the experimental manipulations in outcome neutral tests. Most 
importantly, the classical word-blindness effect was replicated and the volitionally 
induced meaninglessness was experienced as voluntary compared to its post-hypnotic 
counterpart. Although, the second measure assessing the nature of control was not 
sensitive, the amount of evidence was close to the convention of 3 (B = 2.78), suggesting 
that the process of meaninglessness was experienced as imagined in the volitional 
condition and as perceived in the suggestion condition. This difference between the two 
measures of control might be due to the fact that the latter item was only dichotomous 
and so not sensitive enough to capture the mild difference in how people sensed the 
meaninglessness. Therefore, a continuous item assessing the nature of control would be 
more appropriate. In sum the outcome neutral tests were satisfied and we can proceed 
with the crucial test. 
The main results revealed that volitionally induced control by imagining the words 
as meaningless characters did not enhance performance on the Stroop task to the same 
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extent as the post-hypnotic suggestion. The evidence remained insensitive regarding the 
efficiency of voluntary control. Theories of hypnosis that regard the unique hypnotic 
nature of a response is constituted simply by a change in monitoring HOTs, such as the 
simplest versions of the cold control theory, cannot account for these data as it seems that 
the suggestion allowed highly suggestible people to more efficiently resolve conflict than 
it was possible for them through non-hypnotic means. Thus, retaining the assumption of 
cold control that hypnotic vs non-hypnotic action differ primarily in accurate HOTs of 
intending, it seems HOTs of intention, at least the intention to create the experience of 
meaninglessness, can disrupt task performance; thus, HOTs can have causal effects on 
first-order states (cf. Rosenthal, 2008). Incidentally, this finding depicts a counterexample 
for the concept that conscious cognitive control processes are superior to unconscious 
ones (Cleeremans, 2006), given the assumption that the hypnotic and volitional processes 
differ in the conscious status of the intentions. 
A plausible candidate that can influence the two types of control to produce 
different results is the expectation about their efficiency, which is a well-known predictor 
of behaviors elicited by suggestions (Kirsch, 1985; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999). Our scale 
measuring the participants` expectations emphasised the experience of `word 
meaninglessness` and the results derived from these data indicate that expectancy was the 
same in the volitional and the suggestion condition, implying that expectancies of 
meaninglessness alone cannot account for the difference in the effectiveness in producing 
the word blindness effect in the two conditions. However, the underlying mechanism of 
the word blindness suggestion may not be related or restricted to visual processing, which 
would call into question the relevance of the scale we used in gauging expectations. 
Recent behavioral and neural studies of the word blindness suggestion provide evidence 
for the notion that the suggestion affects cognitive control processes rather than the visual 
input stream, thus, the successfulness of the suggestion might lie in the enhanced conflict 
resolution and not in the dampened perception of the meaning of the words (Casiglia et 
al., 2010; Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Parris et al., 2013; Zahedi, Stuermer, Hatami, 
Rostami & Sommer, 2017). In line with this view, the suggestion, in our experiment, 
seemed to influence the performance mostly on the incongruent trials by reducing it 
compared to the no suggestion and volition conditions. Therefore, a measure of the 
expectations should aim to assess the beliefs of people about the efficiency of voluntary 
and involuntary control and not solely focus on the experience of meaningfulness. 
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Incidentally, this new design will also allow us to critically evaluate the simplest form of 
the response expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985), which claims that expectations are the 
single driving factors of hypnotic responses. Were the extent of interference different in 
volition and suggestion conditions while the expectations to see the words as meaningless 
characters, and to exert control be comparable in the two conditions, the response 
expectancy theory will need to be revised.  
Cold control theory asserts that to create the experience of meaninglessness the 
subjects need to have a first-order intention to produce it by engaging in an active strategy. 
The exact mechanism of this strategy is a mystery currently, but several empirical studies 
have been conducted on this issue that can help us exclude possible explanations. For 
instance, as mentioned above, it has been demonstrated that neither the dampening of the 
visual input (Raz et al., 2003), nor the inhibition of meaning processing can be responsible 
for the whole word blindness effect (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Parris et al., 2013; 
Zahedi, et al., 2017). These findings are in consonance with the fact that a posthypnotic 
suggestion that specifically requires highs to lose the ability of reading did not result in 
the reduction of the Stroop interference effect; it appears that the suggestion needs to 
include a phrase such as “words are meaningless gibberish” to be successful in enhancing 
performance (MacLeod, 2011). Consequently, the meaning of the words must be 
processed to some extent even in the suggestion condition indicating that the information 
that the scripts of the stimuli are in fact meaningful is available to the participants. This 
strikes a chord with the idea that highs need to hold two models of reality in the suggestion 
condition as they do in the volition one.  In one model, the meaning can be extracted from 
the words, as they are meaningful, whereas in the other counterfactual model, this is not 
possible. Entertaining multiple models is the basis of pretence and imagination (Perner, 
1991); not being aware that one intended to engage in pretence or imagination would, 
according to cold control theory, lead to the experience of hallucination or delusion.  
Pre-registered Experiment  
In this experiment, we intend to replicate the pilot experiment as a multi-lab pre-registered 
replication project to increase the evidential value (by virtue of a larger sample) of our 
data. Moreover, we introduce a new item measuring the participants` expectations to how 
easily they can overcome the interference in each condition. With this, we aim to address 
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more thoroughly whether involuntary control can be more efficient than the voluntary 
counterpart beyond the influence of expectations.  
The questions that will be addressed are those of the pilot study: (a) Outcome 
neutral test: Was there a Stroop effect and did the suggestion work?; (b) Outcome neutral 
test: Did suggestion and volition conditions differ in experienced degree of control?; (c) 
Crucial test: Is the suggestion equally effective for suggestion and volition conditions in 
reducing Stroop interference as measured in RTs (taking into account expectations)?; (d) 
Supporting test of interest: Do suggestions and volitional requests produce the same 
subjective response?; (e) Side interest: Do post-hypnotic suggestions produce a hypnotic 
trance at the time of activating the suggestion? Is the depth of hypnosis different for the 
suggestion and volition conditions? In addition, we will explore whether the post-
hypnotic suggestion produces a subjective experience of being in hypnosis while it is 
activated: Traditionally it is assumed that a post-hypnotic suggestion, by virtue of being 
post-hypnotic, does not involve the experience of being in a hypnotic state at the time of 
responding (Terhune, Luke & Cohen Kadosh, 2017).  Furthermore, we will estimate the 
extent to which self-reported measures of the feeling of voluntariness converge to assess 
their validity. Finally, we will run an exploratory correlation analysis to estimate the 
extent to which the participants are engaging in the same cognitive strategy in the volition 
and suggestion conditions. The results of this analysis can be used to estimate the sample 
size of a future study that aims to reach a good enough evidence supporting the idea that 
the underlying mechanisms of the responses are either the same or different in the two 
conditions.24 
Methods 
Participants.  Labs from the following institutions recruited participants 
throughout the academic year of 2018-19: University of Sussex, School of Psychology 
(US) Lancaster University Department of Psychology (LaU).25 We invited highly 
suggestible students who are proficient readers of English to attend the experiment in 
exchange for course credits or payment. The amount of payment and course credits will 
be in line with the regulations of the local universities (£10 at US, £7 at LaU). The 
suggestibility of the students was gauged by the Sussex Waterloo Susceptibility to 
                                                 
24 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
25 We planned to recruit participants at the University of Bournemouth (UB) and at Lund University (LuU); 
however, for various reasons we did not manage to collect data at these universities. 
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Hypnosis scale (SWASH; Lush, Moga, McLatchie & Dienes, 2018) prior to participation 
and the threshold of highly suggestibility was based on the composite SWASH score (top 
15% of the population) of the first year psychology students at Sussex (year 
2018)(matching typical percentages used to define “high” in the literature; Barnier & 
McConkey, 2004; Anlló, Becchio & Sackur, 2017). This score was 5.35 on a scale from 
0 to 10. To reduce the cost of screening at LaU, where possible we planned toinvite 
participants to undertake the SWASH who were previously identified as highs with other 
measures. The participants were asked to read an information sheet about the study and 
consent to the terms of participation before starting the experiment. The local Ethical 
Committees have approved the study. 
Since we relied solely on Bayes factors to draw statistical inference, we useed 
optional stopping (Rouder, 2014). The minimum sample size was set at 20 and then we 
conducted all of the crucial analyses after roughly every subject (as different labs are 
involved there were some clumping). We stop collecting the data when all outcome 
neutral tests provide at least moderate evidence supporting that they have been successful, 
or else have failed, and when the main test of the study, comparing volition and suggestion 
conditions, also become sensitive (i.e. the B either larger than 3 or smaller than 1/3). A 
sample size estimation based on the data of the pilot study suggests that we need around 
40 participants to show supporting evidence for the null, if the difference between the 
samples is 0 ms and if the standard deviation of the crucial measure is the same in this 
study as observed in the pilot study (See Supplementary Materials for details of the 
analysis). Should any of the four analyses remain insensitive with 60 participants, we 
desist from recruiting more participants. We began to recruit participants after the date of 
in-principle acceptance (autumn term of 2018) and stop if all of the specified analyses 
reach sensitivity, if we have 60 participants or if the spring term of 2019 finishes (end of 
May). 
In total, we recruited 46 highly suggestible people from which we needed to 
exclude 9 participants as we did not use the appropriate item to measure their experienced 
control over their response. This step was approved by the editor (for the final items of 
the control measure see Appendix G.). Moreover, we needed to omit one more person as 
their RT data file was corrupted. All of the analyses are done on the data of the remaining 
36 participants (27 females, 1 unknown, Mage = 20.72, SDage = 4.55) from which 33 were 
recruited at US and 3 at LaU. 
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Stimuli and apparatus.  The materials of the registered experiment were 
identical to those used in the pilot. We employed OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & 
Theeuwes, 2012) to compile and run the Stroop task part of our experiment. The 
resolution of the applied computer screens was either 1280x1024 or adjusted to these 
values so that the size of the presented stimuli remained constant across labs. 
Design and procedure.  The design of the registered experiment was in 
accordance with those of the pilot experiment. To ensure that none of our participants 
possesses color vision deficiency, we included a statement in the recruitment letter that 
only people with intact color vision can attend the study. In addition, we made three 
modifications in the instruction of the volition condition. Namely, we put the sentence 
“You have the ability to do that anytime you please, under your control, as effectively as 
you just did.” before the following two sentences “You have the ability to do that anytime 
you please, under your control, as effectively as you just did. You'll notice we have not 
initiated a suggestion by clapping or giving any other cue.”, in order to avoid the 
implication that the participants have the ability to activate the suggestion without the 
clap even in the volition condition. Moreover, we replaced the “as effectively as you just 
did” part with “as effectively as you did it during the hypnotic induction” to make it clear 
that we refer to the word blindness test that was done during the induction procedure. In 
addition, we add an extra sentence highlighting that the effect of a suggestion can be 
achieved through voluntary means. See Appendix F for the final instruction of the volition 
condition. 
In addition, we introduced four amendments in the self-report measures: (a) we 
included a new item at the beginning of each Stroop condition measuring the expectations 
about the efficiency to control the interfering information; (b) we replaced the 
dichotomous answer option of the question measuring the experienced nature of 
meaninglessness by a continuous scale; (c) we omitted the question concerning the recall 
of the words; (d) we replaced the item measuring the depth of hypnosis to the one which 
is used in the SWASH (2018). See Appendix F for the new items.  
Data analysis 
The steps of the data analysis closely followed those of the pilot experiment, 
including the exclusion criterion regarding RT data and how we draw conclusions based 
on the results of the Bayes factors (e.g., outcome neutral tests and the crucial test).  
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In terms of Bayes factor calculation, we retained the parameters of the H1 models 
of the analyses with RTs. However, to increase the sensitivity of our tests with the self-
report measures in comparing the suggestion and volition conditions, we were informed 
by the results of the pilot experiment. Specifically, given the score of pilot subjects in the 
volition condition we can determine the maximum predicted change allowed with respect 
to the suggestion condition. For example on a 0-3 scale of experienced control (0 = no 
control, 3 = complete control), the volition condition in the pilot study scored 2.0, so the 
suggestion condition  could experience up to 2 rating units of less control (as it is expected 
to be smaller than the mean of the volition condition). The maximum difference between 
conditions was thus estimated as about 2 for the new experiment, and the SD of the half 
normal was set as max/2  = 1 rating unit (Dienes, 2014). For expectations (both questions), 
the SD was set at 1.4 by this process, and the SD for four items assessing subjective 
experiences as meaningless was set at 30. 
We had three outcome neutral tests to ensure that our experiment is able to test 
the proposed question. All of these tests had to provide evidence favouring the alternative 
hypotheses to allow us to carry on with the main analyses. We tested the presence of the 
Stroop interference effect while ignoring the influence of the type of the control. We 
tested that the experienced degrees of control is higher in the volition than the suggestion 
conditions. Finally, we  assessed whether the suggestion reproduced the word blindness 
effect by reducing the extent of Stroop interference in the suggestion condition compared 
to the no suggestion condition.   
The crucial test of the experiment was the comparison of the suggestion and 
volition conditions in terms of the extent of Stroop interference. Thus, we based our final 
conclusion on this statistical test. In addition, we planned to run a further analysis to 
control for the effect of expectations, conditional on the test of difference in expectations 
between the volition and suggestion conditions. If the evidence does not reach ⅓ to 
support the claim that the beliefs about the efficiency of suggestion and volition are 
identical, we would conduct the following secondary test. We would use a regression 
model with the difference in the interference score between conditions (suggestion vs. 
volition) as the dependent variable and the difference for expectations (suggestion vs. 
volition) as independent variables (if none of the expectation measures provide evidence 
for the null then the outlined analysis would be done as a multiple regression with both 
of the measures as predictors in the model). To conduct the crucial analysis while 
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partialling out the effect of expectations, we would test the intercept of the regression line 
against zero. By this, we could examine the difference between the suggestion and 
volition effects while controlling for the effect of expectations. The parameters of this 
Bayes factor analysis would be the same as the one testing the main question of the study. 
The following are not the main point of the experiment and are thus of secondary 
interest. We tested whether post-hypnotic suggestion and volitional request produce the 
same subjective responses in exactly the same way as was done in the pilot.   We estimated 
hypnotic depth for no suggestion, suggestion and volition conditionswith 95% CIs 
assuming a uniform prior over the scale range. To explore whether these conditions differ 
in hypnotic depth, we calculated the Bayes factor for the following comparisons: 
difference between no suggestion, suggestion and volition conditions. We modelled H1 
with a half-normal, and SD of 0.86 rating unit based on the difference between suggestion 
and volition conditions in the pilot (we used the difference between the volition and 
suggestion condition means after adjusting it according to the lengths of the new and old 
scales). 
To estimate the convergent validity of the self-report measures of involuntariness, 
we calculated the correlation and 95% CIs of the “level of control” and “experienced 
nature of meaninglessness” items on the difference scores of the volition and suggestion 
conditions. We can assess whether people changed the conscious status of the intention 
to imagine by the difference between volition and suggestion conditions in the 
experienced nature of meaninglessness item (i.e. experienced as imagination vs 
perception). As “imagination” is not mentioned in the volition instructions (unlike in the 
pilot), this tests whether subjects report a change that was not directly instructed, but 
should still occur according to cold control theory. As this item has a 4-point scale as the 
degree of control scale does, we tested with the same model of H1 (i.e. SD = 1 unit). We 
calculated the correlation and 95% CI between the extent to which subjects can reduce 
the interference in the suggestion and volition conditions.  
Results 
Data transformation.  Following the steps of the analysis of the pilot experiment, 
trials with errors were excluded from the analysis of the response times (RTs) data (6.9% 
in total from which 2.4% from the no suggestion, 2.2% from the suggestion and 2.3% 
from the volition conditions). Again, we omitted RTs that were 3 standard deviations 
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either above or below the mean (0.1% of the correct trials from which 0.3% from the no 
suggestion, 0.3% from the suggestion and 0.3% from the volition conditions).  
Outcome neutral tests 1: Was there a Stroop interference effect and did the 
suggestion work?  The pattern of the RTs followed that of the pilot experiment. The RTs 
were the longest in the incongruent (M = 830, SD = 144) followed by the neutral trials (M 
= 749, SD = 108) and the quickest in the congruent trials (M = 707, SD = 109). We found 
evidence both for the Stroop interference (t(35) = 8.80,  p < .001, Mdiff = 80 ms, dz = 1.47 
, BH(0, 62) = 1.70*108, RR[4, 2.79*104]) and the Stroop effects (t(35) = 12.03,  p < .001, 
Mdiff = 123 ms, dz = 2.00, BH(0, 90) = 5.52*1011, RR[5, 4.38*104]). Comparing the extent 
of the Stroop interference effect in the no suggestion and suggestion conditions revealed 
moderately strong evidence for the classical word blindness effect (t(35) = 2.20, p = .034, 
Mdiff = 31 ms, dz = 0.37, BH(0, 30) = 5.56, RR[10, 90]).The Stroop interference was 98 ms 
in the former and 67 ms in the later condition. 
Outcome neutral tests 2: Did suggestion and volition conditions differ in 
experienced degree of control?  We found strong evidence supporting that the 
participants experienced more control over the meaningfulness of the words when they 
responded to the volitional request than when they responded to the suggestion (t(35) = 
4.38,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.61, dz = 0., BH(0, 1) = 6.0*102, RR[0.06, 166]). Moreover, the 
participants experienced the effect of the meaninglessness in the suggestion condition 
mostly as perception, whereas they experienced it in the volition condition mostly as 
imagination (See Table 3 for descriptive statistics). Importantly, we found evidence for 
the difference of the conditions (t(35) = 2.68,  p = .011, Mdiff = 0.23, dz = 0., BH(0, 1) = 
7.65, RR[0.08, 2.74]). Finally, we estimated the correlation of the two measures using the 
Kendall`s τ method as it is robust to the violation of the assumption of normality. We 
computed the 95% Credibility Interval of the estimate with the 
credibleIntervalKendallTau R function (van Doorn, Ly, Marsman, and Wagenmakers, 
2016). The two items measuring whether the participants experienced control over their 
responses were associated only to a small extent and the possible population effect sizes 
lie within a rather wide range of values (τ =.10, 95% CI [-.13, .30]). 
Crucial test: Is the suggestion equally effective for suggestion and volition 
conditions?  To test the key prediction of the cold control theory, we compared the extent 
of the Stroop interference effect between the suggestion and volition conditions. The test 
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yielded data insensitivity with anecdotal evidence supporting the model predicting no 
difference (t(35) = 0.66, p = .514, Mdiff = 8 ms, dz = 0.11, BH(0, 30) = 0.65, RR[0, 64]). The 
evidence regarding the difference between the volition and no suggestion conditions 
remained insensitive with anecdotal evidence supporting their difference (t(29) = 1.46, p 
= .154, Mdiff = 23 ms, dz = 0.24, BH(0, 30) = 1.93, RR[0, 256]). Table 1 shows the means 
and SDs of the RTs in the congruency conditions broken down by the experimental 
conditions. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the interference scores in the three 
experimental conditions. 
 
Figure 2. Violin plot depicting the distribution of interference scores in the three 
experimental conditions.  
Importantly, we did not need to partial out the effect of the expectancies as for 
both of the measures we found supporting evidence for no difference between suggestion 
and volition. For the item measuring the expectations to experience the words as 
meaningless: t(35) = -0.50,  p = .618, Mdiff = -0.11, dz = , BH(0, 1.4) = 0.11, RR[]. For the 
item gauging the expectations that naming the color of the words will be easy: t(35) = -
0.50,  p = .543, Mdiff = -0.14, dz = , BH(0, 1.4) = 0.10, RR[0.43, Inf]. For the first item, both 
of the suggestion (t(35) = 6.25,  p < .001, Mdiff = 1.58, dz = , BH(0, 1.4) = 1.42*106, RR[0.09, 
521]) and the volitional request (t(35) = 7.92,  p < .001, Mdiff = 1.69, dz = , BH(0, 1.4) = 
1.60*107, RR[0.08, 583]) elevated the expectations compared to the no suggestion 
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condition. See Table 1 for the descriptive statistics. For the second item, neither the 
suggestion (t(35) = 0.47,  p = .642, Mdiff = 0.14, dz = , BH(0, 1.4) = 0.31, RR[1.32, Inf]) nor 
the volitional request (t(35) = 1.24,  p = .223, Mdiff = 0.28, dz = , BH(0, 1.4) = 0.60, RR[0, 
2.59]) managed to raise the expectations compared to the no suggestion condition. 
Supporting test of interest 1: To what extent does the magnitude of the 
reduction in the Stroop interference by the suggestion and by the volitional request 
correlate?  The extent by which the participants managed to reduce the Stroop 
interference while responding to the suggestion correlated strongly with their response to 
the volitional request (r = .70, 95% CI [.48, .83]). The plausible population effect sizes 
range among the large effect sizes as one can be 97.5% confident that the effect size is 
not smaller than .48. 
Supporting test of interest 2: Do suggestions and volitional requests produce 
the same subjective response?  We tested whether responding to the suggestion and to 
the volitional request was accompanied by a comparable phenomenology, namely the 
subjective experience of meaninglessness. The results of the subjective reports were 
mostly in line with the RTs as we found strong evidence for all four measures that the 
experience of meaninglessness was elevated by the suggestion and volitional request 
compared to the no suggestion baseline. The tests revealed evidence supporting the claim 
that one experiences the same level of meaninglessness while responding to the 
suggestion and the volitional request. Q1.  We found strong evidence for a difference 
between no-suggestion and both of the suggestion (t(35) = 4.91,  p < .001, Mdiff = 28.1, 
dz =, BH(0, 30) = 3.12*103, RR[3, 8.39*103]) and volition conditions (t(35) = 5.78,  p < .001, 
Mdiff = 30.1, dz =, BH(0, 30) = 3.64*104, RR[2, 9.69*103]). Moreover, there was evidence 
supporting the null effect in respect of the difference between the suggestion and volition 
conditions (t(35) = -0.61,  p = .549, Mdiff = -2.1, dz =, BH(0, 30) = 0.20, RR[18, Inf]). 
Q2.  Again, the results indicate strong evidence in favour of the difference 
between no suggestion and suggestion conditions (t(35) = 4.43,  p < .001, Mdiff = 24.9, dz 
= 0., BH(0, 30) = 804, RR[3, 6.86*103]) and between no suggestion and volition conditions 
(t(35) = 5.95,  p < .001, Mdiff = 28.2, dz = 0., BH(0, 30) = 5.90*104, RR[2, 9.15*103]). We 
found strong evidence supporting that suggestion and volition conditions do not differ 
(t(35) = -0.80,  p = .429, Mdiff = -3.3, dz = 0., BH(0, 30) = 0.08, RR[7, Inf]). 
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Q3.  The comparisons revealed strong evidence favouring a difference between 
no suggestion and suggestion conditions (t(35) =3.08,  p = .004, Mdiff = 19.7, dz = 0., BH(0, 
30) = 25.19, RR[3, 316])  and between no suggestion and volition conditions (t(35) = 3.66,  
p < .001, Mdiff = 20.4, dz = 0., BH(0, 30) = 99.60, RR[3, 1.26*103]). We found moderate 
evidence for no difference between the suggestion and volition conditions (t(35) = -0.18,  
p = .862, Mdiff = -0.7, dz = -0., BH(0, 30) = 0.12, RR[10, Inf]). 
Q4.  Similarly to the other measures, there was strong evidence supporting the 
difference between the no suggestion and suggestion conditions (t(35) = 4.23,  p < .001, 
Mdiff = 27.2, dz = 0., BH(0, 30) = 486, RR[3, 7.07*103]), moderate evidence for a difference 
between no suggestion and the volition condition (t(35) = 4.45,  p < .001, Mdiff = 25.1, dz 
= 0., BH(0, 30) = 852, RR[3, 6.95*103]) and insensitive evidence for the difference between 
suggestion and volition conditions (t(35) = 0.51,  p = .611, Mdiff = 2.1, dz = 0., BH(0, 30) = 
0.22, RR[19, Inf]). 
Exploration 1: Do post-hypnotic suggestions produce a hypnotic trance at the 
time of activating the suggestion?  Applying the new measure of hypnotic depth, we 
found again that the reported level of hypnotic depth was the lowest in the no suggestion 
condition (M = 0.93, 95% CI[0.55 – 1.31]), followed by the volition condition (M = 1.69, 
95% CI[1.21 – 2.18]), and it was the highest in the suggestion condition (M = 2.33, 95% 
CI[1.91 – 2.76]). Similarly to the pilot study, these results imply that participants’ 
response to the suggestion might not have been post-hypnotic as they reported to be 
stronger than slightly hypnotised during the Stroop task. Comparing the conditions 
revealed strong evidence supporting that all three differ from one another. No suggestion 
and suggestion (t(35) = 4.70,  p < .001, Mdiff = 1.40, dz = 0.78, BH(0, 0.86) = 1.34*103, 
RR[0.11, 407]), no suggestion and volition (t(35) = 2.64,  p = .012, Mdiff = 0.76, dz = 0.44, 
BH(0, 0.86) = 11.82, RR[0.16, 5.04]), and suggestion and volition conditions (t(35) = 2.77,  
p = .009, Mdiff = 0.64, dz = 0.46, BH(0, 0.86) = 14.36, RR[0.12, 5.47]). 
Exploration 2: Is there any relationship between the subjective responses of 
the participants and the extent to which they reduced Stroop interference? Finally, 
we explored whether or not the subjective ratings of meaninglessness and objective 
meaninglessness (reduction in Stroop interference) are related. We conducted the analysis 
of regression slopes where the predictors were the difference scores of subjective ratings 
(either the difference of no suggestion and suggestion, or the difference of no suggestion 
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and volition) and the outcome variable was the reduction in Stroop interference wither by 
the suggestion or by the volitional request. We ran regression analyses for all four 
subjective meaninglessness items, and modelled the predictions of H1 (asserting a 
positive relationship) with a half-normal distribution with a mode of zero and SD of 0.6. 
This latter value was obtained by dividing the maximum expected word blindness effect 
(60ms) with the maximum expected subjective meaninglessness (100%). The analysis of 
regression slopes revealed good enough evidence for H1 in all cases but one (Bs > 3.17, 
bs > 0.70), supporting the idea that there is a positive relationship between subjective 
experience of meaninglessness and the extent to which participants reduced Stroop 
interference. Table 5 present the results of the regression analyses.  
Table 3 
Summary Table about the Means of the RTs and Self-report Measures in the three 
Experimental Conditions 
  Experimental condition 
Category Item (scale) No Suggestion Suggestion Volition 
Response 
times (RTs) 
Incongruent (ms) 871 (178) 805 (128) 813 (178) 
Neutral (ms) 772 (113) 738 (109) 738 (137) 
Congruent (ms) 717 (111) 699 (118) 704 (141) 
Expectations Expecting the words to 
be meaningless (0-5) 
0.64 (0.76) 2.22 (1.17) 2.33 (0.99) 
Expecting to name the 
color easily (0-5) 
2.56 (1.23) 2.69 (1.21) 2.83 (1.21) 
Experienced 
Control 
Control over 
meaningfulness (0-3) 
2.36 (0.72) 1.50 (0.81) 2.11 (0.67) 
Experienced nature of  
meaningfulness (0-3) 
- 1.39 (0.90) 1.78 (1.15) 
Depth of 
hypnosis 
Depth of hypnosis during 
the task (0-5) 
0.93 (1.12) 2.33 (1.26) 1.69 (1.45) 
Note. The Standard Deviations (SD) of the means are shown within the brackets.  
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Table 4 
Summary Table of the four Items Measuring the Subjective Experience of 
Meaninglessness 
Item Experimental condition 
No suggestion Suggestion Volition 
Q1: „Was the meaning of the 
words on the screen completely 
clear to you”  
 
85.1% (17.3) 57.1% (28.4) 55.0% (27.1) 
Q2: „Were you aware of only 
an unclear meaning of the 
words on the screen” 
 
14.6% (19.0) 39.4% (27.9) 42.8% (26.1) 
Q3: „Were you just aware of 
the color and had no idea of 
what script of the words were 
written in” 
26.0% (30.6) 45.7% (30.3) 46.4% (28.4) 
Q4: „Were the words on the 
screen written in a clear yet 
meaningless script” 
17.4% (25.2) 44.6% (31.8) 42.5% (30.5) 
Note. The Standard Deviations (SD) of the means are shown within the brackets. 
Table 5. 
Results of the Regression Models Predicting Response Times Based on Subjects` 
Experience of Word Meaninglessness 
 Statistics 
Item Comparison b (ms/%) β t p BH(0, 0.6) RR 
Q1 Suggestion 0.94 0.38 2.38 .023 4.02 0.51, 6.31*103 
Volition 1.52 0.50 3.32 .002 3.17 0.58, 7.22*103 
Q2 Suggestion 0.70 0.28 1.69 .099 4.03 0.51, 6.29*103 
Volition 1.35 0.40 2.53 .016 2.86 0, 0.61 
Q3 Suggestion 0.71 0.32 1.97 .057 5.22 0.45, 5.60*103 
Volition 1.32 0.46 3.02 .004 4.11 0.5, 6.21*103 
Q4 Suggestion 0.76 0.35 2.15 .039 4.40 0.49, 6.05*103 
Volition 1.49 052 3.59 .001 3.97 0.49, 6.05*103 
Note. The raw slopes are indicated by b, whereas the standardised effect sizes are 
indicated by 𝛽. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this pre-registered experiment was to test a crucial prediction of the cold 
control theory, namely, whether highly suggestible people can produce comparable word-
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blindness effect when they voluntarily imagine that words are meaningless and when they 
respond to a post-hypnotic suggestion to see words as meaningless characters. 
Importantly, all of the outcome neutral tests of the experimental manipulation were 
fulfilled. We replicated the classical word-blindness effect, and there was strong evidence 
supporting the notion that the participants experienced their response less voluntary in the 
suggestion than in the volition and no suggestion conditions. Moreover, the participants 
reported that their experience of meaninglessness felt more like perception in the 
suggestion condition and more like imagination in the volition condition. This latter 
finding is in accordance with the claim of cold control theory that engaging in imagination 
without possessing an accurate HOT of the intention to do so should lead to the conscious 
experience of hallucination. Finally, we did not define the comparisons of the level of 
expectations as outcome neutral tests since there is a way to partial out their effect if we 
were to find a difference between the suggestion and volition conditions. Nonetheless, 
the tests revealed moderate evidence supporting no difference between suggestion and 
volition for both of the expectancy measures allowing us to rule out the response 
expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985; Kirsch & Lynn, 1997) as an alternative explanation if 
we were to find any difference between these conditions in terms of the magnitude of the 
word blindness effect. 
Cold control theory asserts that hypnosis influences the HOTs of intentions, 
inducing one to believe that their action is not voluntary while leaving the first order 
intention itself unaffected. Hence, as long as the first-order intention is sufficient to 
produce a certain response (e.g., word blindness effect), one should be able to respond 
equally to a (post)hypnotic suggestion and to a volitional request. The result of the crucial 
test is in line with this prediction, however, the Bayes factor did not exceed the level of 
good enough evidence. Currently, there is anecdotal evidence (B = 0.68) supporting the 
model predicting no difference between the suggestion and the volition conditions in the 
size of the word blindness effect over the model that predicts stronger word blindness 
effect in the suggestion than in the volition condition. Therefore, we need to suspend 
scientific judgment and we cannot draw a conclusion whether or not hypnosis is merely 
a simple change in the metacognition of HOTs of intending. To come to a conclusion, we 
will need to continue data collection until the Bayes factor exceeds either 1/3 or 3, which 
are the conventional cut-off of good enough evidence. Nevertheless, we provide the 
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interpretation of the results as if we found good enough evidence for H0 and then as if we 
found good enough evidence for H1. 
Testing whether there is an association between the extent to which highs reduce 
the Stroop interference in the suggestion and in the volition conditions can be a severe 
test of another core assumption of the cold control theory. This test examines whether the 
underlying mechanism of the response, or in other words the strategy used by the subjects, 
is the same when responding hypnotically and voluntarily. Although this analysis was 
defined as an exploratory one in the pre-registration with the aim to help the sample size 
estimation of a future study, the results of the analysis are in line with the existence of a 
strong relationship and it deems implausible that the relationship would be negligible or 
weak. We can be 97.5% confident that the population effect size is not smaller than .48 
(the result of the pilot study is essentially identical with the one of the pre-registered 
study, r = .74, 95% CI [.52, .87]). This finding further corroborates the idea that the 
subjects were indeed engaged in the same strategy in the suggestion and the volition 
conditions, while they responded hypnotically in the former and voluntarily in the latter.  
Obtaining good enough evidence for the absence of a difference between 
suggestion and volition conditions. This finding would imply that the simplest form of 
cold control theory can account for the hypnotic phenomenon. That is, the sole difference 
between a hypnotic and a non-hypnotic (or voluntary) response is the form of the 
accompanying HOT of the intention. Hence, unconscious intentions are no more efficient 
than conscious ones, or more generally speaking, HOTs have limited or no causal power 
over first-order states (Rosenthal, 2008). Nonetheless, this finding still begs the question 
of what is the strategy that highs are using to reduce the Stroop interference effect. For 
instance, it has been demonstrated that highs can still reduce the Stroop effect when their 
ability to blur their vision was disrupted and they could not simply look away from the 
screen to blunt their visual input (Raz et al., 2003). In a recent study of ours, we also 
found evidence supporting the notion that none of these strategies can be the underlying 
mechanisms of the word blindness suggestion (Palfi, & Dienes, 2019). We demonstrated 
in two experiments conducted outside of the hypnotic context that the subjects could 
diminish the extent of the Stroop effect via looking-away or blurring their vision, 
however, the RT pattern of the strategies did not follow the RT pattern of the suggestion. 
A defining characteristic of the word blindness suggestion is that it decreases the 
interference effect as well as the RTs of incongruent trials, yet, these strategies failed to 
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reduce the RTs of the incongruent trials. Moreover, we tested two additional candidate 
strategies in the first experiment: internal rehearsal of the target of the task (“displayed 
color”) and focusing only on a single letter of the presented word (for comparable 
strategies used in and out of hypnosis see Sheehan, Donovan, & Macload, 1988). The 
former strategy may improve task performance through enhancing goal-maintenance (De 
Jong, Berendsen, & Cools, 1999), whereas the latter one may facilitate the resolution of 
response conflict analogously to the single-letter coloring design, in which coloring solely 
the last letter of the Stroop word induces a smaller Stroop interference effect than coloring 
one of the letters in the middle of the word (Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997; for a review 
see Flaudias & Llorca, 2014). The participants could not benefit from using any of these 
strategies and did not reduce either the Stroop interference effect or the RTs of the 
incongruent trials rendering these strategies unlikely to be the underlying mechanism of 
the word blindness effect. Highs might follow the instructions of the suggestion and 
volitional request tightly and the strategy that they use may be imagination itself. Perhaps, 
imagining the words as being meaningless is enough by itself to reduce Stroop 
interference. For example, an imaginative strategy like this would only require subjects 
to entertain a counterfactual model of the world in which words are meaningless. This 
model might reset top-down cognitive control and facilitate the resolution of conflict. The 
results of Exploration 2, in which we found good enough evidence for a positive 
relationship between the subjective experience of meaninglessness and reduction of 
Stroop interference, are in line with this hypothesis. The more frequently subjects 
experienced meaninglessness when they responded to the suggestion or to the volitional 
request, the more efficiently they alleviated Stroop interference. Nonetheless, further 
research is needed to provide an experimental test of this idea, and it would need to be 
demonstrated that lows and mediums can reduce Stroop interference by creating and 
entertaining a counterfactual model of reality. 
A seminal theory of hypnotic responding, the response expectancy theory, is also 
in accordance with the main findings of the pre-registered experiment. Interestingly, this 
theory is not part of the metacognitive class of theories as it assumes that the creation of 
a hypnotic response does not require the involvement of intentional cognitive control 
processes. The mere existence of the expectancies are enough to produce the responses 
and these responses are accompanied by the feeling of involuntariness by virtue of not 
being intentional. Importantly, cold control theory and the response expectancy theories 
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are not mutually exclusive, hypnotic responses might be generated in multiple ways, and 
the current experiment did not aim to distinguish between the two theories. Finally, the 
special process theories of hypnosis that presume the existence of processes other than 
the relinquished metacognition over one`s intentions, expectations and beliefs are not in 
accordance with these findings. For instance, the integrative cognitive theory of hypnosis 
(Brown & Oakley, 2004) and many of the dissociation theories, such as the early version 
of the neodissociation theory (Hilgard, 1977), the dissociated control theory (Bowers, 
1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994) and the integrative model of dissociation theories (Woody 
& Sadler, 2008) surmise differential outcomes for responses to suggestions and volitional 
requests. In a nutshell, the results corroborate the cold control class of theories of hypnosis 
and disconfirm the non-metacognitive, special process theories that surmise that hypnosis 
can give rise to objective responses that cannot be induced via non-hypnotic means. 
Retaining the simplest form of cold control theory has clear and profound 
implications for the clinical application of hypnosis. Strictly speaking, applying hypnosis 
on its own or using it in tandem with therapeutic approaches, such as cognitive behavioral 
therapy (Kirsch, Capafons, Cardeña-Buelna, & Amigó, 1999) or suggestions (e.g., 
indirect suggestions of Erickson and his colleagues [1976]) should produce the same 
outcome as an appropriate control technique. According to cold control theory, a 
technique can be deemed appropriate control when the sole difference between the 
hypnosis and the control technique lies in the nature of the accompanying HOT of the 
behaviors of the clients engaged in the therapy. Meta-analyses concluding that the 
application of hypnosis has beneficial effects usually compare hypnosis to standard care 
groups, which is a mixture of various groups such as no treatment, standard treatment as 
well as waiting-list controls. However, the advancements in the outcome measures tend 
to disappear once hypnosis is compared to a therapeutic control group, which is a more 
adequate control than no treatment or standard treatment (e.g., in irritable bowel 
syndrome [Schaeafert, 2014] and chronic pain studies [Adachi, 2012]). Interestingly, 
there is evidence that hypnosis can improve the efficacy of some cognitive-behavioral 
treatments when the sole difference between the instructions of the hypnotic and non-
hypnotic groups was the usage of the term hypnosis in the former (Kirsch, Montgomery, 
& Sapirstein, 1995). Nonetheless, as argued earlier in this paper, the inclusion of the word 
hypnosis in the instructions can give rise to many confounding factors through elevating 
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expectations and motivation.26 One needs to carefully phrase the instructions used in the 
control group to make sure that people believe that their voluntary response can be just 
as efficient as their hypnotic one. Once we have ensured this, we can expect that the 
clients will benefit just as much from the non-hypnotic than from the hypnotic treatment. 
Obtaining good enough evidence for the model predicting larger word 
blindness effect in the suggestion than in the volition condition. Replicating the 
findings of the pilot study would imply that cold control theory needs to be revisited as 
the theory`s prediction that a response to a volitional request should be just as efficient as 
a response to a (post)hypnotic suggestion would be disconfirmed. Retaining the core 
assumption of the theory that hypnosis targets the HOTs of intentions, the next simplest 
model is a one, in which hypnosis can facilitate first-order intentions via altering the 
awareness over one`s first-order intention. Preserving this assumption is not unfounded 
as the result of the correlational analysis is in line with the notion that highs were engaged 
in the same strategy in the volition and suggestion conditions. Some unexpected 
implications follow from the revised version of cold control theory and the findings of 
this study: it enables HOTs to have a causal role and influence first-order states (cf. 
Rosenthal, 2008), and it demonstrates an example in which unconscious control is more 
efficient than the conscious one (cf. Cleeremans, 2006). These implications raise the 
question of how does the HOT of the intention influence the execution of the first-order 
intention. According to cold control theory, highs possessed the first order intention to 
create the experience of the script as being meaningless in both of the conditions. In the 
volition condition, as we have found it, it leads to the experience of being involved in 
imagination as highs entertained multiple models of the world: one in which meaning is 
accessible and a counterfactual one in which it is not (Perner, 1991). In the suggestion 
condition, however, highs were not aware of their intention to imagine the words as 
meaningless and so they perceived the words as meaningless, in other words, they had a 
hallucination like experience. Perhaps, responding hypnotically makes one sufficiently 
unaware of the real model of the world easing it to focus only on the counterfactual model. 
Whereas responding voluntarily requires one to entertain two conflicting models that 
might hinder the efficiency with which one can focus on the counterfactual one. 
                                                 
26 A similar point is made by Lynn et al. (2019) and Terhune et al. (2017) in their recent papers in which 
they reviewed the strength of the empirical evidence underlying the efficiency of hypnotherapies. 
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Incidentally, these findings challenge the simplest form of the response 
expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985) that asserts that responses to hypnotic suggestions can 
be fully accounted for expectations and beliefs. Observing smaller Stroop effect in the 
suggestion than in the volition condition indicates that responding to the word blindness 
suggestion must have involved processes other than the formation of expectations. 
According to cold control theory, this additional step is the engagement in intentional 
cognitive control processes and it appears that under specific circumstances unconscious 
control processes can be more efficient than conscious ones. Frankly, the modified 
version of cold control theory is not the only one that is consistent with these findings. 
Several other theories of hypnosis, which are not part of the metacognitive class of 
theories, are in line with the current results showing the superiority of the suggestion 
condition over the volition one. For instance, the integrative cognitive theory of hypnosis 
(Brown & Oakley, 2004) and some of the dissociation theories, such as the early version 
of the neodissociation theory (Hilgard, 1977) and the integrative model of dissociation 
theories (Woody & Sadler, 2008). We argue, however, that accepting the explanation of 
the modified version of cold control theory is the next logical step as it is the most 
parsimonious explanation provided by the theories that are in accordance with the results. 
The findings of this study have far-reaching implications for the application of 
hypnosis in the clinical context. For instance, the revised version of the cold control 
theory has clear predictions on when should we expect that adding hypnosis to a 
therapeutic technique is advantageous compared to the non-hypnotic technique. 
Assuming that highs can focus better on counterfactual models of reality when they 
respond hypnotically compared to when they respond voluntarily implies that therapies 
that involve imagination can be improved (at least for highs) when they are applied in 
tandem with hypnosis. Imagination is an essential part of many of the cognitive-
behavioral treatments that generally consists of cognitive strategies, imagery or 
systematic desensitization (Kirsch, Montgomery, & Sapirstein, 1995; Spinhoven, 1987). 
A meta-analysis of 18 studies with various problems and cognitive-behavioral treatments 
to resolve them revealed evidence favoring the adjunct role of hypnosis (Kirsch, 
Montgomery, & Sapirstein, 1995). Nonetheless, these studies did not control for potential 
confounds such as the effect of lifted expectations and motivation in the hypnotic 
compared to the non-hypnotic group, hence, further research is needed to test the 
prediction of cold control theory about the superiority of treatments used in tandem with 
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hypnosis over treatments without hypnosis. For instance, hypnosis might facilitate 
treatments of chronic pain that involve the imagery of a pleasant feeling (e.g., warmth) to 
distract one from the unpleasant feeling, or treatments aiming to alleviate phobias using 
systematic desensitization. Imagining the subject of one`s phobia may feel more real 
when it is experienced as perceived during hypnosis, which might lead to a more 
successful desensitization and adaptation. The application of hypnosis could even 
improve treatments mitigating addictive behavior, such as smoking. Being immersed in 
the picture how one`s lung might look like after life-long smoking could create stronger 
motivation to stop smoking when one is doing it hypnotically compared to doing it non-
hypnotically. Nevertheless, many other therapeutic exercises do not require subjects to 
engage in a counterfactual model of the world, and according to the revised version of 
cold control theory, these techniques should not be catalysed by hypnosis. For example, 
physical anchors (e.g., touching first and second finger together) are posthypnotic 
suggestions that can help subjects implement in their everyday life what they have learned 
during the therapeutic session (Lynn & Kirsch, 2006). An anchor can, for instance, reduce 
craving for smoking by facilitating access to one’s reasons for becoming a non-smoker. 
When an anchor is used hypnotically, one can recall one`s reasons in a way that is 
experienced involuntary, however, according to cold control theory, one should be able 
to recall these reasons just as well in a non-hypnotic way by using a non-hypnotic anchor.  
Experience of hypnotic depth. Although it was not related to the main point of 
the current paper, we aimed to explore whether highly suggestible people report the 
experience of hypnotic depth while they respond to a post-hypnotic suggestion. In 
principle, post-hypnotic suggestions are preferred over hypnotic ones in experimental 
settings as they can control for the influence of the hypnotic induction (e.g., Terhune, 
Luke & Cohen Kadosh, 2017). However, participants might interpret the situational needs 
otherwise and they still create the experience of being in a hypnotic state. Our findings 
are partly in line with this latter assumption. We observed that the participants report 
stronger hypnotic depth experience in the suggestion than in the no suggestion condition 
and that the plausible effect size lies within the range of 1.91 – 2.76 on a scale from 0 to 
5 (where 1 means slightly hypnotized, and 5 indicates deeply hypnotized). Unfortunately, 
we did not gauge the level of hypnotic depth during the induction and after the de-
induction, which could have provided us with baselines on the scale (this was pre-
registered, however, we failed to include it in the procedure). Nonetheless, we know from 
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another project of ours in which we also used the word-blindness suggestion that the level 
of hypnotic depth is substantially smaller in the suggestion condition than during the 
induction, and more importantly, we did not find evidence that hypnotic depth is stronger 
during the execution of the suggestion than right after the de-induction (Palfi, Parris, Seth 
& Dienes, 2018). Taken together, these findings make it plausible that at least some of 
the subjects interpret the context as they need to create the experience of being in a 
hypnotic state while responding to the posthypnotic suggestion. However, it is safe to 
assume that even if they do so they do not achieve the same level of hypnotic depth as 
they would during the hypnotic induction. 
Conclusion 
The cold control theory, which is perhaps the simplest theory of hypnotic responding, 
asserts that hypnosis is a metacognitive phenomenon and the sole difference between a 
response to a hypnotic suggestion and a volitional request lies in the nature of the 
accompanying HOT of the first-order intention. In a pre-registered multisite experiment, 
we tested a key prediction of the theory that objective responses (i.e., the word blindness 
effect) to suggestions and volitional request should be identical (after controlling for the 
effect of expectations). The strength of the evidence is not good enough to draw 
conclusions from the critical test of the theory. However, anecdotal evidence suggest that 
highs reduce the Stroop interference to the same extent when they respond to the word 
blindness suggestion and when they respond to its volitional request counterpart. These 
results settle the issue about the influence of hypnosis on first-order states in favour of 
the cold control theory. Several implications follow from this conclusion: the notion that 
HOTs have limited or zero causal role is corroborated (Rosenthal, 2008). The clinical 
application of hypnosis as an adjunct to therapies should be revisited: according to cold 
control theory, hypnosis cannot increase the successfulness of a therapeutic treatment 
beyond the effect of elevated expectations and motivation. Nevertheless, to draw strong 
conclusions the continuation of data collection is imperative.  
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Chapter V: Can hypnotic suggestibility be measured online? 
Introduction 
Hypnosis and hypnotic suggestions have been shown to be useful experimental tools to 
test theories of cognitive neuroscience (Oakley & Halligan, 2013; Raz, 2011), especially 
theories related to consciousness (Cardeña, 2014; Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz, & Lynn, 
2017). For instance, hypnotic suggestions can evoke changes in the feeling of 
voluntariness (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980) or modify one`s sense of agency (Haggard, 
Cartledge, Dafydd, & Oakley, 2004; Lush et al., 2017; Polito, Barnier, & Woody, 2013). 
Responses to suggestions frequently involve alterations in perception, such as the 
experience of positive and negative hallucinations or delusions (Kihlstrom, 1985; Oakley 
& Halligan, 2009). Moreover, hypnotic suggestions can be employed to simulate some 
properties of neurological and psychiatric conditions in healthy subjects (Barnier & 
McConkey, 2003; Oakley, 2006). Finally, correlations between hypnotisability and 
measures employed by consciousness researchers (e.g., the rubber hand illusion; the 
vicarious pain questionnaire; mirror touch synaesthesia) have recently been found (Lush 
et al., 2019). These correlations suggest that measures common in the consciousness 
literature are driven by hypnotic suggestibility. There is therefore an increasing need for 
an expansion of hypnosis research. Unfortunately, the successful application of hypnotic 
suggestions demands plenty of resources, making it impractical for researchers to run 
large-scale hypnosis related studies. In order to conduct experiments involving hypnosis, 
researchers generally need to recruit from a specific subsample of people based on their 
tendency to respond to hypnotic suggestions. To achieve this, researchers run hypnosis 
screening sessions before recruitment, so that, for example, they can identify the 
participants at the lowest and highest end of the scale (low and highly hypnotisable 
people, respectively). High and low hypnotisability are usually defined as the top and 
bottom 10%-15% of screening scores (Barnier & McConkey, 2004; Anlló, Becchio & 
Sackur, 2017). Therefore, screening procedures are time-consuming; to identify a single 
highly suggestible participant for an experiment, one has to find, on average, ten people 
who are willing to undertake a screening that can last from 40 up to 90 minutes depending 
on the applied method. 
The hypnosis screening procedure has moved through a long developmental 
process in which it has become more and more user friendly. Initially, the screening 
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consisted of two steps, a preliminary group session applying the Harvard Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Susceptibility Form A (HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1963) and an individual 
session using the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale Form C (SHSS:C; 
Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) conducted with only those scoring very high or low in 
the first session. The later development of a reliable group screening method, the 
Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (WSGC; Bowers, 1993), has 
drastically mitigated the time required for screening as it allows researcher to screen up 
to a dozen people in about 90 minutes (although it was originally intended to act as a 
second screen after an HGSH:A, a single screen with the WSGC is quite reliable enough 
to select subjects capable of later having compelling subjective responses to difficult 
suggestions, e.g. digit-colour synesthesia, Anderson, Seth, Dienes, & Ward, 2014, or 
compelling objective reductions in Stroop interference to alexia (word blindness) 
suggestions, e.g. Parris, Dienes, Bate, & Gothard, 2014). Recently, the Sussex Waterloo 
Scale of Hypnotizability (SWASH; Lush, Moga, McLatchie & Dienes, 2018) was 
introduced, which is a modified version of the WSGC. The SWASH includes new items 
to measure the subjective experiences of the participants (compare also the Carleton 
University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale [CURSS, Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, 
Stam, & Bertrand, 1983], the Creative Imagination Scale [CIS, Wilson & Barber, 1978], 
and the Experiential Scale for the WSGC [Kirsch, Milling, & Burgess, 1988]). The length 
of the procedure was reduced to 40 minutes and it can be run with larger groups than the 
WSGC (Lush et al., 2018). Moreover, the dream and age regression suggestions were not 
included in the SWASH. These highly personalized items of the WSGC can be risky by 
virtue of possibly triggering unpleasant memories or emotions (Cardeña & Terhune, 
2009; Hilgard, 1974).  
Nonetheless, the application of the least demanding methods (such as the 
SWASH, the CURSS or the CIS), still requires potential participants to attend a group 
session, which makes the screening procedure relatively time consuming and limits the 
subject pools to psychology students who are the easiest to incentivise to participate in a 
group screening on campuses. These two barriers of large-scale hypnosis studies could 
be overcome by employing fully automatized, online hypnosis screening procedures. In 
the last two decades, psychological science has witnessed growth in the application of 
online data collection for experimental purposes, paving the way for researchers to collect 
large samples in a short period of time (Reips, 2000; though it can come with its own 
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problems, e.g. Dennis, Goodson & Pearson, 2018). In order to adapt the hypnosis 
screening procedure online, one needs to ensure that the non “live” version can induce 
similar objective and subjective hypnotic responses as with a “live” hypnotist. Indeed, 
suggestibility scores of participants are comparable when the hypnotic induction and 
suggestions are delivered by a pre-recorded audiotape and when they are delivered by an 
experimenter (Barber & Calverley, 1964; Fassler, Lynn, & Knox, 2008; Lush, Scott, 
Moga, & Dienes, 2018). These findings underpin the idea that the participants could 
easily undergo a hypnosis screening procedure in their own rooms by listening to a pre-
recorded script and filling out the booklets online. Nevertheless, online data collection 
has its own perils, namely, the data acquired by online questionnaires might not be as 
reliable and the results might not be consistent with the ones of the traditional data 
collection procedures (Krantz & Dalal, 2000). Therefore, the reliability of new online 
questionnaires, such as the online version of a hypnosis screening procedure, needs to be 
tested even if there is evidence that the quality of the data and the findings of online based 
studies can be similar to those obtained by traditional methods (Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastava, & John, 2004; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). 
In this project, our purpose is to explore the extent to which an online hypnotic 
screening procedure is reliable and consistent with an offline procedure. To this aim, we 
measured people`s hypnotic suggestibility with the SWASH on two separate occasions 
and in two different environments. Henceforth, we call every type of data collection 
carried out in a controlled environment with the experimenter present an offline 
screening, whereas undertaking a hypnotic screening alone in one's own room under one’s 
own control will be called online screening. In addition, we are interested in the extent to 
which the length of the delay between first and second screen can influence the reliability 
and the scores of hypnotic suggestibility. The question about the stability of hypnotic 
suggestibility over periods of few days or even decades have inspired various research 
projects (e.g., Fassler, Lynn, & Knox, 2008; Lynn, Weekes, Matyi, & Neufeld, 1988; 
Piccione, Hilgard, & Zimbardo, 1989). To assess the stability of hypnotic suggestibility, 
we recruited half of the sample from the subject pool of the year of 2016 and the other 
half from the year of 2017, both of whom have already received offline screening. 
Therefore, for some of the participants, the delay between the two screenings is not more 
than 6 months (short delay group), whereas for the others, it is at least one and a half years 
(long delay group). For practical reasons, the first screening was organised offline, in 
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groups of 20-40 for all the participants, whereas the second screening was either an online 
screening or another offline one. By this method, we are able to estimate how strongly 
the type of the screening and the length of the delay can influence the suggestibility scores 
of the people; we can also assess their influence on the test-retest reliability and the 
validity of the screening. Taken together, this project strives to explore whether a well-
established offline screening procedure could be replaced for practical purposes by an 
online version, which could help consciousness researchers run more and larger hypnosis 
studies by drastically cutting the recruitment related costs. 
While responding to hypnotic suggestions, people tend to experience as of being 
in some form of trance or altered state (Kihlstrom, 2005; Kirsch, 2011). This experience 
is usually measured by subjective reports of depth of hypnosis (e.g., Hilgard & Tart, 
1966), which is, interestingly, strongly associated with people`s ability to respond to 
hypnotic suggestions (Wagstaff, Cole, & Brunas-Wagstaff, 2008). We investigate this 
link by assessing the strength of relationship between hypnotic suggestibility scores and 
depth of hypnosis reports, and the extent to which the mentioned experimental 
manipulations can influence this relationship. We also aim to evaluate the extent to which 
depth of hypnosis is influenced by the type of data collection and the length of the delay 
between screens to ensure that people experience comparable level of hypnotic depth 
during online and offline screens. 
In our analyses, we solely employed estimation procedures instead of testing the 
existence of differences with an inferential statistical tool such as the null-hypothesis 
significance test (Fisher, 1925; Neyman & Pearson, 1933) or the Bayes factor (e.g., 
Dienes, 2011; Rouder et al., 2009). Estimation is recommended over inferential statistics 
when the existence of a difference is established or it is not relevant (Jeffreys 1961; 
Wagenmakers et al., 2018). The second point proves to be decisive for our case, since it 
is not necessary to test the existence of any investigated effect to answer our research 
questions. For instance, the core aim of the current project was to conclude regarding the 
applicability of online hypnosis screening by comparing the SWASH scores, the 
reliability and the validity of online and offline hypnosis screening. Imagine a scenario in 
which an inferential statistical tool demonstrates evidence for the difference between the 
offline and online groups in favour of the offline group in all aspects that assess the quality 
of the measurement. Importantly, this outcome per se cannot give a definite answer to our 
central question as the mere fact that offline screening is significantly better than online 
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screening neglects the question of magnitude of the difference. To reject or accept the 
idea that online screening is viable, we need to know the extent to which the quality of 
offline and online screening differs so that we can decide whether the benefits of the 
online screen outbalance its costs. Further, the fact that the two types of screening will 
correlate cannot be in doubt; the question is simply the strength of the relationship 
between them. 
To explore the range of plausible effect sizes, estimation methods, either from the 
Bayesian (Kruschke, 2010, 2013; Rouder, Lu, Speckman, Sun, & Jiang, 2005; 
Wagenmakers, Morey, & Lee, 2016) or from the frequentist school (Cumming, 2014) can 
be used. Here, we applied a Bayesian tool, estimation by calculating the 95% Bayesian 
Credibility Intervals, as this is the method that is appropriate to answer our research 
question; namely, how confident can we be that the true effect size lies within a specific 
interval (Wagenmakers et al., 2018). Only Credibility Intervals allow us to make claims 
such as that the true value of the effect size is probably not larger or smaller than a 
particular value.  
Methods 
Participants 
Psychology students at the University of Sussex participated in an offline hypnosis 
screening as part one of their modules during the first semester of their studies. We 
recruited psychology students who had started their BSc studies in the year of 2016 or 
2017 and who had provided their contact information in an offline hypnosis screening 
session. Both subject pools consisted of around 300 students and we randomly assigned 
half of them to each experimental group (experimental groups described below). Thus, 
we invited around 150 people for each group. We continued data collection until the end 
of the spring semester of 2018. In the second session, 73 students participated. However, 
we could not trace back the data of two students to their first session results and so we 
needed to exclude them from all of the analyses, leaving us with 71 participants in total. 
Twenty-six students attended the offline session (23 females, Mage = 19.7, SDage = 1.8) 
and 45 students completed the screening online (41 females, Mage = 21.0, SDage = 5.3). 
We informed each participant about the nature of the study and only those students 
were be able to attend who agreed to the terms and conditions of the study. After finishing 
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the experiment, the participants were debriefed and received a payment of £5 or course 
credit. The study has been approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Sussex 
(Sciences & Technology C-REC). 
Materials 
One of the authors produced the audio recording of the hypnosis procedure (induction 
and the suggestions); the length of this recording was 28 minutes. The questionnaire 
applied in the first session for data collection was created in MatLab (MathWorks, 2016), 
whereas the questionnaire that was used in the second session was a PHP based website. 
The PHP script, the materials and the documentation on how to install the software can 
be accessed at https://osf.io/6twdp/. 
Measures 
The measures introduced below were utilised in the first occasion of the data collection. 
The second occasion only included the assessment of the hypnotic suggestibility 
measured by the SWASH regardless of the type of the session (offline or online). Note 
that, although several questionnaires were registered along with the first screening, we 
only used the suggestibility scores of the participants in this project (see our research 
questions in the last paragraph of the Introduction). 
SWASH.  The hypnotisability of the students was measured by the SWASH. This 
scale is a modified version of the WSGC (Bowers, 1993) which contains 10 suggestions 
and corresponding items measuring objective suggestibility and the subjective 
experiences of the participants about each suggestions. 
Data collection in 2016.  As part of the first session in 2016 the following four 
questionnaires were registered: (a) Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11), which consists 
of 30 items and measures people`s tendency to behave impulsively (Patton & Stanford, 
1995); (b) Free Will Inventory (FWI), which includes 29 items measuring people`s beliefs 
about free will and their relationships with these beliefs (Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, 
Sripada, & Ross, 2014); (c) Short Form of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire 
(FFMQ-SF), which is a 24-item scale assessing the mindfulness skills of individuals via 
self-report (Bohlmeijer, ten Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof, & Baer, 2011); (d) Dissociative 
Experiences Scale-II (DES-II), which is a 28-item self-report questionnaire developed by 
Bernstein and Putman (1986). 
  
125 
 
 
Data collection in 2017.  In 2017, we administered the following four 
questionnaires in the first data collection session of: (a) a 15 minutes long breath counting 
exercises based on Study 2 of Levinson, Stoll, Kindy, Merry & Davidson (2014); (b) the 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) consisting 15 Likert scale items (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003); (c) the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire-Brief (SPQ-B), which 
consists of dichotomous questions (Raine & Benishay, 1995); (d) the DES-II that was 
used in 2016. 
Design 
We employed a 2*2*2 mixed design. The within subject variable is the date of the data 
collection (first session vs. second session). The between subjects independent variables 
are the form of the second hypnosis screening session (offline vs. online) and the length 
of the delay between the first and the second sessions (short delay [few months] vs. long 
delay [more than a year]). 
Procedure 
There were three forms of data collection: 1) group sessions at the university with the 
experimenter present (first, offline screen) 2) individual sessions in a small experimental 
room at the university with the experimenter present (second, offline screen) 3) individual 
sessions at home (second, online screen,). All of the participants engaged in the first, 
offline, screen and later they were invited to attend in a second screen that was either 
offline or online. The procedure of the screening was identical in each case and followed 
the steps below. 
After providing informed consent, the participants had the opportunity to provide 
contact details for a database in case they were willing to participate in hypnosis related 
research in the future. Next, they were asked to adjust the volume of their headphones 
until it was moderately loud by listening to a test tune. Before starting the hypnotic 
induction procedure, they were notified that the whole procedure would last about 45 
minutes and that they should not take a break. By pressing the start button, participants 
ran  the hypnotic induction and suggestions. After the de-induction, participants were 
asked to fill out the SWASH response booklet, rating their response to each suggestion. 
Finally, the participants were thanked for attending and debriefed. 
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Data analysis 
Data transformation.  We computed the Objective and Subjective suggestibility 
scores of the participants as described in the SWASH manual (Lush et al., 2018) and then 
we doubled all subjective scores so that both of the objective and subjective scores fell 
between 0 and 10. By taking the weighted average of these derived scores, we calculated 
the composite SWASH score of each participant, which was used in the majority of the 
analyses. For more details on the calculation of the SWASH scores, see Lush et al. (2018; 
manual available at https://osf.io/wujk8/). Given that the distributions of the objective, 
subjective and composite SWASH scores of the first screen were all fairly normal (see 
Figure 1 in Preregistration), we assumed that the dataset of the second screen was also 
normally distributed. Therefore, we planned to use parametric methods to estimate the 
strength of correlation between continuous variables (Pearson`s r). 
Bayesian estimation.  In this project, we estimated the population effect sizes and 
did not test hypotheses. Thus, here, we report the estimates (e.g., mean or correlation) and 
the 95% Bayesian credibility intervals (CI) applying a uniform prior distribution. Note 
that, although, the bounds of the CIs are numerically equal to the bounds of the confidence 
intervals (assuming a uniform prior), their interpretation is different (e.g., Morey, 
Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2016). 
Implementation of the preregistration 
The design and research questions of this study were preregistered at osf.io/3abje. In order 
to ensure the reproducibility of the analysis and decrease analytic flexibility, we 
preregistered an analysis script, written in R (R Core Team, 2016), a prior to data 
collection. The script includes all of the steps defined in the preregistration and an 
additional data simulation, which helped us test and debug the script. In this paper, we 
present the results of analyses that were preregistered in the above-mentioned R script 
and results of two additional, non-preregistered analyses: 1) test-retest reliability of 
SWASH scores; 2) correlation between SWASH and depth of hypnosis scores. We 
deviated from the analysis script in one aspect. The calculation of the 95% CIs of the 
differences between two correlations was incorrect in the original script due to an issue 
with back-transformation of Fisher`s z values of difference scores to Pearson`s r (e.g., 
Meng, Rosenthal & Rubin, 1992; Olkin & Finn, 1995). Therefore, we used the cocor R 
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package (Diedenhofen & Musch, 2015), which is based on the approximation method of 
Zou (2007), to estimate the 95% CIs of the differences between correlations. 
Results 
SWASH scores 
The mean of the composite SWASH scores in the offline group (M = 3.44) was only 
slightly larger than the mean of the online group (M = 3.13) rendering their difference 
negligible (Mdiff = 0.31, 95% CI [-0.59, 1.22]). Crucially, the difference between the 
groups is unlikely to be larger than 1.22. The difference between the offline and online 
groups is likely to be negligible or small for both of the objective (Mdiff = 0.39, 95% CI [-
0.58, 1.36]) and subjective subscales (Mdiff = 0.24, 95% CI [-0.72, 1.19]). Panel A of 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the distribution of the composite SWASH scores of the offline 
group is akin to the online group. The density of the data is similar between the groups 
even around the right tail (top) of the distribution indicating that similar proportion of the 
participants scored high on the SWASH in the offline and online groups. The mean of the 
composite SWASH scores was comparable in the short (M = 3.32) and long delay groups 
(M = 3.10), and the plausible values of their differences vary around zero with a maximum 
difference of 1.10 (Mdiff = 0.21, 95% CI [-0.67, 1.10]). Table 1 presents the means and 
95% CIs of all groups and comparisons with the composite, objective and subjective 
scores separately. 
Table 1.  
The Mean Composite, Objective and Subjective SWASH Scores with 95% CIs Broken 
Down by the Type of the Second Screen and the Length of the Delay 
 Measure 
Group Composite Objective Subjective 
Offline 3.44 [2.73, 4.16] 3.92 [3.17, 4.67] 2.96 [2.19, 3.73] 
Online 3.13 [2.54, 3.71] 3.53 [2.89, 4.17] 2.72 [2.13, 3.32] 
Difference 0.31 [-0.59, 1.22] 0.39 [-0.58, 1.36] 0.24 [-0.72, 1.19] 
Short delay 3.32 [2.72, 3.91] 3.89 [3.26, 4.52] 2.74 [2.14, 3.35] 
Long delay 3.10 [2.42, 3.78] 3.28 [2.54, 4.02] 2.93 [2.19, 3.67] 
Difference 0.21 [-0.67, 1.10] 0.61 [-0.34, 1.57] -0.19 [-1.12, 0.75] 
Note. Values within the squared brackets represent the 95% Confidence Intervals. Data 
presented in this table are based solely on the second screen. 
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Validity 
The correlation between the objective and subjective subscales of the SWASH was strong 
for the offline screen (r = .78, 95% CI [.56, .89]) as well as for the online screen (r = .79, 
95% CI [.65, .88]) indicating appropriate validity in this respect. The difference between 
the offline and online screen in terms of the strength of the correlation between the 
objective and subjective scales was close to zero (r = - .02, 95% CI [-.25, .17]).  
 
Figure 1. Violin plots depicting the distribution of composite SWASH scores of the 
second screens broken down either by the type of the screen (offline vs. online, panel A) 
or by the length of the delay (long vs. short delay, panel B). Each black dot indicates a 
composite SWASH score of a participant. 
Test-retest reliability (non-preregistered) 
Correlation between the first and the second screen scores was strong for the subjective 
subscale but only moderate for the objective subscale irrespective of the type of the 
screen. For the composite scores, the correlation was strong for the online and offline 
group as well indicating a good enough test-retest reliability of the SWASH. Interestingly, 
the test-retest reliability of the online group was possibly higher than that of the offline 
group, although, only to a small extent (See Table 2 for rs and their 95% CIs). The 
correlation between the first and second screen scores was strong in the short delay group 
for the subscales as well as for the composite scores. However, the correlation was only 
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moderate in the long delay group implying that the test-retest reliability of the SWASH 
is influenced by the length of the delay between the screens from a weak to a moderate 
extent. Table 2 presents the exact correlation values and their 95% CIs separately for the 
experimental groups. 
Table 2.  
Test-retest Reliability of SWASH Scores Broken Down by Type of Screen and Length of 
Delay 
 Measure 
Group Composite Objective Subjective 
Offline .62 [.31, .81] .43 [.05, .70] .69 [.42, .85] 
Online .74 [.57, .85] .59 [.35, .75] .77 [.61, .87] 
Difference -.12 [-.45, .14] -.16 [-.57, .20] -.07 [-.37, .15] 
Short delay .79 [.65, .88] .65 [.44, .79] .81 [.68, .89] 
Long delay .55 [.20, .78] .37 [-.03, .67] .56 [.21, .78] 
Difference .24 [-.02, .61] .28 [-.08, .70] .25 [-.01, .61] 
Note. The correlation values are all Pearson`s rs and the 95% CIs are reported within the 
squared brackets. 
Depth of hypnosis 
Difference between the groups.  The participants reported somewhat higher 
depth of hypnosis scores in the offline (M = 2.15, 95% CI [1.61, 2.70]) than in the online 
(M = 1.73, 95% CI [1.31, 2.16]) group. Nonetheless, the difference between the groups is 
not substantial and the maximum plausible value of this difference is 1.10 (M = 0.42, 95% 
CI [-0.26, 1.10]). The mean of the depth of hypnosis scores in the short delay (M = 1.80, 
95% CI [1.35 – 2.26]) compared to the long delay group (M = 2.04, 95% CI [1.59, 2.49]) 
differed only to a small extent (M = -0.24, 95% CI [-0.87, 0.40]). Figure 2 portrays the 
distribution of the depth of hypnosis scores broken down by the type of the second screen 
(panel A) and the length of the delay between the first and second screen (panel B). The 
depth of hypnosis scores are similarly distributed in the offline and online groups. 
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Figure 2. Violin plots representing the distribution of depth of hypnosis scores separately 
for the offline and online screens (panel A), and for the short and long delay groups (panel 
B). 
Correlation between SWASH and depth of hypnosis scores (non-
preregistered).  The correlation between the SWASH and depth of hypnosis scores was 
strong for all but one measure in the online and for all in the offline screen group (all r > 
.54). The strength of the correlation is unlikely to be larger than .21 in the offline group 
than in the online group rendering the difference between the two groups minimal. There 
was strong correlation between the depth of hypnosis scores and all measures in the short 
delay group (all r > .70), and the correlations were moderate to strong in the long delay 
group (all r > .31). The difference between the two groups for the strength of the 
correlations was weak to moderate, and it was the highest for the objective scores. Table 
3 shows all of the correlation values and their 95% CIs separately for the experimental 
groups and for all of the measures. 
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Table 3.  
Correlation Between SWASH and Depth of Hypnosis Scores Broken Down by the Type of 
Screen and the Length of Delay 
 Measure 
Group Composite Objective Subjective 
Offline .76 [.53, .89] .66 [.37, .84] .77 [.54, .89] 
Online .70 [.52, .83] .54 [.29, .72] .81 [.67, .89] 
Difference .06 [-.21, .28] .12 [-.22, .43] -.04 [-.28, .15] 
Short delay .79 [.65, .88] .70 [.51, .82] .83 [.71, .90] 
Long delay .55 [.20, .78] .31 [-.10, .63] .70 [.41, .86] 
Difference .24 [-.03, .60] .38 [.02, .81] .13 [-.07, .42] 
Note. The correlation values are all Pearson`s rs and the 95% CIs are reported within the 
squared brackets. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to explore whether online hypnosis screening is 
feasible as the adaptation of this method could ease the recruitment related costs of 
hypnosis research. To this aim, we estimated the extent to which offline and online 
hypnosis screening scores, measured by the SWASH, are comparable. The results 
revealed that the difference between offline and online groups was small to negligible in 
all aspects and, importantly, applying online rather than offline screening is unlikely to 
reduce the composite screening score by more than 1.22 and the objective score by more 
than 1.36 out of ten. To put these effect sizes in perspective, for instance, a recent meta-
analysis of four studies investigating the influence of standard induction procedures on 
suggestibility found that, on average, people score 1.46 higher (out of ten) on scales 
assessing objective responses to suggestions if they had received a priori induction 
compared to no induction (Martin & Dienes, 2018). Moreover, the average SWASH score 
in the online group was comparable to the result of an earlier screen conducted in group 
sessions at the same university (Lush et al., 2018). Finally, it is not only the average scores 
in the online group that can be deemed acceptable, the distribution of SWASH scores 
were also akin in the offline and online groups even at the positive end of the scale. This 
implies that some people can successfully respond to many suggestions when they 
undertake an online screening (See Figure 1). None of this was obvious before the data 
were collected. 
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The correlation between objective and subjective scores was strong for both of the 
offline and online groups; crucially, the correlation in the online group can only be as 
small as .65. This indicates that the validity of the SWASH remained acceptable even 
with online data collection. Moreover, the strength of the correlation between the 
subjective and objective components of the SWASH found by Lush et al (2018) was .70, 
which is consistent with our results. The strength of the correlation between SWASH 
scores of the first and second screens was medium in the offline and strong in the online 
group. The lower bound of the 95% CI in the online group was .57 implying that the test 
re-test reliability of the online measurement is adequate. These values are also appropriate 
in relative terms. For instance, Fassler et al. (2008) employed the CURSS which has an 
objective and a subjective subscale such as the SWASH, in two occasions and the test re-
test correlations were .59 and .77 for the objective and subjective components, 
respectively. These results are in line with the correlations found by us in the online group. 
Overall, the psychometric properties of online screening were excellent; the quality of 
data collected online has shown to be consistent with the quality of offline data gathered 
within this study and as part of earlier studies with the SWASH and other hypnosis 
screening tools.  
 Modern theories of hypnosis advocate the notion that all hypnosis is self-hypnosis, 
since the hypnotic subject is the one who actively responds to the suggestions and creates 
the requested experience (Kihlstrom, 2008; Raz, 2011). This does not mean, however, 
that the experimenter has no influence on the responsiveness of the subject. For instance, 
the presence of an experimenter can be helpful in building up a rapport and facilitating 
responsiveness of the participants (e.g., Gfeller, Lynn, & Pribble, 1987). Nonetheless, the 
experimenter can also bias the responses of the subjects (e.g., Barber & Calverley, 1966; 
Troffer & Tart, 1966), and importantly, this level of bias can strongly vary across 
participants as it is almost impossible to deliver the induction and suggestions in an 
identical way multiple times. Therefore, the application of fully automatized screenings, 
such as the online version, can subserve the standardization of the assessment of hypnotic 
suggestibility.  
Introducing online hypnosis screening would markedly decrease the amount of 
time experimenters need to invest to find participants for their studies. However, to 
complete a screening procedure, the participants still need to spend 45-60 minutes without 
taking a break; otherwise, the data would be not usable for recruitment purposes. A 
  
133 
 
 
substantial part of the screening is assigned to the standard hypnotic induction, which 
consists of various suggestions mostly to relax; however, the responses to these 
suggestions are not assessed directly during the screening (e.g., Shor & Orne, 1963; 
Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). Would it be feasible to exclude the standard induction 
from the screening procedure to save time for the participants? Cognitive theories of 
hypnosis, such as the cold control theory (Barnier, Dienes, & Mitchell, 2008; Dienes & 
Perner, 2007), emphasise the role of the feeling of involuntariness in differentiating 
hypnotic from non-hypnotic responses. This feeling is also known as the “classical 
suggestion effect” (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980). Therefore, according to cold control 
theory, not the practice of induction, but the feeling of involuntariness is the demarcation 
criterion, and it is important to ensure with self-report measures that the participants 
experienced a reduction in the level of control over their own behaviour (e.g., Palfi, Parris, 
McLatchie, Kekecs, & Dienes, 2018)27. From a practical perspective, it is important to 
bear in mind that the presence of a standard induction can increase responsiveness to the 
suggestions in the screening,oin average, by 1.46 (Martin & Dienes, 2018) compared to 
the absence of the induction; and that the strength of the effect of an induction fluctuates 
across suggestions (Terhune & Cardeña, 2016). Nonetheless, as argued earlier in this 
paper, a general reduction of responsiveness does not qualify as decisive argument for 
retaining the induction procedure. As long as the absence of the induction does not 
produce a floor-effect or alters markedly the ranking of the suggestibility scores, the 
screening can be perfectly adequate for screening people for individual differences in 
response. Indeed, there are existing attempts to assess responsiveness to suggestions 
without exposing the participants to an induction, such as the Barber Suggestibility Scale 
(Barber & Glass, 1962) and the CIS (Wilson & Barber, 1978). These scales can be easily 
administered in a context presented as a test of imagination while applying motivational 
instructions to replace the induction or simply leaving out the induction. The existing 
evidence suggest that employing motivational instructions creates similar level of 
responsiveness as the application of the induction; however, the absence of the induction 
significantly dwindles the level of responsiveness to suggestions (Barber & Wilson, 
1978). Future research could explore the extent to which the exclusion or replacement of 
                                                 
27 An operational definition of hypnosis necessitates to usage of induction to render suggestions hypnotic, 
and labels all suggestions without a priori induction imaginative suggestion (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; 
Kirsch, 1997; Kirsch & Braffman, 2001). This line of thinking would preclude us from omitting the 
induction in case we want to measure hypnotic suggestibility. 
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the induction from the SWASH would be feasible and assess whether it would be 
beneficial. 
A secondary interest of the current study was to assess the extent to which the 
length of the delay between the first and second screening affects the outcome of the 
screen and the psychometric properties of the measurement tool. Repeated assessment of 
suggestibility can negatively affect the suggestibility scores, for instance, if the delay 
amid the two occasions takes only a few days or weeks (Barber & Calverley, 1966; Fassler 
et al., 2008; Lynn et al., 1988). This reduction in suggestibility may be caused by 
boredom; the participants can become disengaged with the procedure by virtue of finding 
it repetitive (Barber & Calverley, 1966; Fassler et al., 2008). In our case, the short delay 
was a minimum of 5 months and we found no indication of substantial differences 
between the short and long delay groups among the SWASH subscales. For instance, 
Fassler et al. (2008) found a difference of 0.77 on the objective scores between the first 
and second session28, but according to our data, the largest plausible difference is only 
.34. Nonetheless, the effect of boredom on the subjective scores observed by Fassler et 
al. (2018) was 1.0529, which is compatible with our results as the lower bound of the 
difference in that aspect was 1.12. Taken together, our data imply that the negative effect 
of boredom might wear off or becomes negligible after 5 months; however, more research 
is needed to settle this matter and identify the ideal amount of delay that can prevent 
boredom effects in repeated designs. 
We note that our sample was restricted to university students, which might 
preclude the generalization of our findings, crucially, the applicability of online hypnosis 
screening, to a wider population. Nonetheless, the problem of generalizability represents 
a universal issue in experimental hypnosis research. For instance, a meta-analysis on 27 
studies investigating hypnotically induced analgesia found that from the studies with non-
clinical samples (N = 19), only one was run with people recruited from the local 
community whereas all the other studies were run with students (Montgomery, Duhamel, 
& Redd, 2000). Recruiting from a wider population would not only increase 
generalisability of the findings but it would further facilitate researchers to run large-scale 
                                                 
28 The reported raw difference was 0.54; however, we adjusted this value from a scale of 0-7 to the scale of 
the SWASH, which is 0-10. 
29 The reported raw difference was 2.2; we adjusted this value as well from a scale of 0-21 to the scale of 
the SWASH in which values can vary between 0 and 10. 
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hypnosis studies strengthening the replicability of the findings. Future research is needed 
to explore the extent to which online hypnosis research can be applied to screen and 
recruit people from local communities. 
Finally, the vast majority of our participants were females; hence, the gender 
imbalance in our sample might be another factor hindering the generalizability of our 
findings. Research on the link between gender and hypnotic suggestibility has provided 
ambiguous results with some studies finding virtually no effect (Cooper & London, 1966; 
Dienes, Brown, Hutton, Kirsch, Mazzoni, & Wright, 2009; McConkey, Barnier, 
Maccallum, & Bishop, 1996) and some studies demonstrating a small effect size (Green, 
2004; Green & Lynn, 2010; Morgan & Hilgard, 1973; Page & Green, 2007; Rudski, 
Marra, & Graham, 2004). Studies showing a small effect size of gender consistently found 
that women score higher than men, which might be caused by a divergence in a 
personality trait that partly underlies suggestibility or difference between women and men 
in how they assess the difficulty of the suggestions (Rudski, Marra, & Graham, 2004). 
Nonetheless, these explanations are conjectures that have yet to be tested. With only seven 
men in the current data set, we can only speculate how much gender might moderate the 
difference the online compared to the offline measurement of hypnotic suggestibility. 
Conclusion 
Altogether, the online assessment of hypnotic suggestibility appears to be feasible and the 
benefits far outweigh the downsides involved with its application. Although, online 
screening might be less engaging than the traditional, offline measurement of 
suggestibility and so it can result in slightly lower suggestibility scores, our study suggests 
that the effect size of this negative impact lies within acceptable boundaries. Crucially, 
the application of online hypnosis screening can subserve the execution of large-scale 
data collection with heterogeneous samples consisting of student and non-student 
participants as well. Furthering our knowledge based on small sample studies comes with 
many risks (e.g. Loken & Gelman, 2017), but the relative high cost of hypnosis screening 
procedures hinders the researchers of the field from running well-powered studies. 
Therefore, we argue that the adaptation of online hypnosis screening is salutary and it 
helps experimental hypnosis research to realise its full potentials. 
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Chapter VI: Why good enough Bayesian “evidence for H1” in one condition and 
good enough “evidence for H0” in another does not mean good enough evidence 
for a difference between conditions  
Introduction 
“The manipulation in condition A was statistically significant and by contrast, we found 
no statistically significant effect in condition B”. Many believe that these findings are 
sufficient to support the claim that there is a difference between conditions A and B in 
the effect of the manipulation. However, such an inference does not follow from these 
results, as it requires the test of the difference between the conditions in the effect of the 
manipulation, or in other words, the test of the interaction of condition by manipulation 
(Abelson, 1995, p. 111; Gelman & Stern, 2006). This inferential mistake is common in 
neuroscience (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011) and one can safely assume that psychologists are 
also not immune from committing it. While it is perhaps an old saw now when it comes 
to null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), how does this relate to the use of Bayes 
factors? As soon as conventional cut-offs are used for Bayes factors (see Box 1 for a brief 
introduction on the interpretation of the Bayes factor via the conventional cut-offs), there 
may be conditions where the inferential mistake is even more likely than with frequentist 
statistics. When there is good enough Bayesian evidence for H1 in one condition and for 
H0 in another, surely one can conclude that the effect is bigger in the first condition than 
the second! The reader can explore the extent to which they are attracted towards this 
inappropriate conclusion, which asserts an interaction without directly testing it, by 
considering the hypothetical study in Box 1. They can also test whether they would be 
more inclined to accept this inappropriate conclusion when it is based on frequentist or 
on Bayesian statistics. We discuss this scenario in detail in Example 2. 
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Box 1. The interpretation of the Bayes factor  
The central goal of this tutorial is to substantiate the statistical intuition in the 
reader that to claim the existence of a difference between two conditions or groups, one 
always needs to test the interaction, and this principle is as true for Bayesian as frequentist 
statistics. In this tutorial, we present the scenarios that the reader can stumble upon when 
they calculate Bayes factors for the evidence of the presence of an effect in an 
experimental and a control condition (or group) that had a significant and a non-
significant statistical test, respectively. By this approach, we aim to demonstrate that there 
are cases when using the Bayes factor instead of frequentist statistics could make it more 
likely to commit the inferential mistake, and there are cases when it may be the other way 
around. We use a hypothetical study as a case study and by increasing the sample size or 
reversing the effect size, we cover all the scenarios.   
The Bayes factor is a continuous measure of the strength of relative evidence for 
H1 over H0 based on the ability of these hypotheses to predict the data at hand (Dienes, 
2016; Kruschke & Liddell, 2018; Rouder et al., 2009). A Bayes factor of 1 means that 
the two hypotheses under comparison predicted the data equally well. The convention we 
follow (but it is not universal) is that the larger the Bayes factor the better H1 fits the data 
compared to H0, and the smaller it is, H0 is more in line with the data compared to H1. 
To aid decision making about the hypotheses, Jeffreys (1961) suggested B > 3 to be the 
cut-off of substantial evidence for H1 over H0. Note that this value was chosen with the 
intention that the Bayes factor should lead to similar judgment as NHST, when one is 
about to reject H0 (a statistical test resulting in p = .05 will usually provide a Bayes factor 
around 3, so long as the obtained effect size is about that predicted). By symmetry, we 
interpret B < 1/3 as substantial evidence for H0 over H1. However, it does not indicate 
that this cut-off should be automatically accepted as the level of good enough evidence. 
Indeed, it is a rough guideline and it remains a matter of scientific debate (e.g., currently, 
the level of good enough evidence for H1 is defined as B > 6 at Cortex and as B > 10 at 
Nature Human Behavior for Registered Reports). Nonetheless, in this tutorial, we apply 
the cut-off of substantial evidence as good enough evidence. 
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Box 2. Test your intuitions 
At a Golf Club in Sussex, a coach stumbled upon a sport psychology paper concluding that mental training 
(e.g., imagining to hit the ball with the club) can help golfers improve their skills when it is used combined 
with real training. Before implementing the mental training in all of their groups, they decided to test whether 
players can benefit from it. Therefore, they asked their students in one of their groups to engage in mental 
training twice every week for the next 3 months. They also had a control group in which the students 
underwent a real training but they were not told to do mental exercise, and the students had roughly identical 
skills to those in the mental training group. They assessed the performance of the students at baseline and 
after 3 months of training. The evaluation was performed on an interval scale from 0 to 10, and based on 
past studies with other sports they expected that after 3 months of training performance could improve by 
about 2 units. 
To draw conclusions from their analyses, they used Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST), 
and they set the level of alpha at the traditional .05. They reported the results of two statistical tests and a 
conclusion, which was based on these tests. Evaluate the appropriateness of this conclusion on a scale that 
ranges from 0 to 10 where 0 means that you feel that the conclusion is completely inappropriate and 10 
means that you feel that the conclusion is completely appropriate based on the information at your disposal. 
Comparing baseline and post-training performance in the control training group yielded a non-
significant result (t(19) = 0.29, Mdiff =  0.11,  p = .776). However, when they analysed the data of the group 
of golfers who engaged in the mental training, they found a significant difference between baseline and post-
training conditions, with better performance after 3 months of training (t(19) = 2.61, Mdiff = 0.81, p = 
.017). Based on these, they concluded that traditional training is more efficient when it is combined with 
mental training than when it is not combined with it. 
Let us consider that the coach used the Bayes factor to draw conclusions instead of NHST. The 
Bayes factor is a continuous measure of relative evidence, it can tell us the extent to which our data supports 
one model (H1) over another (H0), which they reported as B (As we explain later, a model of H1 is needed. 
Given the researchers had reasons for expecting an effect of about 2 units, we used a half-normal with SD = 
2.). By convention, Bayes factors larger than 3 indicate good enough evidence for H1 (i.e., we can conclude 
that an intervention works) and Bayes factors smaller than 1/3 indicate good enough evidence for H0. Assess 
the appropriateness of their conclusion that was, this time, based on the Bayes factors by choosing a value 
from the same scale of appropriateness. Zero indicates that you feel that their conclusion is completely 
inappropriate and 10 means that you feel that their conclusion is completely appropriate.  
Comparing the baseline and the post-training conditions of the control group yielded good enough 
evidence for H0 (t(19) = 0.29, Mdiff =  0.11,  p = .776, B = 0.24). However, when they analysed the data of 
the mental training group, they found good enough evidence supporting H1 (i.e., difference between the 
baseline and the post-training conditions), with better performance after 3 months of training than at 
baseline (t(19) = 2.61, Mdiff = 0.81, p = .017, B = 6.12). Based on these, they concluded that traditional 
training is more efficient when it is combined with mental training than when it is not combined with it. 
  
139 
 
 
The case study 
Consider the hypothetical study from Box 2, in which a golf coach is trying to test whether 
or not adding mental training to traditional training can improve golf performance. To 
investigate this question, they randomly assigned students into traditional training 
(henceforth control group) and traditional plus mental training (henceforth mental 
training group) groups. They assessed golf performance at baseline and after 3 month of 
training. Therefore, they had a 2x2 mixed design. Hence, the crucial test of the idea that 
one can benefit more from golf training if it is combined with mental boils down to a 2x2 
interaction of time of assessment (baseline vs post-training) and type of the training 
(traditional vs traditional plus mental). For the sake of simplicity, imagine that golf 
performance was measured on a scale from 0 to 10, and the coach expected that the mental 
training should improve performance with about 2 units.   
Justifying the model of H1 and the model of the data 
To compute a Bayes factor, one needs to specify the parameters of the models under 
comparison and of the model of the data (also referred to as likelihood; see Box 3 for 
more information on the essential parts of the Bayes factor). The model of H0 assumes 
no difference in the population. To model the prediction of H1 we employed a half-normal 
distribution with a mode of zero. The properties of the normal distribution align with the 
scientific intuition that small effect sizes are more probable than large ones (Dienes & 
Mclatchie, 2018), and we opted for a half-normal as it is in line with the directional 
prediction of H1. To specify the standard deviation of the distribution, we applied the 
expectation of the coach from the hypothetical study who assumed that performance 
should improve by about 2 units. When we have an effect size estimate based on earlier 
studies for instance, we can use it as the standard deviation of the distribution modelling 
the predictions of H1 (Dienes, 2014). Nonetheless, one might think that the effect size of 
an earlier study is not a plausible representation of the alternative, or there are no relevant 
studies. In these cases, there are several heuristics (e.g., Dienes, 2019) that one can follow 
to specify the predictions of H1. We used the t-distribution as the likelihood function, 
which is recommended over the normal distribution when the variance of the data is 
estimated as it is unknown (Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018). Finally, we will notate all of the 
Bayes factors as BH(0, 2) following the convention introduced by Dienes (2014). This 
notation includes all the necessary information about the model of H1: H indicates that it 
is a half-normal distribution; zero refers to the mode and 2 to the standard deviation of 
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the distribution. All Bayes factors reported in this paper represent evidence for H1 over 
H0. 
Specifying all of these parameters requires the researcher to make many decisions, 
which has the side effect of increasing analytic flexibility and so the opportunity to cherry 
pick the results supporting the researcher`s pet theory. The most crucial step when one 
can introduce bias is perhaps the model specification of H1 that, in some cases, can have 
drastic effect on our conclusions. One way to reduce bias is by constraining analytic 
flexibility through pre-registering the exact parameters of the model of H1 or the strategy 
with which one will acquire those parameters (Chambers, 2013; Munafò et al., 2017). 
One can also consider reporting a “Robustness Region” (RR) that indicates the range of 
parameters (e.g., SDs of the half-normal distribution modelling H1) that would lead to 
the same conclusion (i.e., good enough support for H1 over H0, insensitive evidence, 
good enough support for H0 over H1) as the chosen model specification (Dienes, 2019). 
RRs can diminish bias by increasing transparency over the analytic choices in a similar 
manner as multiverse analyses (Steegen, Tuerlinckx, Gelman, Vanpaemel, 2016). RRs 
have the additional benefit that in cases when model specifications can be motivated in 
different ways, we can ascertain the robustness of our conclusion to the model 
specification by simply checking whether all plausible parameters lie within the RR.  In 
this tutorial, we report the RR for every B in the format of “RRconclusion[min, max]” where 
min indicates the smallest and max indicates the largest SD of the model of H1 that brings 
us to the same conclusion. We will indicate the original conclusion in the subscript of RR 
by reporting one of the following: “B < 3”, “1/3 < B < 3” or “B > 3”. 
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Box 3. The anatomy of the Bayes factor  
Disclosure 
All the materials of this tutorial are available on the Open Science Framework page of the 
project at: https://osf.io/xrctq/. The page includes the R script of the analyses introduced 
here and the script of the Bayes factor function. It also contains the R script of a Bayes 
factor Shiny app that is a simple and interactive web application that can calculate the 
Bayes factors of 2x2 between groups and within participants designs. Box 4 demonstrates 
an example of the usage of the Bayes factor R script (namely, the test of the interaction 
in Example 1) and Figure 1 portrays how the Shiny app can be applied to compute all 
three Bayes factors of Example 1. The Bayes factor Shiny app can be accessed at  
https://bencepalfi.shinyapps.io/Bayesian_Interaction_App/ 
In order to assess the predictive ability of the hypotheses, we need to create models 
that represent their predictions. Modelling the prediction of H0 as no difference is the 
straightforward part of the process. However, specifying the predictions of H1 
requires scientifically informed decisions in every case and so it can be a subject of 
debate. For instance, one needs to define the shape and parameters of the distribution 
representing the predictions of H1 on the possible population effect sizes. This brings 
up questions, such as the distribution should be uniform, t or normal; one-tailed or 
two-tailed; centred on zero or on a non-zero population value; what should be the 
level of variance in the model. The discussion of these decisions is beyond the scope 
of the current tutorial and so we refer the reader to Dienes (2015, 2019), Dienes and 
Mclatchie (2018). Nonetheless, in the case study of the current paper, we justify all 
of the choices about the model specifications. Finally, one needs to define the 
likelihood function, which is modelling the probability of the data along different 
population effect sizes. 
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Box 4. Calculating the Bayes factor in R 
Example 1: When the Bayes factor helps us avoid committing the inferential 
mistake 
Suppose that the researchers found that the test comparing baseline and post-training 
performance was significant in the mental training group (t (19) = 3.58, Mdiff = 1.11, p = 
.002), and it was not-significant in the control group (t (19) = 1.08, Mdiff = 0.41, p = .295). 
Based on this, they concluded that the effect of the training is only expressed (at least 
after 3 months of training) if it is combined with mental training. This conclusion is 
premature for two reasons. First, one cannot claim the absence of an effect based on a 
To calculate the Bayes factor in R (or RStudio), one needs to obtain the summary 
statistics of the data (mean, standard error and degrees of freedom) and decide on the 
parameters of the model of H1. 
The following R script reproduces the results of the test of the interaction of 
Example 1 (all the text preceded by the # symbol are comments helping the reader 
and will be ignored by R when the script is run):  
#Loads the Bayes factor function 
#Note that the current R file and the file containing the function should 
be placed in the same folder 
source("BayesFactor_normalH1_tlikelihood.R") 
 
#Calculates the Bayes factor 
Bf(sd = 0.491, obtained = 0.7, dfdata = 38, meanoftheory = 0, sdtheory 
= 2,  tail = 1) 
 
The first three arguments of the function specify the parameters of the 
likelihood: the standard error, the estimate (i.e., raw effect size) and the degrees of 
freedom of the distribution, respectively. The last three arguments define the 
parameters of the model of H1: the centre (or mode if it is a one-tailed distribution) 
and the SE of the distribution, and whereas it is one- or two-tailed. When all 
parameters are provided, the function returns a vector containing the value of the 
Bayes factor (evidence for H1 over H0). 
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non-significant test (Cohen, 1994; Dienes, 2014, Rouder et al, 2007) and so it is false to 
imply that we have evidence against the effectiveness of the training in the beginner 
group. We don`t have evidence for the contrary either, simply, we need to refrain from 
decision-making. Second, a more relevant point for the purpose of the current tutorial, the 
dissimilarity of two categorical statements (i.e. significant vs not-significant) does not 
grant a meaningful categorical statement about their difference (i.e., the difference 
between the two is not necessarily significant in itself; Abelson, 1995, p. 111). From the 
second point, it follows that one needs to test the difference directly to make any 
meaningful claim on the interaction of the groups. The test of the interaction, however, 
yields a non-significant result (t (38) = 1.43, Mdiff = 0.70, p = .162) meaning that one 
needs to suspend judgment regarding the influence of the mental training on traditional 
golf training. 
The question arises: how would we decide in this scenario if we were to rely on a 
Bayes factor to form conclusions about the hypotheses? These data translate into 
substantial evidence for the effect of the training in the mental training group (BH(0, 2) = 
46.36, RRB > 3[0.2, 36.3]) and leaves us with insensitive evidence for the effect of training 
in the control group (BH(0, 2) = 0.57, RR 1/3 < B < 3[0, 3.5]) as well as for the interaction 
directly comparing the effects of the groups (BH(0, 2)  = 1.14. RR1/3 < B < 3[0, 7.4]).  Clearly, 
one cannot easily claim that good enough evidence for the effect in one group and 
insensitive evidence in the other group is good enough evidence in itself for the difference 
between the groups. Apparently, using the Bayes factor may help us avoid the inferential 
mistake regarding the interaction, even if we were to ignore the results of the direct test 
of the interaction. Hence, using Bayes factors may increase the chance that one would 
conclude that the available data are simply not enough to make a decision about the 
hypotheses. 
The only way to come to a conclusion regarding whether or not mental training 
combined with traditional training is superior to traditional training is to collect more data 
until we obtain evidence in one direction or the other. Optional stopping is not a problem 
for Bayesian statistics, the Bayes factor will retain its meaning regardless of the stopping 
rule applied (Dienes, 2016; Rouder, 2014)30. Thus, we can check the Bayes factor every 
time we recruit a new participant and stop once the Bayes factor reaches a good enough 
                                                 
30 Recently, this claim has been called into question under some conditions by Heide and Grünwald (2017). 
For replies to the concerns see Rouder (2019), and Wagenmakers, Gronau and Vandekerckhove (2019). 
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level of evidence. For example, in this scenario, assuming that the raw effect sizes and 
their variances remain constant, we would need to recruit 94 participants in total (47 per 
group) to have substantial evidence for the interaction (BH(0, 2) = 3.09, RRB > 3[0.3, 2.0]). 
In this scenario, the evidence for the efficacy of the training in the control group would 
still be insensitive with a BH(0, 2) = 0.89, RR1/3 < B < 3[0.8, 5.4]. Thus, evidence for an effect 
in one group, coupled with no evidence one way or the other in the other group, could 
still be evidence for a difference in effects between the two groups. 
 
Figure 1. Print screen of the Shiny app that calculates the Bayes factor separately for the 
two groups and for the interaction based on the following statistical parameters: raw effect 
sizes and their SEs for the two groups and their interaction, the sample size, and the SD 
of the half-normal distribution that models the predictions of H1. In the top left corner, 
one can change between the “between groups”, “mixed design” and “within subjects” 
options. The between groups and mixed design options are identical in that they run an 
independent t-test to test the interaction, and they request the same input parameters. For 
the within subjects design, one needs to provide the difference of the conditions and their 
standard deviation separately. The results appear on the right side of the screen, once the 
calculate button is pressed. The Shiny app reports the degrees of freedoms, the t-values, 
the Bayes factor and the p-values for the groups (or conditions) and for their interaction. 
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Example 2: When the Bayes factor might exacerbate the problem and seemingly 
creates an inferential paradox 
Now let us consider the scenario from text Box 2 that only differs from Example 1 in that 
the raw effect sizes of differences between baseline and post-training conditions were 
reduced by 0.3 units in both of the groups. All other parameters (e.g., the standard 
deviations and the difference between the control and mental training groups) were kept 
constant. In this scenario, the results of significance tests probing the efficacy of the 
training, separately in the control and mental training groups, are identical to those of 
Example 1, being non-significant and significant, respectively. However, if we calculate 
the Bayes factors, it reveals that this scenario is different from Example 1 as we gain good 
enough evidence for the presence of the effect in the mental training group (t (19) = 2.61, 
Mdiff = 0.81, p = .017, BH(0, 2) = 6.12, RR B > 3[0.2, 4.3]) and good enough evidence for the 
absence of the effect in the control group (t (19) = 0.29, Mdiff = 0.11, p = .776, BH(0, 2) = 
0.24, RR B < 1/3 [1.5, Inf]). It might seem intuitive to conclude that the evidence for the 
difference of the two must be substantial in itself as well (c.f., your feeling of 
appropriateness about the conclusion in Box 2). However, that is an unwarranted 
conclusion as the rule that “a meaningful categorical statement does not follow from the 
difference between the two categorical statements” (Abelson, 1995, p. 111) applies to 
Bayesian just as much as it applies to frequentist statistics. Hence, regardless of how 
tempting it feels to claim that the group with substantial evidence for H1 must be different 
from the group with substantial evidence for H0, we need to directly compare these two 
conditions to unravel whether there is an interaction.  
Compared to Example 1, it appears that in this case relying on the Bayes factor 
rather than on the p-value would not help us avoid making the inferential mistake of 
ignoring the test of the interaction. On the contrary, using the Bayes factor may even 
amplify the problem as having good enough evidence for H1 in group A and for H0 in 
group B can easily create the false impression that there is no need for further statistical 
analyses and the two must be different. However, neglecting the test of the interaction is 
an inferential mistake, moreover, it would lead us to an incorrect conclusion, since the 
test of the interaction must yield the same result as in Example 1 as we kept the difference 
between the groups and their standard deviation fixed. It means that the test of the 
interaction is non-significant (t (38) = 1.43, Mdiff = 0.70, p = .162) and the Bayes factor is 
insensitive (BH(0, 2)  = 1.14. RR1/3 < B < 3[0, 7.4]).  
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Seemingly, we got ourselves into a paradox in which we can claim that an effect 
exists in group A and it does not exist in group B, however, we cannot state that the effect 
is stronger in group A than in group B. These conclusions are inconsistent with one 
another, but the Bayes factor should not take the blame for it. The cause of the existence 
of this paradox is that we introduced cut-offs to interpret the Bayes factor and so we 
reduced its continuous nature to a categorical one. That is, the Bayes factors underlying 
the claims that there is an effect in group A and that the interaction is insensitive point in 
the same direction. Hence, we created the inconsistency by imposing a cut-off and 
labelling the first as good enough evidence for H1 and the second as insensitive evidence. 
Nevertheless, applying a cut-off to discern good enough from insensitive evidence is 
useful for scientific practice as it allows us to draw conclusions. And we often need to 
draw conclusions in order to move on with an experiment: Have we equated two 
conditions in terms of a possibly confounding variable, such as expectancy; have we 
established that manipulation does what it says; have we ruled out a nuisance alternative 
theory, and so on (Only a statistician and not a scientist would recommend not ever 
drawing any conclusions from statistics!). In other words, we gain a clear rule telling us 
when we have good enough evidence to make such a decision. On the other hand, if we 
rely on this decision rule, we need to accept that it can lead us to paradoxical situations. 
Fortunately, there is a way to escape this paradox. There is no need to consider 
the evidence at our disposal as fixed. Therefore, the remedy to this problem is to collect 
more data until the Bayes factor of the crucial test exceeds one of the cut-off values (as 
mentioned earlier, optional stopping does not invalidate conclusions based on the Bayes 
factor). Hence, unless our resources are limited, we should always be able to resolve this 
paradox by simply continuing the data collection process and accumulating more 
evidence. For instance, assuming that the raw effect sizes and their variances stay constant 
while we collect data for this study, we would need to recruit the same number of 
participants (68 per group) as we needed in Example 1 to obtain evidence for the 
difference between the groups.   
Discussion 
In this tutorial, we aimed to illustrate how the application of the Bayes factor with cut-
offs relates to the old problem of the tendency to compare the statistical significance of 
the tests of two groups rather than the groups themselves. We introduced two scenarios 
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in which group A had a significant effect whereas group B had a non-significant effect. 
In Example 1, employing the Bayes factor instead of the NHST may help us avoid the 
inferential mistake as the test of the non-significant group turned out to be insensitive and 
it is unlikely that one would assume that the difference of good enough evidence for H1 
in group A and insensitive evidence in group B indicates a clear difference between the 
two. In Example 2, however, the Bayes factor in group B provided good enough evidence 
for H0 and in such a scenario applying the Bayes factor instead of the NHST may increase 
the probability of committing the inferential mistake because the conclusions from the 
simple effects and the interaction contrast are literally inconsistent. 
We observed that drawing a conclusion from the Bayes factor could sometimes 
lead to a paradox (i.e., good enough Bayesian evidence for H1 in group A, good enough 
Bayesian evidence for H0 in group B and the lack of good enough Bayesian evidence for 
their interaction). The reason of the paradox is that we use cut-offs that exchange the 
continuous measure of evidence to a categorical and ultimate claim about the state of the 
world in order to guide our decisions about the hypotheses. This situation bears a strong 
resemblance to Arrow`s theorem (1951) that demonstrates that there is no consistent way 
to explore the preference of a group (“will of the people”), and any ranked voting system 
(i.e. a system that turns strengths of opinion into a categorical outcome) will lead to 
paradoxes, perhaps undermining our faith in representative government and democracy 
itself. However, as Deutsch (2011) pointed out, Arrow`s theorem considers only a 
particular stage of decision making, as if preferences and options were fixed in social 
decision making. As long as preferences can be altered through open discussion and 
reasoning, and it is possible to modify or replace the options, democracy can be used 
consistently in selecting good policies. This conclusion is just as true for science, which 
seeks good explanations rather than policies or governments. When it comes to science, 
it would be a mistake to assume that evidence or the list of options (tested hypotheses) 
are fixed. Hence, even if we stumble upon a paradox, it remains a transient state and by 
accumulating more evidence, or by modifying the hypotheses (e.g., replacing a one-sided 
H1 with a one-sided H2 pointing into the other direction) we can dissolve the 
inconsistency. That is, the issue we raise about cut-offs leading to paradox is a very 
general one, not unique to science, let alone Bayes factors. The solution is just as general. 
Continuing data collection until we obtain good enough evidence for one of the 
theories can be challenging in some cases as we do not have unlimited resources. Thus, 
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estimating the sample size we might need to find good enough evidence for a hypothesis 
over another one should play an essential role in the planning phase of an experiment. To 
this aim, we can compute the rough estimate of the sample size we need to probably 
obtain a Bayes factor that is equal to or larger than a specific value (i.e., the cut-off of 
good enough evidence defined by us). For instance, to have a long-term relative frequency 
of 50% to obtain a Bayes factor of 3 (or 1/3), we should simply replicate the steps of the 
sample size elevation of Example 1 and 2. That is, we can take the raw effect size and its 
standard deviation of a pilot study and assume that these parameters remain constant 
while we raise the sample size (see Dienes [2015] for a detailed tutorial). If we want larger 
probability, then we need to continue increasing the sample size until we reach a Bayes 
factor of 20 (or 1/20). This procedure estimates the sample size that has a long-term 
relative frequency of 80% to obtain a Bayes factor of 3 (or 1/3). See Table 1 for the Bayes 
factors one needs to reach with this sample size estimation procedure to ensure that their 
design is set to find good enough evidence with a given long-term relative frequency. 
Also, see the Supplementary Materials for more information on how these thresholds 
were determined, and on how the reader can calculate the threshold for any chosen 
combination of a cut-off of good enough evidence and long-term relative frequency of 
finding good enough evidence. For an alternative view on how to plan the design of a 
future experiment to achieve good enough evidence, see Schönbrodt and Wagenmakers 
(2018). Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the sample size estimation is useful 
for planning, such as roughly estimating how long data collection will take, it has no 
influence on the inference made once the data are in. The final Bayes factor obtained is 
the measure of evidence for H1 over H0. The meaning of the Bayes factor is independent 
of the sample size estimation procedure (Dienes, 2016). 
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Table 1 
Table of Bayes factors with which one can approximate the Sample Size of a Design that 
will find Good Enough Evidence for a Given Cut-Off with a Specific Long-Term Relative 
Frequency 
 Long-term relative frequency of good enough evidence 
Cut-off of good 
enough evidence 
50% 80% 90% 95% 
B > 3 or B < 1/3 3 20 70 220 
B > 6 or B < 1/6 6 40 150 520 
B > 10 or B < 1/10 10 85 350 1370 
Note. Using optional stopping with a relatively low cut-off of good enough evidence (i.e., 
3) may deteriorate the long-term relative frequency of the design to find good enough 
evidence for H1 when in fact H1 is true. Given that the null is true, designs using these 
thresholds can deliver good enough evidence for H0 with higher probability than their 
corresponding expected long-term relative frequencies. See the Supplementary Materials 
for the demonstration of these claims via simulations. 
In conclusion, it is evident that the Bayes factor is not a panacea for the inferential 
mistake discussed in this tutorial, since we demonstrated that the reliance on the Bayes 
factor mitigated the issue in Example 1, but it exacerbated it in Example 2. By depicting 
these two examples, we intended to raise awareness that any claim about the moderating 
effect of an independent variable should be supported by a sensitive test of the interaction 
regardless whether one uses frequentist or Bayesian statistics. Irrespective of how 
paradoxical it seems, good enough Bayesian evidence for H1 in group A and good enough 
Bayesian evidence for H0 in group B does not necessarily mean good enough Bayesian 
evidence for the difference of the two. 
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Chapter VII: General Discussion 
Summary 
The studies presented in this thesis investigated the relationship between metacognition 
of intentions and the implementation of intentional acts. This idea was examined by using 
hypnosis as an experimental tool to create alterations of reality and the feeling of 
involuntariness in highly suggestible people. According to the cold control theory (Dienes 
& Perner, 2007), hypnosis creates the illusion of involuntariness while leaving first-order 
intentions unaffected, hence it should not provide highs with abilities they do not possess 
outside of hypnosis. This prediction is challenged by a phenomenon (i.e., word blindness 
effect) providing a great opportunity to understand the boundaries of the theory. Chapters 
II-IV focused on unravelling the mechanisms by which highs respond to the word 
blindness suggestion and manage to reduce Stroop interference in order to understand 
whether unconscious intentions can be more effective than conscious intentions, and 
whether cold control theory needs to be revised. Chapter V presented an empirical 
evaluation of the online screening of hypnosis by the Sussex-Waterloo Scale of 
Hypnotisability. Chapter VI is a statistics tutorial illustrating why Bayesian evidence for 
H0 in one condition and Bayesian evidence for H1 in another condition does not mean 
Bayesian evidence between the two conditions.    
Hypnosis as a purely metacognitive phenomenon 
Hypnosis is a powerful tool in altering perceptions of reality and creating the feeling of 
involuntariness (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980; Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz & Lynn, 2017). 
A simple explanation of this intriguing phenomenon is provided by the cold control theory 
that postulates that hypnosis is a purely metacognitive phenomenon. This hypothesis 
follows from the two core assumptions of the cold control theory. First, according to cold 
control theory, responses to hypnotic suggestions are intentional acts, which are 
implemented by regular cognitive control processes. Hence, subjects need to form first-
order intentions to respond to hypnotic suggestions (cf. Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
Second, hypnosis targets the HOTs of intending rather than the first-order intentions 
themselves. A hypnotic suggestion requests subjects to replace accurate HOTs of 
intending with inaccurate ones so that one`s intentional act can be experienced as if it is 
involuntary (cf. classical suggestion effect of Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980). Based on these 
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two assumptions, cold control theory predicts that responses to hypnotic suggestions 
cannot be more effective by objective standards than responses to volitional requests, if 
subjects create identical first-order intentions in these cases (cf. limited casual function 
of HOTs in general, Rosenthal, 2008). In other words, the theory proposes that hypnosis 
is a purely metacognitive phenomenon. 
The current thesis did not test directly the two underlying assumptions of the cold 
control theory. However, some of the Chapters present indirect evidence supporting these 
ideas. For instance, as highlighted in Chapter I, experimental evidence from many studies 
demonstrated that responses to hypnotic suggestions are goal-directed and appropriate to 
the context in which they were created (Spanos & Barber, 1974; Comey & Kirsch, 1999; 
Hilgard, 1977; Spanos, 1986). As argued earlier, this finding implies that hypnotic actions 
are implemented by intentional control processes. If hypnosis could directly induce 
behavior (e.g., by activating a schemata [Norman & Shallice, 1986]), it would be possible 
that the action of the subject is not in line with her goals. Chapter II presented evidence 
that the word blindness suggestion effect is modulated by the proportion of incongruent 
trials of the experimental blocks. High compared to low proportion of incongruent trials 
resulted in stronger reduction in Stroop interference by the suggestion. This finding 
coincides with the notion of hypnotic responses being strategic and goal-directed, and so 
it presents indirect evidence for the idea that hypnotic responses are driven by first-order 
intentions. 
 On many occasions, the first-order intentions that hypnotic subjects form to 
comply with suggestions are strategies in which they engage without being aware of doing 
so (e.g., imagining the buzz of a mosquito to create the experience of a mosquito being 
present). If this core assumption of cold control theory is true then subjects should be able 
to engage in the same strategy in hypnotic and non-hypnotic ways. Indeed, the correlation 
results of the Pilot and the Registered studies of Chapter IV present evidence supporting 
this notion. The studies demonstrated that when highs respond to the word blindness 
suggestion and to the appropriate volitional request, then there is a correlation between 
the two conditions in extent to which highs managed to reduce Stroop interference. 
Interestingly, this correlation was found to be rather strong in both of the studies (we can 
be 97.5 confident that the correlation is stronger than .48). A strong correlation is what 
one would expect if one were to assume that highs respond via identical cognitive 
processes in the two conditions. 
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 The second assumption of cod control theory, which claims that hypnosis changes 
metacognition of intentions, remained untested as well in this thesis. Nonetheless, 
Chapter IV presents evidence that is in line with this notion. If hypnosis changes 
metacognition over one's intention to act upon a suggestion then one should experience 
and report reduced level of control over one's response to a suggestion than to a volitional 
request. Indeed, subjects reported reduced level of control over the meaningfulness of the 
Stroop words in the Pilot as well as in the Registered study of Chapter IV. Moreover, 
subjects` phenomenology was altered by hypnosis in the predicted way: they reported to 
experience meaninglessness as if they perceived it in the suggestion condition and as if 
they imagined it in the volition condition. This corroborates the prediction of cold control 
theory that expects that subjects have hallucination like experiences by relinquishing their 
metacognition over their intentions to create the experience of meaninglessness. Future 
research could explore the domain specificity or generality of the role of metacognition 
in hypnosis. Neuroimaging studies (Morales, Lau & Flemming, 2018) and studies with 
patients with lesions to anterior prefrontal cortex (Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 
2014) showed that metacognition of memory and perception have overlapping as well as 
independent neural substrates indicating that metacognition can be domain-specific, 
however, this question remained unexplored for the domain of intentions. Although cold 
control theory has no clear prediction on this question, unraveling whether or not 
suggestibility is solely related to metacognitive abilities of the domain of intentions can 
further our understanding of HOT theories of consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). 
 The central aim of this thesis was to test the hypothesis of cold control about 
hypnosis being a purely metacognitive phenomenon and having no effect on first-order 
intentions. As argued in Chapters I, III and IV, the vast majority of studies testing the 
superiority of hypnotic over non-hypnotic responses demonstrated that non-hypnotic 
responses can be just as effective as hypnotic ones (e.g., Barber, 1966; Erdelyi, 1994; 
Levitt & Brady, 1964; Milling, Kirsch, Meunier & Levine, 2002; Nogrady, McConkey, 
& Perry, 1985; Spanos, 1986). However, a single phenomenon in which non-hypnotic 
responses are unable to achieve what hypnotic responses can is sufficient to challenge 
this prediction. The word blindness suggestion appears to be a phenomenon exactly like 
that. Therefore, understanding what highs do to reduce Stroop interference, and 
demonstrating that they can do the same in a voluntary manner is indispensable to retain 
the current version of cold control theory. Chapter III demonstrated compelling evidence 
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supporting that the effect of word blindness suggestion cannot be reproduced by simple 
volitional strategies such as looking-away from the target, focus on a single-letter of the 
Stroop word, blurred vision or goal-maintenance by internal rehearsal of the goal of the 
task. These results are unfortunate for the cold control theory and for the idea that 
hypnosis is purely metacognitive. Sadly, Chapter IV did not settle the issue either. The 
comparison of the volition condition and the word blindness suggestion in respect of the 
reduction of the Stroop interference effect did not yield good enough evidence for H0 or 
H1 (i.e., superiority of the suggestion). Although there was anecdotal evidence supporting 
that a volitional request to create the experience of meaninglessness is as effective as the 
word blindness suggestion in reducing Stroop interference, for now, the cold control 
theory hangs in the balance. 
Imagination but not mental imagery may be the key to word blindness  
Good enough evidence for equal reduction in Stroop interference by volitional and 
hypnotic responses would be the favorable outcome for the cold control theory. However, 
this outcome would still not shed light on the underlying mechanism of the word 
blindness suggestion itself. Identifying the strategy by which highs alleviate Stroop 
interference is crucial to test whether or not lows and mediums could use it to reduce 
Stroop interference outside of the hypnotic context. In addition, the exploration of a 
successful strategy would open new avenues for research on the Stroop effect and on 
cognitive control (e.g., how does the strategy fit computational models of cognitive 
control?). Chapter III presented a hypothesis that the underlying strategy of the word 
blindness suggestion may be imagination itself. Perhaps, highs take the instructions to see 
the words as a meaningless script literally, and they imagine the words as meaningless, 
which may result in the reduction of Stroop interference. Here, the term imagination 
should be understood in its broadest possible form, namely, the formulation and 
engagement in a counterfactual model of reality (Perner, 1993). This general definition 
of imagination is in line with contemporary concepts of imagination in cognitive sciences 
(e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002) and in the field of hypnosis (e.g., imaginative 
suggestions by Braffman & Kirsch, 1999).    
Crucially, imagining something, or in other words, considering the world in a 
counterfactual way (think of) is not identical to holding a belief (think that) about what 
the world is like (Perner, 1993). Therefore, the underlying mechanism and the effects of 
imagination are discernable from those of beliefs (cf. response expectancies by Kirsch, 
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1985). The imagination hypothesis proposes that entertaining a model of the world in 
which words are meaningless might be enough to help highs decrease Stroop interference 
via, for instance, resetting top-down cognitive control processes. If being engaged in this 
counterfactual model is necessary to alleviate interference then subjects should 
experience more words as meaningless when they respond to the suggestion than when 
they do the Stroop task without trying to see the words as being meaningless. Indeed, this 
pattern of results was observed in Chapter II as well as in Chapter IV. Moreover, the 
imagination hypothesis predicts that the percentage of trials on which highs experienced 
the words as meaningless is positively related to the extent to which the suggestion 
reduced Stroop interference. All corresponding tests of this proposal remained insensitive 
in Chapter II (Exploration 3), however, Chapter IV presented good enough evidence for 
a positive relationship for the suggestion as well as for the volitional request.  
Importantly, the proposed definition of imagination includes but does not equal to 
visual or mental imagery (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002). Limiting imagination to 
imagery would imply that highs have a vivid, visual experience of meaningless words 
that are not present when they respond to the word blindness suggestion. This is not 
necessarily the case. Highs may experience meaninglessness as a conceptual or 
propositional hallucination, they may see the words crisply, in the form that they are 
presented, and still experience that the words have no meaning as if they are written in 
characters that are unknown to the reader.  This would not be surprising as they were 
instructed to experience meaninglessness precisely this way by the suggestion as well as 
by the volitional request. The items of the subjective measures applied in Chapter II and 
IV were designed to assess whether subjects followed the instructions and experienced 
what the suggestion or volitional request asked them to experience: for instance, “the 
words on the screen were written in a clear yet completely meaningless script”. Since the 
subjects were asked to create a conceptual rather than a visual hallucination, the findings 
of Chapter IV about the positive relationship between subjective reports of 
meaninglessness and reduction in Stroop interference corroborate the imagination as 
counterfactual model rather than imagination as visual imagery idea. Nonetheless, 
vividness of mental imagery was not measured in any of the studies, so more research is 
needed to establish whether or not vividness of mental imagery is related to the alleviation 
of Stroop interference. An interesting experimental test of this question would be to give 
the word blindness suggestion to people with aphantasia, who are unable to create vivid 
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mental images (Zeman, et al., 2010, 2015). This inability to form vivid mental images is 
linked to an impaired performance on working memory tasks that require the engagement 
of visual imagery, however, it does not affect performance on other cognitive tasks such 
as the test of spatial memory (Jacobs, Schwarzkop, & Silvanto, 2018; cf. Baddeley, 2001). 
This finding suggests that aphantasia should not prevent many forms of imagination. 
Hence, people with aphantasia should be able to respond to hypnotic suggestions that 
involve imagination, including the word blindness suggestion, unless the suggestion 
specifically requests the formation of a vivid mental image. 
Finally, provided that there is good enough evidence that highs can decrease 
Stroop interference to the same extent when they respond to the volitional request used 
in Chapter IV and to the word blindness suggestion, the imagination hypothesis would 
gain empirical support. An obvious follow up study would test whether or not lows and 
mediums can reduce Stroop interference when they are asked to voluntarily imagine the 
Stroop words as meaningless. According to the cold control theory, highs are different 
from non-highs in their ability to influence the metacognition over their own intentions, 
or in other words, to create the feeling of involuntariness while they respond intentionally. 
Therefore, if imagination is the key to the reduction of Stroop interference (when highs 
respond to the word blindness suggestion) then the cold control theory expects lows and 
mediums to be able to use this strategy just as well as highs do. 
The cornerstone of a good scientific explanation (or theory) is that it is hard to 
vary it without altering what the explanation is meant to account for (Deutsch, 2011). The 
reach of a theory is its ability to provide explanations for phenomena for which the theory 
was not created to account for (note that good rather than bad theories possess reach, as 
it is easier to determine the reach of an explanation that is hard to vary). Importantly, 
formulating good theories and identifying the reach of them are driving factors of the 
accumulation of knowledge and scientific progress. The imagination hypothesis is an 
explanation with a straightforward reach. Any phenomenon with the following two 
features can potentially be explained by the imagination hypothesis: 1) people entertain a 
counterfactual model of the world in which words are meaningless; 2) people manage to 
reduce Stroop interference. The word blindness suggestion is not the only phenomenon 
that meets these criteria. Another relevant phenomenon is the social priming of dyslexia. 
It was demonstrated by two independent labs that when people are asked to imagine what 
is it like to have dyslexia, they perform better on the Stroop task (indexed by the Stroop 
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interference effect) than after imagining a neutral scenario that does not involve 
experiencing words as meaningless (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2014b; Goldfarb, 
Aisenberg, & Henik, 2011). As argued in Chapter III, the word blindness suggestion 
effect and the dyslexia prime effect produce similar patterns of results. Importantly, they 
both reduce RTs of incongruent trials and they only affect the response conflict 
component of Stroop interference. These similarities between these two phenomena 
suggest that the imagination hypothesis has a reach beyond the word blindness 
suggestion. Nonetheless, the imagination hypothesis is still a conjecture. Hence, future 
research should test whether dyslexia priming and word blindness happen via the same 
cognitive mechanisms and whether this underlying mechanism is imagination. 
Implications of cold control theory  
The perspective of hypnosis in therapies.  
The core prediction of the theory that was investigated in this thesis is that hypnotic and 
non-hypnotic responses differ solely in the form of their accompanying HOT, and so 
hypnosis cannot provide people with abilities they do not possess outside of hypnosis 
(Chapters III and IV). This hypothesis has clear and substantial implications for the 
application of hypnosis in the clinical and therapeutic context. It implies that clients of 
therapies cannot benefit from responding in a hypnotic rather than in a non-hypnotic 
manner. Indeed, evidence supports that the effect of hypnosis on enhancing therapies is 
negligible when hypnotic and control groups receive identical treatment apart from the 
delivery of hypnosis (e.g., Adachi, 2012; Schaeafert, 2014). Nonetheless, a hypnotic 
compared to a non-hypnotic therapy can differ in other aspects than the form of the 
accompanying HOT of the responses of the subjects. Beliefs about hypnosis are so deeply 
ingrained in our culture that the ritual of hypnosis became an effective tool to influence 
expectations and the motivation of the subjects (Kirsch, 1985; Spanos, 1986; see also in 
Chapters II and IV). People with positive attitudes towards hypnosis (mostly highs and 
mediums) experience an elevation in expectations and motivation in the hypnotic context. 
Therefore, hypnosis may facilitate the responses of highs and mediums to hypnotic 
suggestions via, for instance, response expectancies (Kirsch, 1985). In line with this 
assumption, a meta-analysis of studies investigating cognitive therapies used in tandem 
with hypnosis demonstrated that the inclusion of the term hypnosis in the instructions can 
have a positive effect on the outcome of some therapies (Kirsch, Montgomery, & 
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Sapirstein, 1995). This finding subserves the idea that hypnosis can be beneficial in the 
clinical context even if the hypothesis about hypnosis being a purely metacognitive 
phenomenon is confirmed. Nonetheless, the evidence relating to this hypothesis that was 
presented in Chapter IV is not conclusive, hence further research is needed to understand 
the boundaries of cold control and its implications for clinical hypnosis.  
The reach of cold control.  
The cold control theory was created as a theory of hypnotic responding. It provides a 
simple, mechanistic explanation of how hypnotic subjects are able to respond 
intentionally and yet experience their response as if it is involuntary. However, cold 
control is not limited to the context of hypnosis, the theory does not assume that the 
unique ability of highs with which they can relinquish metacognition over their own 
intentions is restricted to hypnosis in any way. Hence, cold control may be the underlying 
mechanism of actions and experiences that are deliberately formed but sensed as if they 
happened automatically (Dienes et al., 2019). This is particularly important for studies of 
conscious experiences highs (and mediums in many cases) can easily transfer demand 
characteristics (Orne, 1962) into conscious experiences without being aware of doing so. 
For instance, a study demonstrated strong correlation between hypnotic suggestibility and 
several measures of conscious experience such as the rubber hand illusion, the vicarious 
pain questionnaire and the mirror touch synaesthesia (Lush et al., 2019). These findings 
imply that cold control may partially or completely account for these phenomena. 
Therefore, unraveling the limits of cold control, for instance, whether it can enhance the 
efficiency of first order intentions (Chapter III and IV) is indispensable to understand its 
implications beyond the field of hypnosis. 
Advancing the measurement of individual differences in hypnotic suggestibility 
The results of Chapter V demonstrated evidence that the online administration of SWASH 
and hypnosis screening, in general, are viable. Crucially, comparing the data of offline 
and online screen revealed that the two methods are comparable in the following aspects. 
The distribution of the scores was akin in the two samples and there was no sign of floor 
effect in the online sample; the internal validity (i.e., correlation of objective and 
subjective scores) was good for both of the offline and online measures; finally, there was 
a strong correlation between offline and online scores. The application of online hypnosis 
screening paves the way for large-scale hypnosis studies with heterogeneous samples. 
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Low power is a widespread problem in psychological science (e.g., Button et al., 2013; 
Cohen, 1962; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1992) and an obvious way to treat it is to increase 
the sample size of the studies. This issue applies to hypnosis research as well. Many 
interesting questions of the field of hypnosis can only be sensitively tested by large-scale 
studies: for instance, some predictions can be tested by correlational designs (cf., Chapter 
II & III) or in many cases the effect size predicted by H1 is either small or it is predicted 
that there is no effect (note that, generally, one needs more data to reach good enough 
evidence for H0 than for H1). To enhance the sensitivity of a study, one could also 
increase the number of trials, however, as we have seen it in Chapter II-IV, studies 
involving hypnosis procedures are already long and demanding for the participants. 
Hence, in order to ensure that the collected data have good enough quality (e.g., 
participants do not get tired during the study), increasing the sample size rather than the 
number of trials seems to be the felicitous choice.  
Online screening may also contribute to the improvement of the generalisability 
of hypnosis research by increasing the diversity of the samples. Most of the hypnosis 
studies, as well as cognitive psychology studies, are conducted on student samples (e.g., 
Montgomery, Duhamel, & Redd, 2000). This is an unfortunate fact that challenges the 
external-validity of the findings of the field (cf., the vision statement of the newly 
appointed editor of APS in which she encourages the submission of studies with more 
diverse samples; “New Psychological Science Editor”, 2019). The application of online 
screening could help hypnosis researchers to increase the generalisability of their findings 
by, for instance, screening and recruiting subjects from local communities.  
The application of the online SWASH is a substantial leap in the right direction, 
however, there are remaining issues regarding the measurement of hypnotic suggestibility 
that can be improved. For instance, the current version of the SWASH still takes about an 
hour to finish. This may disincentivize people to undertake the test or some participants 
may lose interest in the screening procedure during participation. The SWASH and many 
other screening procedures consist of three parts: induction, delivery of suggestion and a 
questionnaire in which participants report their experiences. The second and third part 
can only be shortened by reducing the precision of measurement. For instance, taking out 
some of the suggestions could speed up the screen, however, with fewer items, SWASH 
would be less accurate in assessing the suggestibility of individuals. The first part, the 
induction, consists of many suggestions, for instance, to relax or to focus attention. 
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However, responses to these suggestions are not evaluated as part of the screen (e.g., Shor 
& Orne, 1963; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). Therefore, leaving out the induction 
could substantially decrease the time of the screen. This could be problematic as some 
definitions of hypnosis require the usage of inductions and deem suggestions without a-
priori inductions imaginative suggestions (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch, 1997; 
Kirsch & Braffman, 2001). Nonetheless, the cold-control theory argues that it is not the 
a-priori induction that defines whether a response is hypnotic or not. According to cold 
control theory, if an intentional response is sensed as involuntary then the response is 
hypnotic regardless of the presence of an induction. This criterion can be empirically 
tested by including items in the screen that measure the feeling of involuntariness (e.g., 
Chapter IV; Polito, Barnier, & Woody, 2013). Future research could explore the extent to 
which the exclusion of the induction from the SWASH would be feasible and assess 
whether responses to the suggestions with and without a-priori induction are felt as 
involuntary. 
The Bayes factor and hypothesis testing 
This thesis applied the Bayes factor to draw conclusions about competing hypotheses, 
and this decision was only partly motivated by the practical advantages of the Bayes 
factor over the NHST that were mentioned in Chapter I (i.e., testing the null, and optional 
stopping). NHST consists of a clear set of rules with which one can make decisions (i.e., 
rejecting H0) with controlled long-term error rates, but this procedure will never tell us 
how strongly the evidence supports our pet theory, and this is the type of answer many 
researchers,  including me, are looking for (Dienes, 2011). If a researcher is interested in 
whether the evidence at her disposal is supporting a baseline model, such as the null, or 
an alternative model, then the Bayes factor is the ideal statistical tool for her. To assess 
the evidence in favour of the competing hypotheses, one needs to clarify the predictions 
of these hypotheses. This can be done by considering the predictions in terms of 
standardised effect sizes (Rouder et al., 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007) or in terms of raw 
units of measurement (Dienes, 2008). In the former case, our model representing the 
predictions of the hypotheses incorporates information about signal as well as about noise. 
However, including information about measurement error makes it difficult for 
researchers to consider what exactly their theory predicts, as theories usually remain silent 
on that matter. The signal part, on the other hand, is easy to grasp and interpret with regard 
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to the theory (Baguley, 2009; Dienes, 2019). Therefore, all the Bayes factors reported in 
this thesis followed the approach in which predictions of H1 are considered in raw units 
of measurement. 
 Optional stopping, one of the practical benefits of the Bayes factor, came handy 
for Chapters II-IV. I conducted sequential analyses in all of these Chapters and stopped 
data collection either when the strength of evidence of the outcome neutral and crucial 
tests exceeded the cut-off of good enough evidence (Chapters II-III) or when I ran out of 
subjects (Chapter IV). In the latter case, a well supported conclusion cannot be drawn, 
however, data collection can be continued any time and stopped once we have good 
enough evidence for H0 or H1 (which we are in the process of doing). Recently, the claim 
that optional stopping is not a problem for Bayesians (Dienes, 2016; Rouder, 2014) has 
been challenged on the grounds that the Bayes factor is not well calibrated under certain 
conditions (Heide & Grünwald, 2017). Replies argue that the Bayes factor is well 
calibrated as long as the model representing the predictions of H1 is in line with our 
beliefs about H1 (Rouder, 2019; Wagenkakers, Gronau & Vandekerckhove, 2019). 
However, there are scenarios in which these two things are not aligned. For instance, one 
can use the heuristics applied in this thesis (see Dienes, 2019 for other heuristics) to model 
the predictions of H1 on a pilot study (e.g., Chapter IV) or on the results of earlier relevant 
studies (e.g., Chapters II-III). However, in some cases, one needs to resort to using the 
very same dataset to inspire the model of H1 and to test it.31 Applying, for example, the 
room-to-move heuristic on our sample while we use optional stopping results in a 
dynamic estimate of the expected effect size. Every time we calculate the Bayes factor, 
the model of H1 will be slightly different as the room-to-move changes. This begs the 
question whether or not applying heuristics on our sample in tandem with optional 
stopping can lead us to miscalibrated conclusions. A future study should investigate this 
question and explore the extent to which dynamic models of H1 can miscalibrate the 
Bayes factor, and unravel how the size of the sample relates to this. Note that there is a 
sense in which the Bayes factor was never miscalibrated at any point in time: So long as 
at that point in time the model of H1 represents the best information about the plausibility 
of different effect sizes, the Bayes factor at that time is well calibrated with respect to the 
best model we have. 
                                                 
31 Note that as long as one is using a different aspect of the data to model and test H1, this procedure is not 
invalidating the Bayes factor (Dienes, 2019). 
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 The ability of the Bayes factor to distinguish between insensitive evidence and 
good enough evidence for H0 was exploited in Chapters II-IV. For instance, to conclude 
that a strategy cannot decrease Stroop interference, one needs a tool with which one can 
differentiate between data insensitivity and good enough evidence for the model 
predicting no Stroop reduction (Chapter III). Without such a tool, one could only conclude 
that the test failed to show evidence for the effect of a certain strategy in alleviating 
interference (cf. NHST). An even more interesting scenario arose in Chapter II that 
investigated the idea whether or not there is a minimum amount of cognitive conflict 
(indexed by interference on incongruent trials) that highs need to register to respond to 
the word blindness suggestion. Altering the proportion of incongruent trials allowed us to 
create blocks in which cognitive conflict occurred frequently and a block in which it rarely 
happened due to a low proportion of incongruent trials. If the amount of experienced 
conflict plays a role in the operation of the word blindness suggestion then we should find 
a difference between these blocks concerning the extent to which highs reduced Stroop 
interference. Moreover, if the minimum amount of necessary conflict idea is correct then 
highs should not be able to reduce Stroop interference in the low proportion incongruence 
block. This leaves us with a clear and consistent set of predictions: 1) no word blindness 
effect in the low proportion incongruence block; 2) word blindness effect in the high 
proportion incongruence block; 3) interaction of the block and the word blindness effect. 
However, what happens if we obtain good enough evidence supporting the first two 
claims but the test of the third claim remains insensitive? This is the issue that was 
discussed in Chapter VI. The tutorial highlights that we cannot conclude that the 
conditions differ unless the direct test, the test of the interaction, provides good enough 
evidence for it. This might strike us as being counterintuitive as it means that we cannot 
claim that the condition with no effect and the condition with an effect are different. 
However, as argued in Chapter VI, it is merely a temporary state that can be altered by 
continuing data collection until all tests are sensitive. Tutorials like this can illustrate 
Bayesian principles in a simple way, helping researchers use the Bayes factor to draw 
conclusions from their results. For instance, a recent study of Aczel et al. (2018) 
demonstrated that several papers published in high-tier journals in 2015 contained 
misrepresentations of non-significant results. Many claims about null findings were 
subserved with non-significant statistical tests, and only 14 from 137 papers (10%) 
reported Bayes factors to assess the strength of the evidence supporting H0. This later 
finding underlies that the Bayes factors has not yet reached its full potential and that there 
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is a need for clear and user friendly papers advocating the usage of the Bayes factor (e.g., 
Wagenmakers et al., 2018b). 
A crucial weakness of the current tools with which researchers can calculate the 
Bayes factor is that they do not offer robust versions (cf. robust versions of NHST are 
recommended in many cases or even to be used as default tools by Wilcox, 2017; Field 
& Wilcox, 2017). To calculate the Bayes factor, we need to operate with many 
assumptions that may or may not meet reality. For instance, usually we model the data 
generating process with a normal distribution (or with a t distribution, which 
approximates the normal when we have a large sample size), and so we do not know the 
extent to which a Bayes factor is miscalibrated if we sample from populations that deviate 
from this. A future project should explore the extent to which Bayes factors are 
miscalibrated if skewness or kurtosis is introduced in the distribution representing the 
population effect sizes, while the Bayes factor is still calculated with a normal likelihood 
function. This project could potentially provide us with a rule of thumb helping 
researchers to assess whether or not their sample introduces bias (or large enough bias) 
in their results. A straightforward follow up study would be to test robust methods of the 
Bayes factor. For instance, trimming and winsorizing could be applied on our sample 
before we calculate the Bayes factor, and it could be tested whether these procedures can 
alleviate the bias introduced by violations of the assumptions.  
Concluding remarks 
Evidence presented in this thesis is in line with the prediction of cold control theory about 
hypnosis being a purely metacognitive phenomenon. The word blindness suggestion 
seemingly challenges this simple model of hypnosis, by providing an example in which 
highs can objectively perform better in a hypnotic than in a non-hypnotic way, therefore, 
understanding the underlying mechanisms of this suggestion is essential for theory 
testing. The word blindness suggestion operates via the reduction of response conflict 
rather than semantic conflict (Chapter II), and it is unlikely that highs look-away, focus 
on a single letter, blur their vision or internally rehearse the goal of the task to reduce 
Stroop interference when they respond to the suggestion (Chapter III). The presented 
evidence suggests that highs do not gain special abilities due to the word blindness 
suggestion, as they can reduce Stroop interference via imagining the words as being 
meaningless with and without being aware of doing so (Chapter IV). However, the 
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strength of the relevant evidence is not good enough, therefore, future research should 
settle this matter (research that is actually now ongoing). The online evaluation of 
hypnotic suggestibility is viable, as the online compared to offline measurement reduces 
responsiveness only to a small extent (Chapter V). Adapting the online hypnosis 
screening can help experimental hypnosis research to realise its full potential by, for 
instance, facilitating the conduction of large-scale hypnosis studies with more 
heterogeneous samples. Finally, when it comes to hypothesis testing with Bayes factors, 
one should bear in mind that the principle that any assertion about the existence of an 
interaction necessitates the comparison of the conditions is as true for Bayesian as it is 
for frequentist statistics (Chapter VI). 
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Supplementary Materials of Chapter II 
Supplementary Question 
As a secondary question, we aimed to assess whether the participants experience 
any depth of hypnosis (Hilgard & Tart, 1966) during the suggestion conditions. We 
applied posthypnotic suggestions and so we expected that the participants should not 
experience of being in a hypnotic state while they respond to the suggestion (e.g., 
Terhune, Luke & Cohen Kadosh, 2017). This secondary question is not related to the 
main research question, so we present the results and their interpretation here, in the 
Supplementary Materials labelled as Exploration 4.   
Supplementary Methods 
 Data analysis.  As an exploratory analysis, we aimed to probe the extent 
to which the word blindness suggestion might influences the Stroop facilitation effect. 
Hence, we calculated the Stroop facilitation scores in each condition and block separately 
(mean of neutral RTs - mean of congruent RTs) as we did for the main analyses with the 
interference scores. The analyses were in accordance with the main tests we ran on the 
Stroop interference scores of the merged dataset, namely, all of these tests are direct 
comparisons of two conditions and so can be conducted by running paired samples t-tests.   
Moreover, we conducted the outcome neutral and crucial tests; and the exploration 
on the facilitation effect while employing ratio scores as a dependent variable instead of 
difference scores. That is, for instance, instead of calculating the Stroop interference by 
taking the difference of the mean of incongruent RTs and the mean of neutral RTs, we 
used the ratio of the two condition means (mean of neutral RTs / mean of incongruent 
RTs); and then took the ratio of the ratios at every step of the data processing instead of 
calculating the difference scores. To make sure that the distribution is close to normal, we 
ran a natural log (ln) transformation on the computed values for each analysis. All 
statistical analyses are one-sided t-tests in which we tested the conditions against zero 
(note that the expected effect size for a null effect for ratio scores is 1, however, we used 
ln transformation on the data and so equal condition means would result in a score of zero 
as ln(1) = 0).  
Bayes factor.   
Analyses with difference scores.  To determine the SD of the models of H1s, we 
applied the very same rule as we did for the analysis of the Stroop interference effect and 
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the effect of the suggestion on Stroop interference. That is, we extracted the mean 
facilitation effect from the meta-analysis of Parris, Dienes & Hodgson (2013) and used it 
as the SD of the half-normal distribution (with a mode of zero) modelling the prediction 
of H1 that assumes the presence of the facilitation effect. To specify the SD of the model 
testing the suggestion effect, we used the mean suggestion effect (mean facilitation effect 
in the no suggestion conditions - mean facilitation effect in the suggestion conditions) of 
the same meta-analysis. This latter test is exploratory, however, we set a directional 
hypothesis that is identical to the hypothesis regarding the reduction of the interference 
effect. Thus, we employed a half-normal distribution with a mode of zero as the model of 
H1, in which it is predicted that the facilitation effect will be smaller in the high 
incongruence proportion block than in the low incongruence one. The distribution 
representing the predictions of the model have an SD of 14ms, which is the half of the 
mean facilitation effects gathered in the meta-analysis of Parris, Dienes & Hodgson 
(2013). 
To test the robustness of our conclusions based on Bs that employed a uniform 
distribution to model the predictions of H1, we conducted all of the corresponding 
analyses using a distribution that is in line with the scientific intuition that small effect 
sizes are more probable than large effect sizes. A half-Cauchy distribution with a mode 
of zero and a scale that equals to 1/7th of the maximum effect size fits this assumption 
well (Dienes, 2017). Specifically, such a distribution predicts that it is equally likely that 
the real effect sizes is smaller than 1/7th of the maximum than it is larger than 1/7th of the 
maximum effect size. We report the Bs calculated with a half-Cauchy distribution that 
has a mode of zero and a scale of r as BHC(0, r). 
Analyses with ratio scores.  We applied half-normal distributions with a mode of 
zero to model the predictions of all H1s as we did for the difference score analyses. 
Moreover, we employed the same process to determine the parameters (SDs) of the H1 
models for the analyses with ratio scores as the parameters of the corresponding analyses 
with difference scores. Using the raw condition means (see Supplementary Materials of 
Palfi, Parris, & Dienes, 2019) rather than the calculated interference and facilitation 
scores, we were computed ratio scores (e.g., mean of Neutral RTs divided by mean of 
Incongruent RTs) and directly apply them as the SDs of H1 models. For instance, to 
acquire the expected effect size of the Stroop effect, we calculated the mean of the 
congruent conditions and divided it by the mean of the incongruent conditions ((652+644) 
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/ (783+695) = 0.88). The computed expected effect sizes of the Stroop interference, 
Stroop facilitation, the effect of the word blindness suggestion on interference and 
facilitation are 0.91, 0.96, 0.92 and 0.98, respectively. For the test of the proportion 
congruency effects, we halved the expected effect sizes of the standard Stroop and 
interference effects. Note that halving a ratio based effect sizes imply that we took the 
arithmetic mean of the expected effect size and one. Therefore, the expected effect size 
of the proportion manipulation on the Stroop and interference effects are 0.94 and 0.96, 
respectively. Finally, to calculate the B, we ln transformed the derived expected effect 
sizes and used them as the SDs of the H1 half-normal models (e.g., the SD of the half-
normal distribution modelling the Stroop effect is ln(0.88) = -1.28). 
Supplementary Results  
Analyses with difference scores. 
Exploration S1: Is there an interaction between the suggestion, the type of the 
block and the extent of the Stroop facilitation effect?  There was a Stroop facilitation 
effect (t(22) = 6.24,  p < .001, Mdiff = 93 ms, dz = 1.30, BH(0, 28) = 1.79*103, RR[4, 
2.90*104]) as the participants took more time to respond to neutral trials (M = 807 ms, SD 
= 113) than to congruent trials (M = 714 ms, SD = 112). Surprisingly, the difference 
between the suggestion and no suggestion conditions was larger in the low incongruence 
proportion block (M = 50 ms, SD = 110) than in the high incongruence proportion block 
(M = -21 ms, SD = 154). Indeed, the Bayes factor was closer to reach the level of good 
enough evidence for an interaction showing a greater effect of suggestion for the low 
rather than high incongruence block (t(22) = -2.13,  p = .045, Mdiff = -71ms, dz = -0.44, 
BH(0, 14) = 1.91, RR[13, 544]) than for an interaction predicting the effect the other way 
around BH(0, 14) =0.58, RR[0, 19]. The data were non-evidential regarding the suggestion 
effect in both of the low incongruence proportion block (t(22) = 2.13,  p = .042, Mdiff = 
50ms, dz = 0.45, BH(0, 14) = 2.53, RR[10, 291]) and the high incongruence proportion block 
(t(22) = -0.66,  p = .515, Mdiff = -21 ms, dz = 0.14, BH(0, 14) = 0.75, RR[0, 32]).  
Supporting test 1: Does the suggestion, the type of the block and their 
interaction influence subjects` experiences of word meaninglessness?  The effect of 
suggestion on the reports about meaninglessness is robust over the two distributions 
modelling the predictions as all Bs show strong evidence for H1. However, the picture 
about the absence of the effect of the block and the interaction between suggestion and 
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block is less clear as the Bs indicate insensitive evidence for the items Q1, Q2 and Q3. 
Table S1 depicts all Bs with the half-Cauchy and uniform distributions. 
Supporting test 2: Does the suggestion affect subjects' expectations?  The 
evidence for the effect of the suggestion on the subjects` expectations to experience 
meaninglessness is strong irrespective of the chosen distribution (BHC(0, 14) = 84.60, 
RR[0.03, 278], BU[0, 100] = 7.71 *103). 
Exploration 1: Is there any relationship between the expectations and the 
subjective experiences to the suggestion?  The conclusion of all Bs based on half-Cauchy 
distributions are in line with the Bs using uniform distributions as all the difference scores 
show strong evidence for the positive relationship between expectations and subjective 
reports of meaninglessness. See Table S2 for the exact Bs. 
 Exploration 2: Is there any relationship between the objective responses 
and the expectations of the participants?  The analysis revealed data insensitivity for all 
three cases with both of the alternatives. The evidence is insensitive about the relationship 
between the objective responses and the expectations in the no suggestion condition 
(BHC(0, 3.54) = 1.44, RR[0, 2.81*102], BU[0, 24] = 2.07), in the suggestion condition (BHC(0, 
3.54) = 1.17, RR[0, 16.87], BU[0, 24] = 1.35) as well as for the difference between the 
conditions (BHC(0, 3.54) = 0.95, RR[0, 2.17*102], BU[0, 24] = 0.85). 
 Exploration 3: Is there any relationship between the subjective and 
objective responses of the participants?  All Bs comparing the evidence for the existence 
and absence of the effect between the objective and subjective responses are insensitive 
with the half-Cauchy distribution. These results are in accordance with the ones based on 
the uniform distributions. See Table S3 for the exact Bs. 
Exploration 4: Do subjects experience some depth of hypnosis during the post-
hypnotic suggestion?  The participants reported experiencing a hypnotic state or being 
relaxed during the hypnotic induction (M = 1.78, 95% CI [1.56 – 2.01]) and they reported 
being in a normal or relaxed state after the de-induction (M = 0.65, 95% CI [0.40 - 0.90]). 
The contrast of these two time points revealed strong evidence in favour of the difference 
between them regarding the experienced depth of hypnosis (t(22) = 7.81,  p < .001, Mdiff 
= 1.13, dz = 1.63, BU[0, 3] = 5.20*105, RR[0.08, 3.20*103]). Although, the suggestion was 
posthypnotic, the participants claimed to be relaxed or even hypnotised in the suggestion 
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condition (M = 0.97, 95% CI [0.65 - 1.28]), whereas they felt that they were in a normal 
state while engaging in the Stroop task in the no suggestion condition (M = 0.51, 95% CI 
[0.24 - 0.78]). To further investigate this state that the participants experienced while the 
posthypnotic suggestion was active, we compared the suggestion condition to the no 
suggestion one, and to the induction and de-induction time points. There was a difference 
between the suggestion and no suggestion conditions in the reported depth of hypnosis 
(t(22) = 2.64,  p = .015, Mdiff = 0.45, dz = 0.55, BU[0, 3] = 3.46, RR[0.09, 343]). However, 
the contrast of the suggestion condition and de-induction did not provide sensitive 
evidence (t(22) = 1.62,  p = .118, Mdiff = 0.31, dz = 0.34, BU[0, 3] = 0.57, RR[0, 5.01]). 
Moreover, during the induction, the participants experienced deeper hypnosis than in the 
suggestion condition (t(22) = 5.94,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.81, dz = 1.24, BU[0, 3] = 7.00*103, 
RR[0.08, 2.06*103]). 
All effects are robust to the shape of the distribution used to model the predictions 
of H1s. The participants reported greater hypnotic depth during the induction than right 
after the de-induction (BHC(0, 0.43) = 3.25*105, RR[0.02, 333]). There was also a difference 
between the suggestion and no suggestion conditions (BHC(0, 0.43) = 8.20, RR[0.02, 148]) 
and between the induction and the suggestion condition (BHC(0, 0.43) = 7.63*103, RR[0.02, 
226]). The evidence for the difference between the suggestion condition and de-induction 
is insensitive (BHC(0, 0.43) = 1.71, RR[0, 3.37]). 
Analyses with ratio scores. 
Outcome neutral tests.  We found strong evidence for the Stroop interference 
(t(22) = 6.20,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.12, dz = 1.29, BH(0, 0.09) = 2.04*104, RR[0.01, 40.20])32 
and for the Stroop effects (t(22) = 14.94,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.24, dz = 3.11, BH(0, 0.13) = 
4.92*1010, RR[0.01, 82.26]). The type of the block influenced the extent of the Stroop 
interference (t(22) = 2.94,  p = .007, Mdiff = 0.07, dz = 0.61, BH(0, 0.04) = 14.59, RR[0, 0.55]) 
and Stroop effects (t(22) = 6.54,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.15, dz = 1.36, BH(0, 0.06) = 1.14*104, 
RR[0.01, 35.60]) in the predicted direction showing evidence for the proportion 
congruency effect. In other words, the extent of the interference and Stroop effects was 
smaller in the high incongruence than in the low incongruence proportion block.  
                                                 
32 Of note, for all the computed values and predicted effect sizes, a negative Mdiff indicates a difference in 
the non-predicted direction. 
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Crucial test.  There was a three-way interaction between the type of the block, the 
suggestion and the interference effect (t(22) = 2.15,  p = .043, Mdiff = 0.09, dz = 0.45, BH(0, 
0.08) = 4.90, RR[0.02, 0.24]). The suggestion decreased the interference in the high 
incongruence proportion block (t(22) = 2.25,  p = .035, Mdiff = 0.06, dz = 0.47, BH(0, 0.08) = 
5.19, RR[0.02, 0.37]), whereas the suggestion did not influence the extent of the 
interference in the low incongruence proportion block (t(22) = -0.99,  p = .335, Mdiff = -
0.03, dz = -0.21, BH(0, 0.08) = 0.22, RR[0.04, Inf]). 
Exploration S1: Is there an interaction between the suggestion, the type of the 
block and the extent of the Stroop facilitation effect?  There is evidence for the Stroop 
facilitation effect (t(22) = 6.62,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.12, dz = 1.38, BH(0, 0.04) = 5.27*103, 
RR[0.01, 39.41]). The ratio score analysis also showed some evidence for the unexpected 
finding that the suggestion diminished the facilitation effect to a greater extent in the low 
incongruence than in the high incongruence block (t(22) = -2.03,  p = .055, Mdiff = -0.08, 
dz = -0.42, BH(0, 0.02) = 2.01, RR[0.02, 0.80]); and it supported the null over the model 
predicting the contrary (BH(0, 0.02) = 0.55, RR[0, 0.03]). In fact, the suggestion modulated 
the extent of the facilitation effect in the low incongruence block (t(22) = 2.21,  p = .038, 
Mdiff = 0.06, dz = 0.46, BH(0, 0.02) = 2.92, RR[0.02, 0.47]) while the results for the high 
incongruence block were insensitive (t(22) = -0.55,  p = .588, Mdiff = -0.02, dz = 0.11, 
BH(0, 0.02) = 0.73, RR[0, 0.03]). 
Discussion of Supplementary Results 
 The experience of being in a hypnotic state. 
The convention of giving a suggestion posthypnotically is the standard way to 
distinguish the effects of hypnotic inductions and suggestions, and so control the potential 
confounds that can be introduced by the induction procedure (Terhune, Luke & Cohen 
Kadosh, 2017), such as the experience of being in an altered state of consciousness. 
Interestingly, we found evidence that highs reported experiencing a deeper hypnotic state 
in the suggestion than in the no suggestion condition. Indeed, hypnotic trance was earlier 
hypothesised to happen spontaneously during the implementation of a posthypnotic 
response (Erickson & Erickson, 1941). However, our participants reported being in a 
substantially deeper hypnotic state during the induction than during the Stroop task. 
Further, the evidence regarding the difference between the moment when the participants 
were asked to return to their normal state of wakefulness (after de-induction) and the 
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suggestion condition is insensitive. In sum, these data indicate that the mere application 
of posthypnotic suggestions cannot prevent participants from sensing any form of altered 
state of consciousness while responding to the suggestion opposing the traditional view 
that posthypnotic suggestions are not accompanied by any feeling of hypnotic depth (e.g., 
Terhune, Luke & Cohen Kadosh, 2017). Nonetheless, the observed hypnotic depth in the 
suggestion condition did not even exceed the level of feeling relaxed (M = 0.97, 95% CI 
[0.65 - 1.28]) rendering this change in the experience of being in an altered state most 
probably negligible. 
Table S1. 
Bayes Factors with Half-Cauchy and Uniform Distributions Modelling the Predictions of 
H1s about the Effect of Suggestion, Block and their Interaction on Subjective responses 
of meaninglessness 
  Statistics 
Item Predictor BHC(0, 14) RR BU[0, 100] 
Q1 Suggestion 2.47 * 102 1, 8.63*103 196 
Block 0.19 0, 29 0.04 
Suggestion*Block 3.26 0, 100 1.13 
Q2 Suggestion 1.86 * 102 1, 5.86*103 120 
Block 0.36 0, 32 0.08 
Suggestion*Block 1.63 0, 53 0.47 
Q3 Suggestion 8.71 1, 5.64*103 4.15 
Block 0.29 0, 45 0.06 
Suggestion*Block 0.65 0, 25 0.17 
Q4 Suggestion 55.87 1, 5.03*103 33.66 
Block 0.11 6, Inf 0.02 
Suggestion*Block 0.33 12, Inf 0.08 
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Table S2. 
Bayes Factors with Half-Cauchy and Uniform Distributions Modelling the Predictions of 
H1s Testing the Questions of Exploration 1  
 Statistics of Exploration 1 
Item Condition BHC(0, 3.57) RR BU[0, 25] 
Q1 No Suggestion 1.00*105 0.48, 9.16*103 2.99*105 
Suggestion 3.23*102 0.64, 5.30*103 1.39*103 
Difference 1.50*104 0.45, 6.47*103 9.26*104 
Q2 No Suggestion 1.63 2.18, 25.59 1.73 
Suggestion 1.68*102 0.61, 4.29*103 8.08*102 
Difference 68.95 0.48, 3.81*103 2.32*102 
Q3 No Suggestion 11.13 0.88, 1.20*103 36.14 
Suggestion 2.54*102 0.80, 3.96*102 1.15*103 
Difference 1.95*103 0.49, 6.09*103 1.03*104 
Q4 No Suggestion 2.62 1.21, 98.23 3.97 
Suggestion 2.03 0, 42.48 2.54 
Difference 67.86 0.67, 271 
 
Table S3. 
Bayes Factors with Half-Cauchy and Uniform Distributions Modelling the Predictions of 
H1s Testing the Questions of Exploration 3 
 Statistics of Exploration 3 
Item Condition BHC(0, 0.14) RR BU[0, 1] 
Q1 No Suggestion 1.06 0, 1.83 1.11 
Suggestion 0.88 0, 0.39 0.65 
Difference 0.93 0, 0.96 0.77 
Q2 No Suggestion 1.10 0, 2.36 1.19 
Suggestion 1.02 0, 1.13 0.91 
Difference 1.05 0, 2.20 1.04 
Q3 No Suggestion 1.21 0, 7.51 1.45 
Suggestion 0.80 0, 0.57 0.52 
Difference 0.96 0, 2.21 0.80 
Q4 No Suggestion 1.09 0, 2.23 1.17 
Suggestion 0.65 0, 0.71 0.33 
Difference 0.85 0, 1.03 0.63 
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Supplementary Materials of Chapter III 
Experiment 1  
Supplementary Methods 
 Bayesian parameter estimation with 95% Credibility intervals.  To 
explore the extent to which hypnotisability and self-reports of strategy usage are related 
to the objective effectiveness of the strategies (reduction in Stroop interference), we 
employed parameter estimation rather than hypothesis testing. Hence, for these analyses, 
we report the strength of the association and its 95% Credibility Intervals (CI). For the 
first type of analyses, we report the Pearson`s r correlation coefficients, and for the second 
type of analyses, we computed the Kendall`s τ as the self-report scores followed a 
negatively skewed distribution. To calculate the 95% CIs of the Kendall`s τ, we applied 
the credibleIntervalKendallTau function of van Doorn, Ly, Marsman, and Wagenmakers 
(2016). Note that as these measures are standardized effect sizes, they do not indicate how 
much e.g. a given change in estimated percentage change in strategy use predicts a change 
in milliseconds of interference. 
Supplementary Results 
Supporting analysis of interest: What is the strength of the relationship 
between hypnotisability and the extent to which people reduce the Stroop 
interference via the strategies?  As an additional analysis to the test of the regression 
slopes, we explored the strength of the association between the SWASH scores and the 
extent to which the participants reduced the Stroop interference by using the strategies. 
Virtually all correlation coefficients equal zero and the range of the plausible estimates 
lies within the boundaries of small to medium effect sizes. The results in descending order 
of the correlation coefficients are blurring (r = .03, 95% CI = [-.23, .29]), looking-away 
(r = .01, 95% CI = [-.25, .27]), single-letter (r = .01, 95% CI = [-.25, .27]), and goal-
maintenance (r = -.01, 95% CI = [-.27, .25]) strategies. 
Exploration: Estimation of the strength of the relationship between self-
reports of strategy usage and the reduction in the Stroop interference effect.  Finally, 
we explored the strength of the association between the participants` subjective reports 
on how successfully they applied the strategies and the objective efficiency of the 
strategies in reducing the extent of the Stroop interference effect. For the looking-away 
strategy, data are consistent with a null as well as a small effect size (τ = .16, 95% CI = 
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[-.02, .32]). We can be 95% confident that the correlations between self-reports and the 
blurring (τ = - .04, 95% CI = [-.21, .13]) and single-letter focus (τ = .03, 95% CI = [-.14, 
.20]) strategies are not stronger than .13 and .20, respectively.  For the goal-maintenance 
strategy, the plausible values of the correlation do not exceed the level of a negligible 
association (τ = -.14, 95% CI = [-.28, .06]). 
Experiment 2 
Supplementary Results 
Exploration: Estimation of the strength of the relationship between self-reports of 
strategy usage and the reduction in the Stroop interference effect.  Finally, we 
explored the strength of the relationship between the experienced and objective efficiency 
of the strategies. The results are comparable for the looking-away (τ = .02, 95% CI = [-
.20, .24]) and blurring strategies (τ = .03, 95% CI = [-.19, .25]). We can be 95% confident 
that the correlations lie within the region of weak effect sizes, and the data are consistent 
with either a negative or positive relationship for both of the strategies. 
  
  
203 
 
 
Supplementary Materials of Chapter IV 
Pilot Experiment 
Supplementary Results 
Supplementary analyses of the Outcome neutral tests 2.  We analysed how the 
suggestion and volition can influence the experience of control over the meaningfulness 
of the appearing words. The participants reported the highest level of control in the no 
suggestion condition (M = 2.33, SD = 0.84). They reported slightly lower level of control 
in the volition condition (M = 2, SD = 0.69) and the lowest level of control was reached 
in the suggestion condition (M = 1.1, SD = 0.71). The analyses revealed strong evidence 
for the difference between suggestion and no suggestion on the level of reported control 
(t(29) = 6.50,  p < .001, Mdiff = 1.23, BH(0, 1.5) = 1.29*105, RR[0.08, 4.02*102]) and 
insensitive evidence for the difference between volition and no suggestion volition (t(29) 
= 2.41,  p = .023, Mdiff = 0.33, BH(0, 1.5) = 2.76, RR[1.37, 12.81]).  
To estimate the extent to which the experienced meaninglessness felt voluntary, 
we also investigated the subjective nature of this phenomenon, by measuring whether 
people experience the suggestion as perception and the voluntarily produced 
meaninglessness as imagination. As the corresponding item of the questionnaire had only 
two levels (either imagination or perception), we can apply it as a dichotomous or a 
continuous variable. In the main text, we reported the analysis considering the variable as 
continuous, and here, we introduce the analysis in which the variable is taken as 
dichotomous. Based on the answers of 26 participants (4 participants did not provide an 
answer in one of the conditions), we estimated the odds ratio (OR) of the experienced 
nature of meaninglessness (either perceived or imagined) influenced by the type of the 
suggestion. The estimate (OR = 4, 95% CI[0.64-25.02]) is in the predicted direction, 
namely, indicating higher probability for experienced imagination over perception in the 
volition condition compared to suggestion condition, but the estimation covers a broad 
range of possible values. 
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Table S1 
The 2x2 Contingency Table of the Experienced Nature of the Meaninglessness 
Suggestion Volition 
Imagined Perceived 
Imagined 8 2 
Perceived 8 8 
Note. The table contains the data of 26 participants as 4 people did not provide an answer 
for either question. 
Pre-registered Experiment 
Supplementary Methods 
Sample size estimation.  To have an approximation of how many participants we 
might need in the registered experiment to find supporting evidence for the null (given 
that the null were true) in respect of the difference between the suggestion and volition 
conditions, we conducted a sample size estimation based on Dienes (2015, April 23). The 
core idea of this sample size estimation procedure is that we assume that the level of noise 
in measurement, indexed by the standard deviation of the crucial measure (difference in 
RTs between suggestion and volition conditions), will be identical across the two 
experiments. This allows us to calculate the B corresponding to any sample size with a 
chosen sample mean. In this analysis, we surmised that if the null were true then our 
sample mean would be 0 ms, and if there is a difference between the hypnotic and 
volitional suggestions then our sample mean would be identical to the one acquired in the 
pilot study (25 ms). We calculated the Bs with both raw effect sizes for sample sizes 
varying between 6 and 60 (Figure S1). Given that there is a difference of 25 ms between 
the two conditions in our sample we need to recruit around 24 people to provide moderate 
evidence for the alternative hypothesis. Whereas, to find moderate evidence favoring the 
null hypothesis, one might need to recruit 41 people with a sample mean of 0 ms. 
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Figure S1. Sample size estimation. The bold line indicates Bs (H0 over H1) calculated 
with a sample mean of 0 ms and varying sample sizes, whereas the dashed line shows 
the Bs (H1 over H0) computed with a sample mean of 25 ms. The SD of the sample was 
taken from the pilot study; thus, the analysis assumes that the level of noise will be the 
same in a future study. The dotted line shows the threshold of a sensitive B based on 
Jeffreys (1961). 
Supplementary Results 
Analysis plan.  Here, we will report the results of the analyses comparing the no 
suggestion and suggestion, and the no suggestion and volition conditions in respect of the 
experienced level of control. In addition, to demonstrate the variability in noise among 
the four participating labs, we will report a table with the Ms and SDs of the crucial 
analysis (difference between suggestion and volition conditions in terms of RTs) broken 
down by the place of data collection.  
Supplementary analyses of the Outcome neutral tests 2.  As expected, the 
reported level of control over how meaningful the words appeared to the participants was 
the highest in the no suggestion condition (M = 2.36, SD = 0.72) followed by the volition 
condition (M = 2.11, SD = 0.67) and it was the lowest in the suggestion condition (M = 
1.50, SD = 0.81). The contrast of the conditions revealed that we need to suspend 
judgment regarding the effect of the volitional request on the level of control (t(35) = 
1.51,  p = .141, Mdiff = 0.25, BH(0, 1) = 0.92, RR[0, 2.8]). However, we found strong 
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evidence supporting for the effect of the suggestion in reducing the experienced level of 
control (t(35) = 4.49,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.86, BH(0, 1) =957, RR[0.08, 240]). 
Comparison of the participating labs in terms of the effect size of the crucial 
test. The crucial test of the current experiment was the comparison of the suggestion and 
the volition conditions in terms of the magnitude of the Stroop interference effect. Table 
S2 demonstrates the means and SDs of the conditions and of their differences separately 
for US and LaU. The raw effect sizes and SDs were comparable among the places of data 
collection apart the volition effect for which the level of noise appears to be substantially 
smaller at LaU than at US. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that the results of 
LaU are based on only three participants. 
 
Table S2 
Summary Table about the Means of the RTs of the Stroop Interference effect in the 
Suggestion and Volition Conditions and for their Difference Broken Down by the Place 
of Data Collection 
Place of Data Collection  Experimental condition 
Suggestion Volition Difference 
University of Sussex (US) 
 
31 (86) 24 (100) 7 (72) 
Lancaster University (LaU) 
 
29 (89) 17 (38) 12 (81) 
Note. The means are reported in ms and the Standard Deviations (SD) of the means are 
shown within the brackets. 
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Supplementary Materials of Chapter VI 
Sample size estimation 
Calculating the thresholds 
Consider running a pilot study from which we take the standard error of the 
parameter tested and assume that will change only according to N in future studies. If we 
assume that H1 is true and we choose a raw effect size we expect to find, we can estimate 
the sample size we might need to find good enough evidence for H1 (e.g., B > 3) by 
simply increasing the sample size one-by-one and calculating the Bayes factor until it 
reaches the pre-set threshold of good enough evidence (Dienes, 2015, April 23). Note that 
elevating the sample size increases the evidence by reducing noise, the standard deviation 
of the sampling distribution (i.e., the standard error), while we assume that signal, the 
effect size measured in raw units, remains the same. This method has a 50% long-term 
relative frequency to find good enough evidence for H1 if the real effect size is identical 
to the effect size we used in the sample size estimation procedure. This statement follows 
from two principles. First, B = 3 roughly corresponds to p = .05, when the expected effect 
size is about the same as the obtained effect size (Jeffreys, 1961), indicating that there is 
a single critical t-value with which we can gain a B that indicates good enough evidence 
for H1 and a p-value that is just significant (provided that the level of alpha is set to .05). 
Second, if the critical t-value is identical to the noncentrality parameter of our t-
distribution then the observed t-values will be above the critical value half of the time. 
Hence, the long-term relative frequency of the design to reject the null or in the case of 
the Bayes factor to find good enough evidence for H1 is 50%. 
We can improve the long-term relative frequency of our design to find good 
enough evidence for H1 by further increasing the sample size and so reducing the standard 
error. This shifts the noncentrality parameter of our t-distribution and so increases the 
area under the curve that is beyond the critical t-value. To obtain a specific expected long-
term relative frequency such as 80%, first, we need to identify the noncentrality parameter 
of the t-distribution from which we would obtain t-values larger than the critical t-value 
80% of the time. This t-value is 2.8. Next, we simply need to find the corresponding B of 
the noncentrality parameter of that the distribution. We can do this by calculating the B 
as if the noncentrality parameter is the effect size and the expected effect size at the same 
time, while standard error equals 1. The result of this is B = 20. To calculate the threshold 
we need to estimate the sample size if we have a different cut-off of good enough evidence 
  
208 
 
 
than 3, we would need to adjust the critical t-value. We can do this by finding the t-value 
that corresponds to the B we plan to use as the cut-off of good enough evidence. For 
instance, t-value of 2.2 roughly corresponds to B of 6. To get the B threshold that we can 
use to estimate the sample size with which our design has a specific long-term relative 
frequency to find good enough evidence, we need to follow the steps described above and 
use the newly identified t-value as the critical t-value. 
It is to be noted that the arguments laid here underlying the sample size estimation 
method are related to fixed designs (i.e., data collection until we reach the pre-set sample 
size) in which we want to assess the evidence for H1. It is not straightforward however, 
how this procedure works out when one uses optional stopping or when one is assessing 
evidence for H0. For instance, optional stopping allows us to stop collecting the data 
before we reach the sample size we gained from the estimation process, once we have 
reached the cut-off of good enough evidence for either H1 or H0. Due to this, however, 
in some cases, we may conclude wrongly that the null is true (based on the good enough 
evidence), when in fact H1 is true. This feature of optional stopping may or may not 
deteriorate the long-term relative frequency of our design to find good enough evidence 
for H1 when H1 is true. To evaluate the performance of the sample size estimation method 
for these cases, we conducted simulations covering all the combinations of long-term 
relative frequencies, cut-offs of good enough evidence and assumptions whether H1 or 
H0 is true. 
Testing the thresholds via simulations 
For each combination, we generated 1000 studies that had identical properties on 
average to the case study of Example 2. Specifically, the average of the raw effect sizes 
and the means of the experimental and control groups were equal to those of Example 1, 
respectively (when we assumed that H0 is true, the samples had identical means). This 
practice is in line with the assumption that the real effect sizes and their standard 
deviations are about the same as we acquired in the pilot study. The reader should be 
aware that they can have different assumptions and, for instance, replace the raw effect 
size gained from the pilot study with one that seems more plausible to approximate the 
real effect size, it is up to their scientific judgment. To calculate the Bayes factor, we used 
the same assumptions and parameters as we did in the case of Example 2. In half of the 
cases, we used fixed design, so we calculated the Bayes factor based on all data in each 
study. In the other half of the cases, we used optional stopping: we calculated the Bayes 
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factor first with 10 participants and then we added 10 participants and calculated the 
Bayes factor repeatedly until we gained good enough evidence either for H0 or H1. 
Finally, we derived the performance of a specific threshold by counting how many studies 
delivered evidence stronger than or equal to the cut-off of good enough evidence. The R 
script of the simulation can be accessed at: https://osf.io/5bzdf/. 
Assuming that H1 is true. The results of the simulations, when we assumed that 
H1 was true, are represented in Table S1. Using fixed design and optional stopping 
produced similar long-term relative frequencies of finding good enough evidence, and 
their performance is comparable to what was expected. However, when the cut-off of 
good enough evidence is set at 3, optional stopping appears to be inferior to fixed designs 
as it did not reach higher long-term frequency than 62%. 
Table S1 
Simulated Long-Term Relative Frequencies of Finding Good Enough Evidence for H1 
when H1 is Assumed to be True 
Cut-off of 
good 
enough 
evidence 
Threshold of 
B to 
estimate 
sample size 
Theoretical 
probability 
(%) 
Simulated 
probability with 
fixed design (%) 
Simulated 
probability with 
optional stopping 
(%) 
B > 3 
3 50 0.521 0.571 
20 80 0.778 0.672 
70 90 0.864 0.676 
220 95 0.899 0.694 
B > 6 
6 50 0.495 0.58 
40 80 0.762 0.787 
150 90 0.864 0.863 
520 95 0.936 0.9 
B > 10 
10 50 0.472 0.559 
85 80 0.771 0.808 
350 90 0.866 0.898 
1370 95 0.922 0.937 
 
Assuming that H0 is true. When we assumed that H0 is true, the simulated long-
term relative frequency of finding good enough evidence for H0 was higher in virtually 
all of the cases than the expected probability of finding good enough evidence. This seems 
to be true for both of the fixed design and for the optional stopping. 
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Table S2 
Simulated Long-Term Relative Frequencies of Finding Good Enough Evidence for H0 
when H0 is Assumed to be True 
Cut-off of 
good 
enough 
evidence 
Threshold of 
B to 
estimate 
sample size 
Theoretical 
probability 
(%) 
Simulated 
probability with 
fixed design (%) 
Simulated 
probability with 
optional stopping 
(%) 
B < 1/3 
3 50 0.519 0.473 
20 80 0.948 0.927 
70 90 0.981 0.928 
220 95 0.992 0.93 
B < 1/6 
6 50 0.511 0.589 
40 80 0.951 0.963 
150 90 0.979 0.96 
520 95 0.994 0.947 
B < 1/10 
10 50 0.482 0.612 
85 80 0.944 0.964 
350 90 0.991 0.975 
1370 95 0.992 0.971 
 
Conclusions.  The results of the simulation support that the presented sample size 
estimation method approximates well the long-term relative frequency of our design to 
find good enough evidence for H0, when H0 is true. This conclusion holds for the case 
when we assume that H1 is true as well with the restriction that if we use B > 3 as the cut-
off of good enough evidence for H1 and we apply optional stopping then our design may 
not be able to achieve a better long-term relative frequency to find good enough evidence 
for H1 than 70%.  
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Appendix A. Items of the experiment 
Expectations 
How strongly do you expect to experience the words as at least somewhat meaningless? 
1. I know the meaning of the words on the screen will be completely clear to me 
2. I am guessing that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way be 
unclear 
3. I am fairly sure that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way be 
unclear 
4. I am almost certain that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way 
be unclear 
5. I am certain that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way be 
unclear 
 
Subjective experience questions 
On what percentage of the trials: 
1. Was the meaning of the words on the screen completely clear to you? 
2. Were you aware of only an unclear meaning of the words on the screen? 
3. Were you just aware of the colour and had  no idea of what script the words were 
written in? 
4. Were the words on the screen written in a clear yet completely meaningless script? 
 
Depth of hypnosis scale 
How deeply hypnotised were you during that game (Stroop task)? 
1. Normal state 
2. Relaxed 
3. Hypnotized 
4. Deeply hypnotized 
  
  
212 
 
 
Appendix B. R script to calculate the Bayes factor  
The following R script integrates the scripts of the Dienes and McLatchie (2018) 
and the Dienes (2008) Bayes factor calculators into a single R function that can calculate 
Bs with normal and t likelihood function; and it can model the predictions of H1 with 
either a uniform, a normal, a t or a Cauchy distribution. Moreover, the R script allows to 
calculate Bs with one-tailed models that have a non-zero mode.   
Bf<-function(sd, obtained, dfdata = 1, likelihood = c("normal", "t"), 
modeloftheory= c("normal","t","cauchy", "uniform") ,lower =0, upper=1, modeoftheory 
= 0, scaleoftheory = 1, dftheory = 1, tail = 2) 
{ 
  if(likelihood=="normal"){ 
    dfdata=10^10 
  } 
  if(modeloftheory=="normal"){ 
    dftheory = 10^10 
  } else if(modeloftheory=="cauchy"){ 
    dftheory = 1 
  } 
  area <- 0 
  normarea <- 0 
  if(modeloftheory=="uniform"){ 
    theta <- lower 
    range <- upper - lower 
    incr <- range / 2000 
    for (A in -1000:1000){ 
      theta <- theta + incr 
      dist_theta <- 1 / range 
      height <- dist_theta * dt((obtained-theta)/sd, df=dfdata) 
      area <- area + height * incr 
    } 
    LikelihoodTheory <- area 
  }else{ 
    theta <- modeoftheory - 10 * scaleoftheory 
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    incr <- scaleoftheory/200 
    for (A in -2000:2000){ 
      theta <- theta + incr 
      dist_theta <- dt((theta-modeoftheory)/scaleoftheory, df=dftheory) 
      if(identical(tail, 1)){ 
        if (theta <= modeoftheory){ 
          dist_theta <- 0 
        } else { 
          dist_theta <- dist_theta * 2 
        } 
      } 
      height <- dist_theta * dt((obtained-theta)/sd, df = dfdata) 
      area <- area + height * incr 
      normarea <- normarea + dist_theta*incr 
    } 
    LikelihoodTheory <- area/normarea 
  } 
  Likelihoodnull <- dt(obtained/sd, df = dfdata) 
  BayesFactor <- LikelihoodTheory/Likelihoodnull 
  BayesFactor 
} 
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Appendix C. Instructions in the experimental conditions of Experiment 1 
No strategy 
“This time do not use any of the strategies we have instructed you in previous blocks. 
 
We would now like you to respond to the colour of the word on the screen as quickly and 
as accurately as you can.” 
 
Looking-away 
“We would like you to focus on the top-right corner of the screen throughout the 
following experimental block and use only your peripheral vision to identify the colour 
of the words that appear on the screen.  
 
You can practice this strategy now on an example word.” 
In this condition, the participants were told that they can focus on a spot that is closer to 
the word if they found the top-right corner to be too far away to easily identify the color 
of the word. 
 
Blurring 
“We would like you to blur your vision throughout the following experimental block by 
focusing on the screen as if you were looking into the distance. 
 
You can practice this strategy now on an example word.” 
 
Single-letter focus 
“We would like you to attend to a portion of the last coloured letter of each word in the 
next experimental block. 
 
You can practice this strategy now on an example word.” 
 
Goal-maintenance 
“We would like you to internally repeat the phrase “displayed colour” whenever you see 
the fixation cross.  
Please repeat the phrase until the target appears on the screen.” 
  
215 
 
 
Appendix D. Protocol of the Pilot Experiment 
This is an example protocol in which the order of the condition was: (1) Suggestion, (2) 
No suggestion, (3) Volition. Note that the order of these conditions was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
1.      Instructions and consent form 
Start script and provide the participant with the consent form 
2.      Practice 
5 minutes of practice Stroop. Ends up with a screen asking to wait for the 
experimenter. 
3.      Induction, suggestion and test of suggestion 
(O). Induction by Eye Closure. 
(1). Now, please seat yourself comfortably and rest your hands in your lap.  That's 
right.  Rest your hands in your lap.  Now look at your hands and find a spot on either hand 
and just focus on it.  It doesn't matter what spot you choose; just select some spot to focus 
on.  I will refer to the spot you have chosen as the target.  That's right... hands relaxed... 
look directly at the target. 
I am about to help you to relax, and meanwhile I will give you some instructions 
that will help you to gradually enter a state of hypnosis.  Please look steadily at the target 
and while staring at it, keep listening to my words.  You can become hypnotized if you 
are willing to do what I tell you to, and if you concentrate on the target and on what I say.  
You have already shown your willingness by coming here today, and so I am assuming 
that your presence here means that you want to experience all that you can.  Just do your 
best to concentrate on the target -- pay close attention to my words, and let happen 
whatever you feel is going to take place.  Just let yourself go.  Pay close attention to what 
I tell you to think about; if your mind wanders, that will be okay; just bring your thoughts 
back to the target and my words, and you can easily experience more of what it's like to 
be hypnotized. 
Hypnosis is perfectly normal and natural, and follows from the conditions of 
attention and suggestion we are using together.  It is chiefly a matter of focusing sharply 
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on some particular thing.  Sometimes you experience something very much like hypnosis 
when driving along a straight highway and you are oblivious to the landmarks along the 
road.  The relaxation in hypnosis is very much like the first stages of falling asleep, but 
you will not really be asleep in the ordinary sense, because you will continue to hear my 
voice and will be able to direct your thoughts to the topics that I suggest.  What is 
important here today is your willingness to go along with the ideas I suggest and to let 
happen whatever is about to happen.  Nothing will be done to embarrass you. 
(2)  Now take it easy and just let yourself relax.  Keep looking at the target as 
steadily as you can, thinking only of it and my words.  If your eyes drift away, don't let 
that bother you... just focus again on the target.  Pay attention to how the target changes, 
how the shadows play around it, how it is sometimes fuzzy, sometimes clear.  Whatever 
you see is all right.  Just let yourself experience whatever happens and keep staring at the 
target a little longer.  After awhile, however, you will have stared long enough, and your 
eyes will feel very tired, and you will wish strongly that they were closed.  Then they will 
close, as if by themselves.  When this happens, just let it happen. 
(3)  As I continue to talk, you will find that you will become more and more 
drowsy.  When the time comes that your eyes have closed, just let them remain closed.  
You will find that you can relax completely, but at the same time sit up 
comfortably in your chair with little effort.  You will be able to shift your position to make 
yourself comfortable as needed without it disturbing you.  For now, just relax more and 
more.  As you think of relaxing, your muscles will actually begin to relax.  Starting with 
your right foot, relax the muscles of your right leg......  Now the muscles of your left 
leg......  Just relax all over.  Relax your right hand...  your forearm...  upper arm...  and 
shoulder....  That's right....  Now your left hand....  and forearm....  and upper arm....  and 
shoulder....  Relax your neck, and chest....  more and more relaxed....  completely 
relaxed....  completely relaxed. 
 (4)  As you become relaxed, your body will feel deeply at ease....  comfortably 
heavy.  You will begin to have this pleasant feeling of heaviness and comfort in your legs 
and feet....  in your hands and arms....  throughout your body....  as though you were 
settling deep into the chair.  Your body feels comfortable and heavy....  Your eyelids feel 
heavy too, heavy and tired.  You are beginning to feel very relaxed and comfortable.  You 
are breathing freely and deeply, freely and deeply.  You are becoming more and more 
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deeply and comfortably relaxed.  Your eyelids are becoming heavier, more and more 
heavy and difficult to keep open. 
 (5)  Staring at the target so long has made your eyes very tired.  Your eyes may 
hurt from staring and your eyelids feel very heavy.  Soon you will no longer be able to 
keep your eyes open.  Soon you will have stood the discomfort long enough; your eyes 
are tired from staring, and your eyelids will feel too tired to remain open.  Perhaps your 
eyes are becoming moist from the strain.  You are becoming more and more relaxed and 
comfortable.  The strain in your eyes is getting greater and greater.  It would be a relief 
just to let your eyes close and to relax completely, relax completely.  The strain in your 
eyes will eventually be so great that you will welcome your eyes closing of themselves, 
of themselves. 
 (6)  Your eyes are tired and your eyelids feel very heavy.  Your whole body feels 
heavy and relaxed.  You feel a pleasant warm tingling throughout your body as you 
become more and more deeply relaxed  ...  deeper  ...  deeper  ...  more relaxed  ...  
completely relaxed and drifting down into a warm pleasant state of relaxation.  Keep your 
thoughts on what I am saying; listen to my voice.  Your eyes are getting blurred from 
straining.  You can hardly see the target, your eyes are so strained.  The strain is getting 
greater, greater and greater, greater and greater.  Your eyelids are heavy.  Very heavy.  
Getting heavier and heavier, heavier and heavier.  They are pushing down, down, down.  
Your eyelids seem weighted and heavy, pulled down by the weight  ....  so heavy  ...  your 
eyes are blinking, blinking  ....  closing, closing  ... 
Your eyes may have closed by now, and if they have not, they would soon close 
of themselves.  But there is no need to strain them more.  You have concentrated well on 
the target, and have become very relaxed.  Now we have come to the time when you may 
just let your eyes close.  That's it, eyes closed now. 
 (7)  You now feel very relaxed, but you are going to become even more relaxed.  
It is easier to relax completely now that your eyes are closed.  You will keep them closed 
until I tell you to open them or until I tell you to become alert  ...  You feel pleasantly, 
deeply relaxed and very comfortable as you continue to hear my voice.  Just let your 
thoughts dwell on what I'm saying.  You are going to become even more relaxed and 
comfortable. Soon you will be deeply hypnotized, but you will have no trouble hearing 
me. You will remain deeply hypnotized until I tell you to awaken later on.  Soon I shall 
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begin to count from one to twenty. As I count, you will feel yourself going down further 
and further into a deeply relaxed, a deeply hypnotized state...  but you will be able to do 
all sorts of things I ask you to do without waking up...  One...  you are going to become 
more deeply relaxed and hypnotized.... Two... down, down deeper, and deeper...  Three...  
Four... more and more deeply hypnotized....  Five... Six...  Seven...  you are sinking deeper 
and deeper into hypnosis.  Nothing will disturb you...  Just let your thoughts focus on my 
voice and those things I tell you to think of.  You are finding it easy just to listen to the 
things I tell you.  Eight...  Nine, Ten...  halfway there...  always deeper... Eleven... 
Twelve... Thirteen... Fourteen... Fifteen...  although deeply hypnotized you can hear me 
clearly. You will always hear me distinctly no matter how deeply hypnotized you become. 
Sixteen... Seventeen... Eighteen...  deeply hypnotized.  Nothing will disturb you.  You are 
going to experience many things that I will tell you to experience... Nineteen... Twenty.  
Deeply hypnotized now!  You will not wake up until I tell you to.  You will wish to 
remain relaxed and hypnotized and to have the experiences I describe to you. 
Even though you are deeply relaxed and hypnotized, I want you to realize that you 
will be able to write, to move, and even to open your eyes if I ask you to do so, and still 
remain just as hypnotized and comfortable as you are now.  It will not disturb you at all 
to open your eyes, move about, and write things.  You will remain hypnotized until I tell 
you otherwise...  All right, then.... 
Very soon you will be playing a computer game. When I clap my hands once, 
meaningless symbols will appear in the middle of the screen. They will feel like characters 
of a foreign language that you do not know, and you will not attempt to attribute any 
meaning to them. This gibberish will be printed in one of four ink colours: red, blue, green 
or yellow. Although you will only be able to attend to the symbols ink colour, you will 
look straight at the scrambled signs and crisply see all of them. Your job is to quickly and 
accurately depress the key that corresponds to the ink colour shown. You will find that 
you can play this game easily and effortlessly. When I clap my hands twice, you will 
regain your normal reading abilities.  
[Clap to activate: “Now you see meaningless words on the screen] 
[Show an example word and ask the participant to open her eyes and read out 
loud the following question with the answer options] 
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How strongly do you experience the word as meaningless? 
1)   The meaning of the word on the screen is completely clear to me 
2)   The meaning of the word on the screen is a little unclear 
3)   The meaning of the word on the screen is unclear 
4)   The meaning of the word on the screen is completely unclear 
[If the participant has chosen 1 or 2 then read the following script otherwise jump 
it through] 
“Notice how as you look at the word on the screen, you can look at it with the 
meaning fading to the background of your mind. We have found even when people 
consciously experience some meaning after this suggestion, they still process the words 
differently at a deeper level. You know you are capable of not reading meaningfully, 
remember how you have zoned out while reading a book.” 
[Clap twice to deactivate: “Now you see meaningful words on the screen”] 
[Ask the participant to close her eyes] 
Stay completely relaxed and pay close attention to what I'm going to tell you next.  
In a moment I shall begin counting backwards from twenty to one. You will awaken 
gradually, but for most of the count you will remain in the pleasant, relaxed state that you 
are now in. By the time I reach "five" you will open your eyes, but you will not be fully 
aroused. When I get to "one", you will be fully alert, in your normal state of wakefulness. 
You probably will have the impression that you have slept, because you will have 
difficulty in remembering all the things I have told you and all the things you did or felt, 
since you started looking at the target. In fact, you will find it so much of an effort to 
recall any of these things that you will have no wish to do so.  It will be much easier 
simply to forget everything until I tell you that you can remember.  You will remember 
nothing of what you did or felt from the time that you started looking at the target, until I 
say to you: "Now you can remember everything!" You will not remember anything you 
did until then. After you open your eyes you will feel fine. I shall now count backwards 
from twenty, and at "five", not sooner, you will open your eyes but not be fully aroused 
until I say "one". At "one" you will be awake ... Ready, now: 20...19...18... 17... 16... 15... 
14... 13... 12... 11... 10, halfway... 9... 8... 7... 6... five... 4... 3... 2... 1. Wake up! Wide 
awake! Any remaining drowsiness which you may feel will quickly pass. 
From now you won’t feel hypnotised at all, but the suggestion will powerfully 
affect you when it is activated by the clap." 
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4.      Suggestion condition  
[Say the following] 
[Clap to activate suggestion: “Now you see meaningless words on the 
screen”] 
 [Get the expectancy rating. Read out loud the question and provide the 
participant with the text format. Explain in detail if the participant has a question (same 
procedure for all of the other self-report measures)] 
[Start the Stroop task] 
[Ask about the subjective experience] 
[Ask them to recall the meaning of the words] 
[Ask about the depth of hypnosis] 
[Ask about the level of control] 
[Ask about how did they produce the effect of meaninglessness] 
[Clap twice to deactivate suggestion: “Now you see meaningful words on the 
screen”] 
5.      No suggestion condition  
[Say the following] 
“For this part of the experiment no suggestion has been activated. It is important 
that you make no attempt to make the words seem like gibberish or word of foreign 
language. We would now like you to respond to the colour of the word on the screen as 
quickly and as accurately as you can” 
[Get the expectancy rating] 
[Start the Stroop task] 
[Ask about the subjective experience] 
[Ask them to recall the meaning of the words] 
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[Ask about the depth of hypnosis] 
[Ask about the level of control] 
6. Volition condition 
[Say the following] 
“Highly hypnotisable individuals such as you have been shown to be able to 
eliminate the interference from the irrelevant word when under the influence of the post-
hypnotic suggestion and even when the suggestion is given without hypnosis.  We would 
like you to voluntarily strongly and clearly imagine the irrelevant words as gibberish, 
words of a foreign language so that no meaning can be taken from them.  This is not a 
hypnotic suggestion and we have not hypnotised you for this part of the task. You'll notice 
we have not initiated a suggestion by clapping or giving any other cue. You have the 
ability to do that anytime you please, under your control, as effectively as you just did. 
Please now voluntarily remove meaning from the words. You can do this so that it is 
under your control, just by exercising your imagination. You can be aware it is your 
imagination at the same time as it produces powerful effects.” 
[Have the participants look at a Stroop stimulus on the screen and ask them to 
make the word seem meaningless and then meaningful again. Tell them they can turn the 
control on and off.] 
[Get the expectancy rating.] 
[Start the Stroop task] 
[Ask about the subjective experience] 
[Ask them to recall the meaning of the words] 
[Ask about the depth of hypnosis] 
[Ask about the level of control] 
[Ask about how did they produce the effect of meaninglessness] 
[Finish] 
7.      Debrief and thank the participant  
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Appendix E. Items of the Pilot Experiment 
Expectations 
How strongly do you expect to experience the words as at least somewhat meaningless? 
1. I know the meaning of the words on the screen will be completely clear to me 
2. I have a little confidence that the meaning of the words on the screen will in 
some way be unclear 
3. I am somewhat sure that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some 
way be unclear 
4. I am fairly sure that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way be 
unclear 
5. I am almost certain that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some 
way be unclear 
6. I am certain that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way be 
unclear 
 
Subjective experience questions 
On what percentage of the trials: 
Was the meaning of the words on the screen completely clear to you? 
Were you aware of only an unclear meaning of the words on the screen? 
Were you just aware of the colour and had  no idea of what script the words were 
written in? 
Were the words on the screen written in a clear yet completely meaningless script? 
 
Recalling the meaning of the words 
If you were aware of any words, can you recall them? 
Depth of hypnosis scale 
How deeply hypnotised were you during that game (Stroop task)? 
1. Normal state 
2. Relaxed 
3. Hypnotized 
4. Deeply hypnotized 
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Level of control 
How much control did you have over how meaningful the words appeared to you? 
1. I had no control 
2. I had some control 
3. I had almost complete control 
4. I had complete control 
Experienced nature of meaninglessness 
How did you produce the effect of meaninglessness? 
1. The script appearing meaningless was just me imagining it was meaningless 
2. The script appearing meaningless was me perceiving the script as really 
meaningless  
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Appendix F. Instruction in the Volition condition of the Pre-registered Experiment 
“Highly hypnotisable individuals such as you have been shown to be able to eliminate the 
interference from the irrelevant word when under the influence of the post-hypnotic 
suggestion and even when the suggestion is given without hypnosis. Notice that when a 
hypnotic suggestion is given it is always you who creates the response; thus you can 
achieve the full effect of a suggestion any time you wish. We would like you to 
voluntarily, strongly and clearly create the experience that the irrelevant words are 
gibberish, words of a foreign language so that no meaning can be taken from them. You 
have the ability to do that anytime you please, under your control, as effectively as you 
did it during the hypnotic induction. This is not a hypnotic suggestion and we have not 
hypnotised you for this part of the task. You'll notice we have not initiated a suggestion 
by clapping or giving any other cue. Please now voluntarily remove meaning from the 
words. You can do this so that it is under your control, just by exercising your every-day 
capacity to consider the world in different ways, while still knowing how the world really 
is. You can have complete control over the strategy you used hypnotically and use it 
without being hypnotised and produce the same powerful effects.” 
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Appendix G. New items of the Pre-registered Experiment 
Expectations 2. 
How strongly do you expect that naming the colour of the words will be somewhat easy? 
1. I know that naming the colour of the words on the screen will be hard to me  
2. I have a little confidence that naming the colour of the words on the screen will in 
some way be easy 
3. I am somewhat sure that naming the colour of the words on the screen will in 
some way be easy 
4. I am fairly sure that naming the colour of the words on the screen will in some 
way be easy 
5. I am almost certain that naming of the words on the screen will in some way be 
easy 
6. I am certain that naming of the words on the screen will in some way be easy 
Depth of hypnosis 
On a scale from 0 to 5, to what degree did you enter a hypnotic state during the game? 0 
means your general state of consciousness was just the same as normal, 1 means you were 
slightly hypnotized and 5 means you entered very deep hypnosis? 
Normal State   0 – 1  –  2  –  3  –  4  –  5 Deep hypnosis 
Level of control 
How much control did you have over how meaningful the words appeared to you? 
1. I had no control because the words were written in a meaningless script 
2. I had some control because the words were written in a meaningless script 
3. I had almost complete control over whether the script appeared meaningless or 
meaningful 
4. I had complete control over whether the script appeared meaningless or 
meaningful 
Experienced nature of meaninglessness 
How did it seem the effect of meaninglessness came about? 
The script appearing meaningless 
was me perceiving it as 
meaningless 
1 – 2  –  3  –  4   The script appearing meaningless was 
me imagining it as meaningless 
 
